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SUMMARY
This study examines through a case study of Germany and its politics of
citizenship vis-a-vls members of ethnic minorities a) the deficiencies of a
nationally bound concept of citizenship in countries of immigration; b) the
transformation of citizenship into a concept that is increasingly oblivious to
national borders as a result of international migration and ethnic
heterogeneity. This is a development that takes place despite strenuous
efforts by the nation state to maintain a nationally bounded notion of
citizenship; c) finally, the role of members of ethnic minorities in inducing
this transformation will be analysed by focussing on the case of Berliners
of Turkish origin.
The thesis is an original contribution to the development of sociological
accounts of citizenship for three reasons: First, it integrates three central
debates around citizenship - as regards legal status, rights and
participation. Second, it contributes to the development of a new
dimension to citizenship studies by analysing the social construction of
citizenship from below. Finally, it provides important empirical findings that
illuminate current debates on citizenship which have so far been highly
abstract and theoretical.
The thesis is based on empirical research that was carried out in Berlin in
October/November 1996, from April to June 1997 and in May 1998. In this
context, I conducted interviews with civil servants, officials and politicians
at the national and city level; with members/employees of social initiatives,
academics and journalists. Furthermore, I carried out qualitative, semi-
structured interviews with a) young Berliners of Turkish origin, and with
persons of the same background who are b) active members of German
political parties and trade unions; c) active in immigrant organisations.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship is being smothered by the national embrace. What was in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a liberating and emancipatory
relationship has turned sour. As is the experience of many unhappy
couples, one has moved on and demands changes or even divorce, while
the other desperately tries to hold on to the status quo. One particular
arena where problems in the relationship between citizenship and the
nation-state have unfolded forms the topic of this thesis: namely Germany
and its politics of citizenship vis-a-vis members of ethnic minorities. The
principle aim of this study is to examine through a case study of Germany
a) the deficiencies of a nationally bound concept of citizenship in
immigration countries; b) the transformation of citizenship into a concept
that is increasingly oblivious to national borders as a result of
international migration and ethnic heterogeneity. This is a development
that takes place despite strenuous efforts by the nation state to maintain a
nationally bounded notion of citizenship; c) finally, the role of members of
ethnic minorities in inducing this transformation will be analysed by
focussing on the case of Berliners of Turkish origin.
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THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The nation state has been the primary reference point for both the politics
and the study of citizenship. We may identify two lines of arguments put
forward in accounts that conceptually tie the concept of citizenship to the
nation state: Firstly, the nation state is seen as the principal administrative
and political unit in world politics and is thus understood to be the ultimate
source of decision-making and sovereignty. Its territory is regarded as the
stage where citizenship is practised and its institutions are seen as
prerequisites to guarantee and to maintain the rights and privileges
embedded in the concept of citizenship. Secondly, the 'national
community' - distinguished by a unique blend of shared values and
collective loyalties, language, and common history - is perceived to be the
wider community the citizen belongs to, and identifies with. The individual
'matures' into a citizen by transcending particularistic interests and
loyalties and by identifying with, and participating in the affairs of, the
wider national community. In this context citizenship is seen as both
based upon, and an expression of, a national culture or a national identity
(Smith 1995).
The national closure of citizenship is however being increasingly
challenged. The nation state has on the one hand no longer absolute
power to determine its domestic or international affairs, including
important decisions about social and even political rights. Increasingly it
has to seek solutions in negotiation with a large and growing array of
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additional 'power-containers' (see Giddens 1985) located on multiple
levels of politics (McGrew 1992).1 On the other hand, international
migration movements continue to transform the composition of
contemporary societies into a complex and heterogeneous mixture of
people with diverse affiliations and identities. More and more residents of
contemporary nation states are non-nationals or hold multiple
citizenships. Many 'aliens' have gained access to rights previously
reserved for nationals, and a high proportion of ethnic minority members -
regardless of their citizen status - experience exclusion and
discrimination and are treated as outsiders or 'second class citizens'. As
Ruth Lister has pointed out with characteristic clarity, a crucial question
for academic and political debates on citizenship is: "how useful is a
concept associated with the nation-state at a time when the nation-state is
becoming less pivotal economically and politically and when migration
and asylum-seeking are on the increase? (Lister 1995,p. 1)
Some scholars, such as Jacobson and Soysa/, have already concluded
that citizenship is an obsolete concept. For them the days of citizenship
are numbered and they claim that "national citizenship is losing ground to
a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritorialized
notions of persons' rights" (Soysa/ 1994, p. 3, Jacobson 1996). I remain
sceptical about such an assumption." Although we can undoubtedly
observe a transformation of citizenship, I do not agree that this
transformation will - or should - inevitably result in the disintegration of
citizenship and its replacement by a body of rights that are defined and
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legitimised at the international or supranational level in increasingly
abstract terms. My scepticism is based on the following three arguments:
Firstly, citizenship is a contested concept that has so far not been clearly
defined. To focus the discussion purely on the granting and
institutionalisation of rights leaves out a whole array of other questions
commonly associated with citizenship, most notably those articulated in
the context of the republican and feminist debates where citizenship is
seen as a form of active participation and civic engagement which helps
to engender solidarity and co-operation between members of a society."
Secondly, approaches that presuppose a decline of citizenship highlight
almost exclusively the importance of civil and social rights that are
enjoyed by an increasing number of persons regardless of their legal
citizenship. These authors downplay the importance of political rights
which are in their entirety still inaccessible to non-citizens as these are
deemed to be nonessential (Martiniel/o 1997, p. 640). The importance of
the political dimension of citizenship should not be underestimated. It has
been amply demonstrated this century. The struggle for female suffrage
was an important step on the march towards gender equality." The
colonial subjects of European powers only achieved full citizenship rights
after fierce struggles for independence and the creation of new sovereign
states. In South-Africa non-whites only gained (or regained) political rights
in the 1990s and this led immediately to the ending of white supremacy
and the transfer of political leadership to the black majority. Finally, the
great majority of studies that celebrate the advent of 'post-national'
membership and the prevalence of international human rights do not pay
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enough attention to the - albeit changing - role of the nation state.
Although challenged, the nation state is striving to hold on to its political
power and to maintain the allegiance of its citizens and its control over
them. Its institutions and politics forcefully shape the living conditions of
its population and its territory remains an important arena where the
struggles around citizenship are acted out.
The central aim of this study is to understand those processes which
induce antagonism between a national enclosure of citizenship on the one
hand and the concept's emancipatory objective on the other. Despite
attempts by some scholars to argue that citizenship is no longer a useful
notion, I will argue that contemporary scholarship does not have to
jettison the concept of citizenship, nor should it render the nation state
obsolete in the course of its analysis. In doing so, I will seek to contribute
to the study of citizenship on three.accounts: Firstly, an attempt is made to
add to the focus on 'rights' that characterises critical approaches to
modern citizenship in multi-ethnic countries, by bringing together or
integrating three main dimensions of citizenship - citizenship as a legal
status, citizenship as a set of rights, and citizenship as participation.
Secondly, and directly related, I will go beyond an approach which defines
and discusses citizenship predominantly within the context of state
policies and legislation and will contribute an analysis of the social
construction of citizenship 'from below'." Thirdly, I apply an - admittedly
old-fashioned and in many respects analytically limited - approach and
focus on one national setting. I have chosen Germany as my critical case
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study. This is partly because of my knowledge of German and German
debates, but also because Germany provides an excellent example of an
arena where the battle between traditional nation-state definitions of
citizenship on the one hand and a more broadly defined concept of
citizenship on the other is being fought. This case study will provide
detailed empirical findings that can illuminate current debates on
citizenship which have so far been rather general and highly abstract."
THE GERMAN SETTING
Today, about 7.5 million 'foreigners' live in Germany, constituting nine per
cent of the German population. People of Turkish origin comprise the
largest group with more than two million, the majority of whom have been
resident in Germany for more than ten years, or have been born and
brought up there. It is well known in the academic literature that the
German concept of citizenship is characterised by an exclusionary
approach towards those immigrants and their offspring who are not of
ethnic German origin. As a result only few are holders of a German
passport and, although most members of ethnic minorities have access to
substantial social rights, they are denied - with European citizens
constituting a special case - formal rights of political participation, that is
they cannot vote or stand for elections on the national, regional or local
levels. Furthermore, the well known mantra of Germany's conservative
political establishment that 'Germany is not a country of immigration' in
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conjunction with laws that manifest exclusion as a legal norm have both
generated and reinforced ideas of 'belonging' and 'otherness'. Just how
much the notion that an 'Auslander remains an Auslander ... ' dominates
the German discussion was made transparent to me at an international
conference a few years ago in the USA. A well-known German
demographer produced statistics regarding demographic developments in
Germany during the next two decades. He came to the conclusion that
given a decrease in the German birth-rate, continuous immigration flows
and a comparatively higher birth-rate amongst the 'foreign' population in
Germany, the 'foreign' population will constitute 15 per cent in the year
2010. His presentation caused criticism and concern amongst the
Americans. One American demographer commented poignantly that
clearly, such a result could only occur by assuming that all 'foreigners'
and their offspring will permanently remain 'foreigners' and that it simply
ignores the possibility of naturalisation or, to go one step further, the
inclusion of a ius soli element in Germany's citizenship legislation.
This German demographer may be re-calculating his statistics, as
German citizenship have become more inclusive after all. The first step in
this direction was already made by the former German Minister for the
Interior Wolfgang Schauble (Christian Democratic Union) who introduced
in 1991 changes in Germany's naturalisation law (which came into force in
their current form in 1993). Accordingly, for the first time two groups of
'foreigners' were given the right to become naturalised. On the one hand
adults who have been living in Germany for at least 15 years; on the other
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young people between 16 and 23 years of age who have been resident in
Germany for more than eight years. Schauble's legal changes are seen by
the majority of German academics "asthe first important change in seeking
to establish a more inclusive politics of citizenship (see Klingst, Die Zeit,
14.1.1999).
This first development has been largely ignored in the international - and
in particular in the Anglo-Saxon - academic literature. Here, the German
concept of citizenship is generally defined as being based on 'blood'
('B/utrecht? and as being the antithesis to the French model that is
regarded as a clear example for a territorially based notion of citizenship
(Brubacker 1992). In this context one argument identifies as "Itlhs central
problem in German nationality law... the emergence of multiple
generations of alien residents as a consequence of the jus sanguinis rule"
(Neumann 1995, p. 22). Furthermore, explanations of the ethnic
exclusiveness of German citizenship are primarily of a historical nature
and identify the German history of a "Vo/k-centred" process of
nationbuilding as its main cause (Brubacker 1992).
Both a simplified condemnation of the ius sanguinis principle and the
application of an exclusively historical framework of analysis have from
my point of view led in the past to a rather distorted understanding of
German citizenship politics. On the one hand the granting of citizenship
on the basis of ius sanguinis is by no means a German peculiarity but a
widely, if not universally, applied principle (see Hagedorn 1998,p. 16).As
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a general rule, nation states grant formal citizenship to the offspring of
their nationals regardless of their place of birth. Rather than identifying
the ius sanguinis principle as the main reason for the passing on of
foreigner status over several generations, I will argue that a) the absence
of ius soli as an additional element in Germany's citizenship legislation; b)
obstacles established in the naturalisation process; and c) long-drawn out
bureaucratic procedures appear to be the primary causes. Secondly, I
think it is necessary to highlight the limits of a historical analysis as
offered by Brubacker (1992) whose work has informed much of the
international debate on German citizenship. Influenced by Barth's criticism
of a 'historical mode of explanation' I remain doubtful of a historical
perspective that seeks to analyse contemporary social facts and
structures essentially as a linear continuum of past events (see Barth
1981, p. 6). Such an analytical framework risks the danger of omitting,
neglecting or misinterpreting contemporary processes that may challenge
both an assumed developmental sequence, or the actual present
significance of a historical event. Furthermore; by using a rather inflexible
analytical framework it also fixes .certain aspects of German politics as
essential features, that may be modified but that - like their historical root-
causes - do not vanish.
Today, Germany has reached a critical turning point regarding its formal
citizenship politics. The new German government, a coalition of the Social
Democratic Party and the Green Party intends to introduce new
citizenship legislation. This would allow: 1) adult 'foreigners' to be granted
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the right to become naturalised after eight years, minors after five years
and 'foreign' spouses after three years residence. 2) Dual citizenship for
newly naturalised Germans will be tolerated officially. 3) The new
government will introduce an element of ius soli by granting German
citizenship at birth to those children, whose parents have been born in
Germany or who have migrated to Germany as minors. As the new
German government coalition has only come into power in September of
last year, and as the new law is being strongly resisted by the opposition
and it is unclear whether it will pass in its current torm,' a discussion of
the latest proposals for change is not provided in this thesis. In my
analysis of the legal aspects of citizenship I will exclusively focus on the
current law.
The restrictive nature of German citizenship legislation is only one - yet
the most obvious and arguably the most consequential - manifestation of
the exclusion experienced by most members of ethnic minorities in
Germany." The political assumption underlying German 'immigration
policies', namely that immigration has not taken place and that former
'Gastarbeiter' and their offspring who reside in Germany are not really part
of the German population, has also resulted in their being ignored as
regards the design of social, economic and cultural policies. Although it is
correct to state that hardly anyone "can legally enter the Federal Republic
without immediately being endowed with nearly the full range of social
rights" (Radtke 1994, p. 33) I argue that, due to their marginal or second
class status, members of ethnic minorities cannot access these social
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rights to their full extent. For example, in comparison with the German
population, ethnic minority members have a higher unemployment rate,
particularly regarding long-term and youth unemployment. As a
consequence of their marginal position in the labour market, minority
households have in general less income at their disposal than those of
Germans. Children and young persons of minority background perform far
worse in school than their German counterparts, and members of ethnic
minorities are more likely to live in urban districts with a low tax base and
consequently 'enjoy' poorer quality social facilities. Access to social rights
does not automatically go hand in hand with an actual enjoyment of these
rights, if the underlying policies - as is the case in Germany - fail to meet
particular needs of members of ethnic minorities and neglect their
disadvantaged standing in society. Clearly, such a negligent treatment is
less likely to have adverse consequences for policy makers in a situation
where those affected are not able to express their dissatisfaction at the
ballot box.
Citizenship's ultimate link to the problem of unequal distribution of
resources in society leads us to the third dimension of citizenship to be
discussed in the analysis of the German case study. This is the question
of engagement and participation or, to use a popular catch-phrase,
'citizenship from below'. What strategies do members of ethnic minorities
apply in order to establish themselves as equal members of German
society, both despite, and in light of, their exclusion from formal and
substantial citizenship? Furthermore, what additional 'practices', for
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example as regards religion, do they want to have recognised and
tolerated by the state as complementary and accepted features of
German society? Finally, to what extent do members of ethnic minorities
contribute to, or even induce, a transformation of citizenship in their
endeavour to articulate and to realise their interests?
In order to discuss these questions it is important to carry out the analysis
on two levels. Firstly on the level of 'organised' articulation of interests
and secondly the development of strategies on an every day level.
Regarding the former it becomes apparent that thus far only a marginal,
but currently increasing, number of ethnic minority members have chosen
to further their interests by joining political parties. Outside the 'political
mainstream' however, a plethora of immigrant organisations - according
to the Berlin Institute of Comparatlve Social Research there are around
800 to 1,000 such organisations just in Berlin - seek to advance the
interests of minority members in primarily two ways: a) by providing
crucial social and cultural services that are neglected or ignored by main-
stream society; and b) by trying to incorporate 'minority politics' onto the
agenda of political parties and policy makers. An analysis on the every
day level should capture the attitudes of 'unorganised' members of ethnic
minorities towards, and their practical strategies with regard to, the
German politics of citizenship. What for example are the reasons for
applications for naturalisation, and what are the barriers to undertake this
step? To what extent is the rejection of dual nationality an important issue
for ethnic minorities in Germany?
12
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
This dissertation is divided into three main parts: firstly an analysis of
theoretical and methodological issues; secondly an analysis of citizenship
as enforced and administered by the state; and finally an analysis of
citizenship demands and strategies adopted by members of the ethnic
minorities in Germany.
In the following chapter I will outline the underlying methodology and
applied methods for carrying out this research. Chapter three is
concerned with challenges to citizenship that occur in countries of
immigration. In order to discuss the value of citizenship at a time when the
nation state is starting to lose some of its supremacy it seems logical to
first pose the question: to what extent citizenship is actually tied to the
nation state? This discussion is followed by an outline of those elements
that are commonly attributed to modern citizenship and a summary of the
concept's conceptualisation in modern political thought. Third, I will
discuss problems that occur between three main tenets of modern
citizenship on the one hand (namely the insistence on the concept's
national enclosure, its claim of universality, and its traditional location in a
narrowly defined public realm) and the needs of immigration countries on
the other.
In chapters four and five I will provide detailed information on citizenship
legislation and policies on both the national and the local level (Germany,
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Berlin and one city district, Kreuzberg). Both chapters aim at describing
the context in which the struggles around citizenship takes place. The
main concern of chapter four is to provide an overview of immigration
flows into Germany, to outline the fundamental principals guiding
governmental reaction to migratory movements and to analyse in detail
both the legal framework for the allocation of citizenship in Germany as
well as recent data on naturalisation. Given the current political debate,
particular focus is given to the question of dual citizenship. Chapter five
will deal with the politics of citizenship on the Uindenevel (Berlin) and the
local level (Kreuzberg). I have chosen to narrow the scope of analysis to
the Uinderlurban level for a number of reasons. Most importantly,
elements of citizenship policies both regarding its formal attribution (for
example, toleration of dual citizenship, discretionary allocation of
citizenship), and its social dimension (for example education) fall under
the competence of German Lander. Furthermore, conflicts around
unequal distribution of resources are often fought and conditioned by
urbanllocal conditions.
In chapters six, seven and eight I will analyse the strategies of Berliners of
Turkish origin in order to establish themselves as equal members of
German society. Chapter six is based on interviews with young Berliners
of Turkish origin. These interviews provide rare insights into young
people's attitudes towards, and actually applied strategies with regard to,
formal citizenship. Although I argue that they actively contribute to the
transformation of citizenship on an every-day level, I will however
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emphasise at the same time the limits of their agency. This is particularly
constrained by their disadvantaged position in the area of education.
Chapters seven and eight are concerned with forms and content of
political organisation of Berliners of Turkish origin. In this context, I have
carried out interviews with individuals who are involved in mainstream
German party politics and those working in immigrant organisations.
Focus is given to those aspects of their political involvement that
transcend the scope of what is traditionally perceived as 'national political
affairs'. In chapter seven I will a) analyse the motives for the involvement
of Berliners of Turkish origin in political parties, i.e. the GOU, FOP, O/E
GRUNEN, POS and the SPO, b) discuss their political concerns and c) the
ways in which they seek to articulate their interests within the party
framework and the problems they encounter by seeking to put their
interests onto the parties' agenda. In chapter nine I will first provide an
overview of central aspects concerning the emergence of organisations of
Berliners of Turkish origin. Second the content and form of the work of
three immigrant organisations will be discussed, these are the Ttutascne
Gemeinde zu Ber/in (TGB), the Turklscner Bund Ber/in-Brandenburg
(TBB) and the Turklscher Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB). The main
argument in these chapters is that - within the limits of restrictive
structural conditions - Berliners of Turkish origin mediate and enforce the
transformation of modern citizenship.
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Chapter nine will summarise the main findings. They will be discussed in
the context of Ruth Lister's question posed at the beginning as to whether
the concept of citizenship retains any value in contemporary societies.
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ENDNOTES CHAPTER 1
The dispersion of national power changes the politics of citizenship: On the one
hand, it is increasingly difficult for national governments to determine and to guarantee
citizens' rights independently from other political forces. In this context, not only external
influences (e.g. European legislation to be adopted by member states of the EU are
encoded and enforced by such bodies as the International Court and the European Court
of Justice) can be decisive, but also challenges from within, for example by city or
regional governments. On the other hand, participation and even representation in the
polity are increasingly matters beyond the jurisdiction of national governments and nation
states. A good example for this is the attempt by the European Union to create a
European citizenship and to define the political rights of European citizens with the
member states by granting local and European voting rights (Meehan 1993).
2 For an interesting critical discussion of an assumed expansion of human rights
cross-nationally, see Sterett (forthcoming).
3 See for example Ruth Lister 1997; Carol Pateman 1970; Henry Tam 1998;
Michael Walzer 1983, 1992.
4 It is also surprisingly recent, so that in Switzerland female suffrage was only
achieved in 1970.
5 In this context Ruth Lister's work has greatly influenced my ideas. She seeks to
establish a "synthesising thread" between the two main traditions of citizenship, civic
republicanism and liberal rights, via the idea of human agency (Lister 199n.
6 An attempt in this direction was made by Soysal, however she tries to analyse
"cross-national patterns of incorporation" of "Turkish guestworkers" in six European
countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) and -
due to the scope of study - is not able to provide detailed empirical analyses.
7 Currently the CDU/CSU collects signatures against a formal toleration of dual
citizenship as a matter of law and demands the holding of a referendum on this topic
(see a discussion in Der Spiegel, 11.1.1999). In February 1999, the new government
seems to backing out of its proposals regarding dual citizenship. After it lost the regional
election in Hesse at the 8th of February - with significant consequences regarding the
Red/Green majority in Germany's upper house, the Bundesrat, voices from within the
upper echelons of the SPD already point out that "one should find a consensus in this
question" (Oskar Lafontaine, SPD Finance Minister (chancellor) and head of party,
Frankfurter Rundschau 9.2.1999).
8 The special case of EU citizens residing in Germany will be discussed in the
.course of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
METHODS AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis is based on empirical research that was carried out in Berlin in
October/November 1996, from April to June 1997 and in May 1998.
During this fieldwork, I have collected primary and secondary literature
and data sources that are of relevance for the German case study. This
collection of material was supplemented through interviews with a small
number of a) civil servants, officials and politicians at the city level; and b)
with members/employees of social initiatives. Additional essential
background information was collected in meetings with academics and
journalists. Furthermore, I conducted qualitative, semi-structured
interviews with a) young Berliners of Turkish origin, and with persons of
the same background who are b) active members of German political
parties and trade unions; c) active in immigrant orqanlsatlons.'
The empirical material is used as a means to contribute to and develop
the theory of citizenship. By seeking to analyse the concept of citizenship
on the basis of qualitative data, this thesis represents what Schatzman
and Strauss categorise as an 'analytical description' (1973).
THREE METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A crucial first step in any form of sociological/scientific inquiry is that of
defining clearly the phenomenon under investigation (Snizek et a11979, p.
81). What exactly are we looking at and why do we think that our chosen
focus will provide valuable sociological insights, that is knowledge about
society and the individuals therein. This thesis, as has been pointed out
before, aims at a) examining the limits of modern citizenship in
immigration countries, b) identifying those processes that induce a
transformation of citizenship; and c) analysing the role played by
members of ethnic minorities in bringing about this transformation. In
doing so I seek to add insight to three questions that are at the heart of
the study of sociology. First, what are the causes for, and the effects of,
social exclusion? Second, what strategies are, or can be employed, to
overcome social exclusion? Finally, how do individual and or group
actions relate to structural conditions and vice versa?
It is of course stating the obvious, that the process of identifying and
formulating the research problem does not start from point zero. Rather, it
is influenced by certain sociological traditions, or more generally, by
approaches that exist in the wider field of social science. The employment
of such approaches, as Treibel has pointed out, is not always an entirely
conscious decision, but can at the same time be a more indistinct process
as our analytical perception is influenced by arguments that are almost
automatically applied (see Treibel1993, p. 10).
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1) This thesis is in general orientated towards those approaches that seek
to overcome the dualism between micro- and macroscopic sociology, i.e.
that focus on the interrelationship between state, society and individuals
and/or groups. Juckes and Barresi have pointed out that difficulties that
arise in developing a perspective of the "individual society connection"
have resulted from "theorists' attempting to reduce society to (a mass of)
individual action, or individuals to (functionaries in a constituting and
coercing) society." (Juckes and Barresi 1993, p. 197). The discussion
against the reductionism of either of the two approaches has led some
theorists to attempt a combination of both. Simmel for example, suggests
that each can be relevant in order to obtain different, but equally
important, perspectives into the object under investigation
We obtain different pictures ... when we see it at a distance
of two, or of five, or of ten yards. At each distance ...
however, the picture is "correcf' in its particular way ... a
view gained at any distance whatever has its own
justification. It cannot be replaced or corrected by any other
view emerging at another distance. In a similar way, when
we look at human life from a certain distance, we see each
individual in his precise differentiation from all other. But if
we increase our distance, the single individual disappears,
and there emerges, instead, the picture of a "society" with its
own forms and colors. (Simme11970, quoted in Bealer 1979,
p.90)
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Others seek to establish a single model in which both approaches are
combined. This thesis largely conforms to this perspective. In my analysis,
I do not only focus on the politics of citizenship as enforced and
administered by the German state and its exclusionary outcome, but I try
at the same time to conceptualise citizenship as a process that is altered
by 'semiautonomous' individuals (see Elias 1970, p. 11), in this case
Berliners of Turkish origin. In particular the concept of 'agency' has
informed my approach. Agency can be broadly defined as ''the ability to
engage in intentional, goal-directed action" (Juckes and Barresi 1993, p.
202)2 This action however does not take place in a vacuum, but is both
embedded in social relations (Gould 1988) and affected by social
structures (Giddens 1988).
2) Furthermore, some scholars have applied the concept of 'agency' as
the "synthesising thread" between the two historical traditions of
citizenship, the republican and the liberal debate (see in particular Lister
1997, but also Turner 1993). Lister's adoption of a critical synthetic
approach holds two benefits. First, citizenship emerges as a dynamic
concept in which "process and outcome stand in dialectical relationship to
each other" (Lister 1997. P. 36). Second, it establishes a dialogue
between the main approaches of citizenship that is generally regarded as
crucial for the advancement of citizenship studies (Dagger 1997). By
interlinking three dimensions of citizenship, that of citizenship as a status,
citizenship as a system of rights, and citizenship as a form of participation,
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I have adopted the central elements of this discussion, while at the same
time contributing to it.
3) Citizenship studies are in need of an empirical dimension. To date,
there has been little empirical investigation within citizenship studies in
general, and in those that are concerned with the transformation of
citizenship in particular. Accounts of multi-cultural, transnational, or global
citizenship (Kymlicka 1995, 8aubock 1994, Turner 1993), post-national
membership (8oysal 1994), or multi-layered feminist perspectives on
citizenship (Lister 1997) are largely formulated by applying ideas from an
'established formal theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 33). Only a few,
such as Ireland's (1994) empirical study on political participation, or case
studies dealing with 'citizenship construction' at the city level have sought
to base their theoretical discussion on empirical material (see
Environment and Planning 1994, vol. 26). The qualitative research that I
have carried out in Berlin will illuminate what have thus far been
predominantly abstract and theoretical accounts of citizenship.
METHODS
Before describing the actual techniques of how the empirical material of
this thesis was collected, I would first like to explain my choice of
geographical focus (Germany and Berlin/Kreuzberg). I have chosen
Germany as my critical case study; partly because of my knowledge of the
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German language, German debates and existing academic contacts in
Germany. However, over and above this, Germany provides - as has
been argued before - an excellent example of an arena where conflicts
have arisen between the national enclosure of citizenship and the
struggle for a more broadly and inclusively defined concept. The analysis
has been narrowed down further to the level of Berlin and one of its
districts, Kreuzberg, for a number of reasons: a) I had to make the
empirical investigation of this study manageable and realistic; b) every
capital city has perhaps a greater symbolic presence in the 'nation's' self-
image than that of other cities; c) some aspects of formal and social
citizenship fall under the authority of Germany's Bundeslender (Berlin is
one) and not under that of the national government; d) the notion of the
city is implicit in may discussions on citizenship; e) conflicts around social
rights are often fought over and conditioned by urban/local conditions; f)
strategies by individual members of ethnic minorities to establish
themselves as equal members of German society are largely directed at
their immediate environment and social relations; g) the political
involvement of members of ethnic minorities tends to be located at the
local/city level, owing to their general exclusion and underrepresentation
at the national political level (Holston and Appadurai 1996; PincetI1994).
Furthermore, I have chosen to focus on one minority group, namely
Berliners of Turkish origin. The reason for choosing this particular group
is threefold. On the one hand, Berliners of Turkish origin constitute the
largest minority group in Germany/Berlin. On the other, people of Turkish
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origin are the main reference point in the debate around citizenship in
Germany and are themselves most actively involved in this debate.
Finally, as regards political participation, Berliners of Turkish origin are
involved in mainstream German parties and have set up a plethora of
immigrant organisations that are concerned with a wide variety of issues.
People of Turkish origin are of fundamental importance to German politics
and provide a litmus test in the national debate around citizenship and
integration policy.
A variety of methods were used in the course of this thesis. In addition to
an extensive and detailed critical review of secondary literature on
citizenship, I have collected and analysed primary and secondary source
materials on German/Berlin citizenship policies. The focus here was on
the attribution of rights, the emergence of dual citizenship, policies
regarding naturalisation and access to citizenship as well as the socio-
economic position of Berliners of Turkish origin in Berlin and in the district
of Kreuzberg. Furthermore, academic literature dealing with German
immigration policies was critically analysed and incorporated.
The data collection through primary and secondary literature and data
sources was supplemented and extended through six sets of semi-
structured interviews. At this stage it is important to emphasise that I had
lived in Berlin for many years prior to migrating to the UK and have
worked on related issues at the Berliner Institut fUr Vergleichende
Sozialforschung (BIVS - Berlin Institute for Contemporary Social Studies).
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In addition, I had conducted a short study on German citizenship policies
for the European Union Human Capital and Mobility Programme. This
background provided me with ample personal and professional contacts
that were invaluable for conducting the qualitative research in Berlin. For
the establishment of new contacts, particularly those with young Berliners
of Turkish origin and those who work in immigrant organisations, it was
however beneficial that I no longer live and work in Berlin. I frequently
discovered that it was a positive asset to be affiliated to an English, as
opposed to a German university, and the fact that I live in London was
credited by the youngsters.
The first set of interviews included employees of the offices of the
Aus/anderbeauftragten at the national (one branch is located in Berlin
rather than Bonn), Landes-, and local level. These interviews were
beneficial in getting up-to-date information on, and improved
understanding of, governmental policies and discussions as regards
citizenship. In order to obtain a better insight into the wider social context
of the city, and in particular into the distinct situation in Kreuzberg, I
conducted a second set of interviews with members/employees of social
and anti-racist initiatives in this district. Additional and essential
background information was thirdly collected in meetings/interviews with
academics and journalists.
Access to Berliners of Turkish origin who are active members in German
political parties and trade unions was unproblematic. Members of the
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Abgeordnetenhaus were contacted directly. There were extremely open
and spent much time in discussing their views and aspects of their work.
These interviews provided further contact to other Berliners of Turkish
origin who are actively involved in political parties and trade unions and
with whom I conducted interviews subsequently.
A fifth set of semi-structured interviews was carried out with Berliners of
Turkish origin who were organised in immigrant organisations. These
were a) two umbrella organisations that are primarily concerned with
immigration politics, i.e. that focus on the improvement of the political and
socio-economic situation of people of Turkish origin in Germany, or more
specifically in Berlin (the TOrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB) and the
Turkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB)); b) organisations of Berliners
of Turkish origin that represent the interests of particular groups within the
'Turkish' population in Berlin, these were the students' organisation
Turkisches Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum (BTBTM) and the
women's association Turkiscner Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB); the
Kurdistan Kultur- und Hilfsverein e.V. and the Kulturzentrum Anatolischer
Alewiten, c) organisations with a primarily Islamic orientation, these were
the Milli Gonse and the Verein Vergessene Jugend e. V. (the Association of
Forgotten Youth). Key questions in the interviews concerned the focus of
their work, their co-operation with other groups, the form of their activities,
established contacts with policy-makers and bureaucrats, and their
demands vis-a-vis formal German citizenship policies.
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The organisations were chosen with the help of computerised data and
address lists at the Berlin Institute for Comparative Social Research along
with expert advice (academics, journalists, politicians/bureaucrats)
regarding relevance and access. With the exception of Islamic
organisations, it was unproblematic to set up interviews. In the case of the
Milli GarOs and the Verein Vergessene Jugend e. V. the situation was
more complicated. This was not however due to the fact that these groups
were less open or less willing to give interviews in principle. Rather, the
extremely negative media coverage on the 'danger of Islamic
Fundamentalism' at the time (Spring and Summer 1997), in particular
regarding the work of the Milli GarOs, caused great concern amongst the
organisation's leadership and understandably resulted in their hesitance
to make themselves available for further interviews. I remained in contact
with both organisations throughout"Autumn and Winter 1997 and was able
to conduct interviews in May 1998.
However, in the course of analysing my qualitative material, I finally
decided to focus on the work of just three out of a total of eight
organisations, namely on the work of the two umbrella organisations and
the women's organisation. An inclusion of all associations would have
gone beyond the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, regarding an
adequate analysis of the work of the Kurdish and Alevi organisations as
well as of the Milli Gotue, a more detailed understanding and analysis of
Turkish politics is necessary. This is not to say that these organisations
are primarily involved in what is generally referred to as 'home-orientated'
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politics, but their interconnections with conflicts (and institutions) in
Turkey, that in many respects influence their work in Germany, are
complex and require a well informed and clearly focused investigation.
Finally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 25 (13 male, 12
female) young persons of Turkish origin aged 16 to 24. The content of the
interviews concerned primarily the attitudes and interests of young people
vls-a-vis the question of formal citizenship, their perception of their
acceptance by wider German society, experiences of discrimination, and
their future prospects. Access wasestablished a) through three schools in
Kreuzberg, including a Haupt-, Real-, and Gesamtschule (in 13 cases); b)
one girls' group in Kreuzberg (in 4 cases); and two immigrant
organisations (in 8 cases). Although the interviews are exclusively used
as illustrations and - given the small sample - not as representative
material, I have conducted interviews with equal numbers of young
women and men. Furthermore, I have sought to include young people
from a variety of social, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The possibility
of achieving this aim was increased by accessing young persons through
different school forms and immigrant organisations.
Before conducting the interviews with young people, I met with teachers,
headteachers and social workers in order to guarantee their consent.
Furthermore, these professionals were important in establishing contact
and facilitating the interviews. The headteachers and teachers of the
three schools granted their pupils leave from lessons for the duration of
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the interview and gave me permission to conduct the interviews within
school premises. Beforehand I had to secure the permission of the
Department of Education of the Berlin Senate. The interviews with girls
from the girls' group and young persons affiliated to immigrant
organisations were also conducted within the premises of these
centres/organisations. Only one interview was carried out in a private flat.
For the atmosphere during the interviews it was important to meet the
young persons 'on their turf' and furthermore, to meet them in groups. I
only made appointments in three cases to meet young persons
individually. These three were a little older (18-24) and felt more
comfortable in meeting me on their own. However, as I spent whole
mornings or afternoons in the company of the groups, and as we did not
only sit in one room in a rather strict interview situation, it was also
possible to speak to the young people individually, or in groups of two.
During the fieldwork, care was taken to explain the nature and intent of
the research and to secure the consent of the interviewees. Participants
were asked beforehand, whether they agreed to the interview being
recorded. In most cases the interviewees agreed. All the interviews with
young people were recorded and they were assured that their anonymity
was preserved. During those interviews where I could not use the tape-
recorder, I took extensive notes which were written up in the form of a
report immediately after the interview, or - depending on circumstances -
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later the same day. Recorded interviews were transcribed, and the
original transcription was later organised according to sub-headings.
A note on the translation of German material: My translation of quoted text
from German sources (publications or reports) is indicated in the text. I
have not indicated the translation of quotes taken from interviews, which
were all conducted in German, and have been translated by me. In this
context it is important to point out one factor that characterises the
translated quotes of young people. The quality of their German was, at
times, rather poor. However, given the fact that the content of their
statements is being analysed, it was from my point of view more beneficial
to focus in the translation on content rather than form. As a result the
translation is in some cases more articulate than the original.
A note on terminology: "'Gastarbeiter' is a word I love. When I encounter it
I always picture two people: one is just sitting there as a guest, and the
other is working" (Emine Sevgi Ozdamer)3 Writing about the situation of
ethnic minorities in Germany bears a whole array of difficulties with regard
to terminology. Terms like 'Gastarbeiter', 'foreigner' or 'migrants' are still
used, but have been avoided in this thesis (or put into inverted commas).
They contain assumptions about temporariness or recent arrival that do
not capture the experience of settled ethnic minority groups. Furthermore,
they add to the construction of ethnic minorities as 'outsiders' and not as
full members of German society. The application of the term 'immigrant'
also contains difficulties as a large proportion of the second generation
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was born in Germany and did not immigrate. When using the term
'immigrant' in this thesis, I refer to the first generation, otherwise I will
refer to 'immigrants and their offspring', or more generally 'ethnic
minorities'.
However, when referring to statistical data, using the term 'ethnic
minorities' includes some inconsistencies. German statistics are
exclusively based on categories reflectlnq the Individual's nationality and
not his or her ethnic background. That means for example that the number
of 'Turkish' residents in Berlin is not congruent with the number of people
of Turkish origin as some have become naturalised. With an increase of
naturalisation rates and the possible introduction of elements of the ius
soli principle, it is likely that debates similar to those around the census in
Britain are also going to take place in Germany. The term 'people' or
'Berliners of Turkish origin' as used throughout this thesis does not refer
to an ethnic background, but to the country of origin, as it also includes for
example, Kurds or Alevis.
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ENDNOTES CHAPTER 2
2
A list of interviews can be found in the Annex.
For a discussion on 'agency' see: Bhaskar 1979, Giddens 1991, James 1984.
3 Emine Sevgi Ozdamer is an actress and author who writes and publishes her
work in German. She was quoted in Hotrocks and Kolinsky 1996.
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Chapter 3
CITIZENSHIP: THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY
"The urge forward along the path [towards an
ideal of citizenship] ... is an urge towards a
fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the
stuff of which the status is made and an
increase in the number of those on whom the
status is bestowed." (T.H. Marshall 1950).
Citizenship is a contested concept. Looking at the endless list of
publications dealing with this subject, any commentator is left somewhat
puzzled and confused regarding the variety of foci that are discussed.
There is no one accepted theory of citizenship that can be easily applied
as the wider analytical frame for academic investigation (see Kymlicka
and Norman 1994; Martiniello 1997). Consequently, attempts that deal
with contemporary challenges for, and the transformation of, citizenship -
as does this thesis - are based on different starting points and come to
conclusions that often appear to be unconnected, conflicting or even
mutually exclusive.
The central task for the advance of citizenship studies is to initiate a
dialogue between distinct discourses. This - as has been pointed out
before - is attempted in this study. The first step along this difficult path
will be undertaken in this chapter: I will try to incorporate three debates
concerning the subject of citizenship, namely those that emphasise the
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formal aspects of citizenship, its perception as a set of rights, and its
participatory dimensions. Such an approach will throw light from different
abstract angles upon the central questions of this chapter: Why is a
nationally based concept of citizenship inadequate for meeting the needs
of immigration countries? At what points can we observe citizenship
becoming increasingly oblivious to national boundaries?
The structure of this chapter is as follows, First, I will discuss the issue of
whether citizenship is inextricably linked to the nation state. Second,
those elements that are commonly attributed to modern citizenship shall
be elucidated and its conceptualisation in modern political thought
outlined. Finally, I will analyse the benefits, limits and fallacies of this
concept in the context of immigration countries.
CITIZENSHIP AND THE NATION STATE
A reasonable starting point for a discussion about the value of citizenship
at a time when a) the role of the nation state appears to have become less
pivotal and b) ethnically heterogeneous societies challenge a traditional
perception of 'national communities', is the question of whether citizenship
is inextricably linked to nationalism, national identity and the nation-state.
If this is the case, any attempt to transform it into a concept that is
sensitive towards the needs of contemporary societies would by definition
be doomed from the start.
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Bryan Turner contends that contemporary ideas on citizenship are
essentially modern and emerged as a result of the French and Industrial
Revolutions. His claim to citizenship's modernity is based on the
assumption:
...that the evolution of citizenship participation is founded
on a number of structural and cultural preconditions: a
city culture, secularization, the decline of particularistic
values, the emergence of the idea of a public realm, the
erosion of particularistic commitments and the
administrative framework of the nation-state. (Turner
1993, p. i)
What has to be stressed here is one rather crucial and obvious element of
citizenship that is implied in Turner's approach, but one that is all too
often neglected - namely the fact that citizenship depends on structural
conditions. As Turner points out, modern citizenship is a distinct form of
citizenship that differs fundamentally from classical, Roman, or medieval
concepts. It could only arise on the basis of certain structural conditions
that had developed over time. Both the form and the content of citizenship
are thus not static or fixed but they have changed and shifted according to
transformations of the structural conditions that gave rise to the concept's
principal elements in the first place. A prerequisite of, and the motor for,
these transformations and for changes in the concept of citizenship are -
as Turner has argued - ruptures in class relations (Turner 1986, 1993).
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"[T]he political, legal, territorial and moral boundaries of citizenship
change only when the existing class relations are threatened by the
emergence of new forces" (lsln 1997, p. 118). Citizenship is thus
essentially a reflection and an outcome of struggles over resources and
privileges in society. The perception of citizenship as such a 'mirror
image' and an emphasis on its conditions rather than on its particular
content (/sin 1997) is a useful way to theorise its transformational
potential.
The work of Turner (1986, 1990)· Mann (1986, 1987) and more recent
contributions by scholars such as Engin F. Isin (1997) have helped to
understand the shifting nature of citizenship, both with regard to time and
place. Isin - basing his argument on Mann's exposition in The Sources of
Social Power (1986) - seeks to establish a theoretical and empirical
framework toward a genealogy of the citizen and highlights the episodic
nature of the concept of citizenship. He describes class, territory and
capital as conditions of citizenship and he outlines significant historical
episodes "in which these conditions created different ideal types of
citizen: warrior-citizen, peasant-citizens, patrician-citizen, plebeian-
citizen, artisan-citizen, bourgeois-citizen, and worker-citizen." (lsin 1997,
p. 115)
Isin defines classes in the Weberian sense as a group of individual people
who are in a similar market situation by sharing similar access to
resources or forms of capital. 1 The access to different forms of capital
36
(means of warfare, property, cultural capital/knowledge) conditions the
power that classes have at their disposal. A class can only effectively
challenge established power relations when it gains new or increased
access to forms of capital. Resulting demands that are formulated to
ensure access to political and economic privileges and resources,
transform the content and the form of citizenship.
A second structural condition is - according to /sin - the territory. He
defines citizenship as a 'territorial institution' and states that struggles
over privileges and rights have taken place within territorial boundaries
which were the physical reflection of socio-economic and political
interdependencies and power relations. "As citizenship embodies political,
legal and moral boundaries within which a political practice becomes
possible, it also defines territorial boundaries within which other
boundaries gain content" (/sin 1997, p. 119). For most of its existence, the
principal territory for the practice of citizenship has been the city and "Illt
was only in modernity that the territorial boundaries of citizenship moved
beyond the city and gained content at the level of the nation-state" (/sin
1997,p.119).
It might be useful at this stage to point to three pre-modern developments
which were both decisive for this transformation and which illustrate the
relationship between territory and power relatlons'r First, with the rise of
absolute monarchies after the 16th century, the medieval pattern of
political life - i.e. the supremacy of autonomous jurisdictions - was
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destroyed and replaced by the concentration of power in the hands of the
king; hence the centre of power was transferred from the city to the
central administration of territorial states. Bendix, adopting Tocqueville's
analysis formulated in The Old Regime and the Revolution, describes how
the corporate identity of these autonomous jurisdictions has been fully
eradicated by the ancien regime. The granting of privileges (e.g. tax
exemptions) to the urban nobility procured their consent to royal
absolutism and although the city merchants as a result harboured a
substantial degree of anti-aristocratic sentiment they conceded in order to
guarantee preferential treatment for themselves. "[N]othing had been left
that could obstruct the central government, but, by the same token,
nothing could shore it up" (Tocqueville, quoted in Bendix 1977, p. 58).
Second, in medieval political life the participation in the struggles over
resources and privileges depended on hereditary privilege or institutional
immunity as in the case of the Church or municipal corporations. Rights
and liberties were not granted to individuals but to corporations or estates
who demanded recognition of new and autonomous jurisdictions.
Peasants, workmen or artisans were only indirectly - in their role as
subjects of an autonomous sovereign, i.e. as fiefs of a lord or members of
a guild or town - involved in polltlcal action. With the rise of absolute
monarchies "a new pattern of class relations emerges, replacing the
earlier traditional one by an individualistic authority relationship" (Bendix
1977, p. 67). Third, this new pattern of class relations resulted in new
forms of conflict and the emergence of a new set of ideas vls-a-vls the
status of individuals. According to Bendix,
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ltlhe appeals of populist legitimism and the claim ... to be
'fathers of their people' and 'first servants of the state' are
harbingers of equalitarianism and the nation-state in
societies marked by hereditary privilege and great
differences in rank. Where all people have rights, where all
are the subjects of one king, where the king in turn
exercises supreme authority over everyone - we get a first
intimation of 'national citizenship' (Bendix 1977,p. 57).3
However, citizenship's relationship with, and its subsequent
transformation within, the borders of the nation state has not resulted in
the emergence of one single concept. Similar to the differences that
appear in the concept of citizenship over time, significant differences also
occur within specific national settings. In this context, it was Mann (1987)
who provided first systematic arguments. Criticising the Marshallian
account of citizenship as one that exclusively describes the British (or
even English) situation, Mann develops a comparative framework that
distinguishes five 'strategies of citizenship' that have been pursued by
different advanced industrial countries: liberal (the United States and
Switzerland), reformist (Brltaln'') authoritarian monarchist (18/19th century
Germany, Russia, Austria), fascist (Nazi Germany) and authoritarian
socialist strategies (Soviet Union) (Mann 1987).
The introduction of a comparative angle as proposed by Mann is
perceived as a major theoretical contribution towards "the understanding
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of the historical processes of citizenship formation" (Turner 1990, p. 197).
Yet, I disagree with two assumptions that underlie Mann's argument:
Mann's understanding of national 'citizenship strategies' is based on the
assumption that citizenship is a process handed down from above, Le. he
regards citizenship as a ruling class strategy. Furthermore, Mann focuses
exclusively on class relations and does not consider the impact of other
conflicts in the transformation of citizenship, that for example occur along
the lines of gender or ethnicity (Turner 1990 pp. 197-201). In doing so
"Mann's analytical framework appears to preclude any ... consideration of
the impact of new social movements on the expansion of citizenship from
below" (Turner 1990, p. 200). This however is precisely what I will seek to
argue with the example of ethnic minorities in Germany.
So far, I have sought to highlight the dependency of the concept of
citizenship on structural conditions and accordingly to delineate
citizenship as a flexible and constantly changing concept. The nation-
state has not given birth to citizenship per se, but to particular forms of
citizenship. These forms are currently challenged by, and in tension with,
developments that undermine the integrity and supremacy of the nation-
state and notions of a national community.
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CITIZENSHIP IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
In order to identify those elements of modern citizenship that are
incompatible or stand in tension with the social and political reality of
immigration countries, it is important firstly to outline the concept's
conceptualisation in modern political thought. As pointed out above,
citizenship is a contested concept and a clear and exhaustive definition of
its main principles have not been elaborated. For the sake of simplicity
and relevance to this thesis, I will restrict myself to three main elements
that are commonly referred to in the literature: citizenship as membership,
as a set of rights and duties, and as a form of political participation and
engagement.
(1) Citizenship as the formal membership of a state, or nominal citizenship
(Baub6ck 1994), determines "those who are, and who are not, members
of a common society" (Barbalet 1988, p.tt. In this context citizenship
serves two functions: firstly, in international law it is a means to associate
a person to the authority of one state, and thus establishes the
sovereignty of a particular state over individuals. Secondly, on the
national level, citizenship functions as a means to draw the line between
the "indigenous" and the "foreign" population of a particular state (PreuB
1993).
(2) Being a formal member of a state recognised in international law
means having access to a full set of rights. According to the Marshallian
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distinction, these are civil, political and social rights. They are, in
principle, provided for every formal member of any given society and go
beyond human rights (for example parnclpatlon in national elections,
access to national welfare provisions). The provision of, and access to,
rights - particularly social rights - is regarded as a means of achieving
greater social and economic equality within society.
The common starting point in sociological discussions about citizen's
rights is the work of T.H. Marshall. Describing modern citizenship as a
system of rights which both emerged from market relations and supported
them, Marshall puts at the heart of his analysis the constant tension
between the inequalities of the class system and the unaccountability of
the marketplace on the one hand and the liberal demand for social and
political equality on the other (Barba/et, 1993, pp. 37-38). Citizenship is
seen as a "buffer" and thus as a means of guaranteeing the equality for
members of the national society. Marshall is in particular concerned with
social rights and sees the role of the welfare system as enabling
disadvantaged citizens to exercise civil and political rights fully by
providing basic needs. Thus, social citizenship is regarded as the
"principal political means for resolving, or at least containing, those
contradictions" (Turner, 1990, p. 191).
For Marshall, "citizenship in general involves an equality of membership
status and of ability to participate in a society" (Roche 1992, p. 19). It is
important to highlight that Marshall stresses that for him "[e]quality of
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status is more important than equality of income" (Marshall 1950, p. 56).
In his view a manual worker might accept that he (sic) earns less money
than a clerk, as long as he possesses - via the status as equal citizen -
the same access to social rights (education, health etc.) (Marshall 1950,
p. 82). From my point of view Marshall's account of social rights can be
best understood with a metaphor he applies himself: in his discussion of
whether "there are natural limits to the ... drive towards greater social and
economic equality" (Marshall 1950, p. 48) Marshall poses the question as
to whether it is possible to convert the design of society from that of a
skyscraper to that of a bungalow (Marshall 1950, p. 47). He draws the
conclusion that the answer has to be no. The structure of modern society
is set by capitalism and is thus by definition characterised by a hierarchy
of social classes. The transformation of the skyscraper into a bungalow
could only be achieved by the dismantlement of capitalist structures - and
thus the cradle of modern citizenship and the financial source of the
modern welfare system. This certainly is a scenario which contradicts both
Marshall's theoretical considerations and his political convictions.
Remaining with his metaphor, Marshall's idea of social citizenship does
not pull down the skyscraper, but equips it with a sufficient number of
stairs and lifts which guarantee access to the upper floors and provide
equal services for all stories of the building.
(3) The rights debate which is particularly prominent in Britain is
challenged by a variety of approaches that emphasise the duties,
responsibillties" and virtues of citizenship. Without discussing the duties
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discourse" let me outline the main ideas within these approaches that
emphasise political participation and civic engagement - as this will be of
crucial importance later. Generally referred to as the republican tradition,
the emphasis here is on "the public community and political participation
therein'" (Lister 1995, p.e). The citizen is primarily regarded as an active
and responsible participant and contributor to the 'common good'. It is
argued that an exclusive focus on the citizen as bearer of certain rights
promotes first of all self-interest and thus carries the danger of 'blinding'
the individual to the wider needs of the community (Dagger 1997, p. 3).
Responsible activity can either involve the fulfilment of citizen's duties -
such as voting, paying taxes or acting as a juror - or forms of political
involvement and political participation (other than voting). An activity
becomes responsible and turns into a citizen's activity if a) it is an activity
carried out in the public domain; and b) it goes beyond self-interest and
serves a general public good.
I will argue below that these three traditional perceptions of modern
citizenship - citizenship as membership of a national community, equality
of status as guarantor of equality of opportunity, and citizenship as a form
of political participation that transcends particularity in order to secure a
common good - stand in tension to the realities and needs of poly-ethnic
societies.
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CHALLENGES TO MODERN CITIZENSHIP
T.H. Marshall regarded the advent of social citizenship as the end of the
long chapter of Europe's history of inequality - not a surprising view for his
time. However, many of the post-Marshallian developments, most
importantly large scale post-war migration and the transformation of
European states into increasingly heterogeneous societies as well as the
'de-centred character of politics' (McGrew 1992) and the profound
dismantling of the Marshallian 'buffer' - the welfare state - open new
chapters.
For the protagonists of one of these post-Marshallian chapters - migrants
and ethnic minorities - national modern citizenship presents itself in many
respects not as an emancipatory and inclusive concept but rather as a
means for, and a signifier of, their exclusion from 'mainstream' society.
However, the inability of modern national citizenship to function as an
inclusive concept in societies that are characterised by diversity - and
thus to adequately react to the needs of today's societies - at the same
time undermines citizenship's existing form and therefore poses a
challenge to the legal and political framework according to which,
citizenship is implemented by the apparatus of the modern nation-state.
This challenge can be identified on three levels.
First - with regard to formal citizenship - contemporary societies no longer
consist exclusively of formal citizens, but also - and increasingly - of
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'resident aliens' (Hammar 1990; Layton Henry 1990). In this context the
question arises as to whether the granting of citizens' rights is
conceptually tied to formal membership of the nation state. Many authors
such as Hammar (1990) have argued that international labour migration
and the development of large settled foreign populations has caused
advanced industrial states to erode the distinction between citizens and
'aliens'. As a result a significant number of 'non-citizens' have gained
access to a variety of rights - such as social rights and limited political
rights - initially reserved for citizens and have also accepted many
citizens' obligations. Some of these are enjoyed by all aliens and
sometimes they are enshrined in bilateral agreements between states. A
simplified categorisation of the population of the EU in terms of their legal
status and their resulting access to rights makes the following distinctions
(see Wrench 1996):
• Citizens living and working within their own country;
• Citizens of an EU Member State who reside in another country within
the Union;
• Third country nationals who have full rights of residency and work in a
Member State - so called "denizens";
• Political refugees;
• Third country nationals who have leave to stay on the basis of a
revocable work permit for a fixed period of time;
• Asylum seekers;
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• Undocumented or "illegal" migrants.
The hierarchy illustrates that the question of formal citizenship, or in other
words the possession of an appropriate passport, is no longer the all-
decisive factor determining access to rights whereas status, in
comparison, is crucial (see SoysaI1994). Some policies/policy proposals
developed in the past demonstrate that both in academic and political
discussions it is not regarded as an imperative to link access to full rights
in a particular society to the question of formal citizenship. The most
obvious example are EU law and the agreements that secure access to
rights for EU citizens Europe wide. Other considerable developments in
this direction are ongoing discussions about the right of third-country-
nationals to vote and stand in local elections and academic work in
developing the concept of 'denizenship' (Cohen 1987; Hammar 1990).
In addition, many people are holders of dual or (more rarely) multiple
citizenship, a development that adds to the blurring of the boundary
between citizens and non-citizens. Many labour migrants and their
families respond to settlement abroad by acquiring the citizenship of their
new country but retain the ci1izenship of their country of birth.
Furthermore, an increasing number of children born to parents with
different nationalities gain both parental nationalities at birth as a result of
the competing citizenship allocations of different sovereign nation states
(Hailbronner 1992). Dual nationality was traditionally regarded as unusual
and unwelcome, something that should be discouraged. Citizens were not
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meant to have multiple loyalties and multiple duties which contradicted the
traditional view that citizenship and nationality were identical and that the
nation-state had the exclusive right to represent its nationals and demand
their loyalty.
Secondly, formal membership and equal status as a citizen do not
necessarily mean that every citizen actually enjoys, or has access to, the
full meaning of citizens' rights. From the beginning of citizenship's modern
existence, the group of the nominal citizens has not been congruent with
the group who enjoys full rights. The poor, the young, women and black
people have been excluded from civil and political rights and have had to
fight and struggle against barriers denying them the formal equality up
until - as pointed out in the introduction - very recently in certain cases.
The common justification for their exclusion was linked either to
dependency and the inability to make free decisions (women and the
property-less classes) or to undeservedness and 'fitness' (slaves,
paupers, non-white South-Africans, African-Americans) (see Beuooc«,
1992, p. 18; Vogel 1991).
Today, full citizenship rights have been formally extended to nearly all
nationals in liberal capitalist societies (with the exception of minors, the
mentally ill and prisoners). However, citizens clearly differ with regard to
their status, their economic means, and their influence over political
decision-making etc. - "some", in the Orwellian formulation, "are still more
equal than others". Many scholars - particularly those who argue from a
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'cultural pluralist' and a 'gender' perspective - put at the heart of their
analysis of social cleavages and existing inequalities, citizenship's
intrinsic claim to universality. "Citizenship is a status bestowed on those
who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are
equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status is endowed"
(Marshall 1950, pp. 28-29).
In particular much of the feminist literature has sought to lift "the veil of
universalism" (Lister 1997) and has pointed out that many women still
have only limited access to social rights because social rights provisions
are in many respects linked to economic activity (such as pensions based
on a contributory principle). In a situation where women are predominantly
employed in lower paid or part-time jobs and against the background that
many women are 'economically active' in the so called domestic sphere,
the notion of 'equal treatment' for 'equal citizens' shows inconsistencies.
Extending the claim of 'false universalism' beyond the category of women
Iris Marion Young (1989) argues:
... where differences in capacities, values, and behavioural
or cognitive styles exist, equal treatment in the allocation of
reward according to rules of merit composition will reinforce
and perpetuate disadvantage. Equal treatment requires
everyone to be measured according to the same norms, but
in fact there are no "neutral" norms of behaviour and
performance. Where some groups are privileged and others
oppressed, the formulation of law, policy and the rules of
private institutions tend to be biased in favour of the
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privileged groups, because their particular experience
implicitly sets the norm. Thus where there are group
differences, only attending to such differences can enable
the inclusion and participation of all groups in political and
economic institutions. This implies that instead of always
formulating rights and rules in universal terms, which are
blind to difference, some groups sometimes deserve special
rights (Young 1989,p. 269).
However, although Marshal/'s theoretical account of citizenship implies
the formulation of rights in universal terms, he embraces and bases his
argument essentially upon the necessity to recognise difference - and I
mean here difference that results from hierarchies and structural
disadvantage: Marshal/sees social citizenship - implemented in the form
of a universal welfare state - as a means of enabling disadvantaged
citizens to fully exercise their citizens' rights and to achieve a higher
degree of equality within a particular society ("...indeed the very notion of
political equality implies differences to be discounted so that, despite
them, people are treated as equals for a specific purpose." Lister 1995,p.
15). In this context two questions have to remain open: is citizenship in
need of additional rights in order to adequately respond to the exclusion
of ethnic minority groups? And should these rights be formulated in
universal or particularistic terms. From my point of view, the latter
question does not necessarily have to be discussed in mutually exclusive
terms. For instance, it may be feasible to think of the implementation of
rights that are universally available but that are in fact targeted to
overcome the disadvantage of a particular group. The system of 'parental
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leave' in Germany, that grants either the mother or the father the right to
remain at home, is an example. Such policies avoid the danger of turning
a 'difference' that results out of a situation of disadvantage into a
difference that is 'characteristic' of certain groups.
Furthermore, the traditionally articulated assumption that citizenship is
both based upon, and an expression of, a national culture and a national
identity is contested in societies whose members come from diverse
ethnic backgrounds. Many minority groups claim - often against the
background of their experiences of exclusion and discrimination - the
'right to be different' and demand policies that allow them to express their
cultural particularity - for example with regard to language or religion.
Clearly, modern societies allow space for expressions of cultural
particularity, but this space is restricted to the 'private' domain - as
opposed to the public sphere where citizenship is located. Thus conflicts
arise in situations where minority groups claim for example public support
for bilingual education or their exemption from regulations that hinder their
exercise of certain professions due to religions customs - as in the case
of young Turkish women in Berlin who would like to join the police force
on condition that they can war a headscarf." It is in these moments when
the expression of cultural particularity enters the 'public' domain that
claims for recognition of diversity .are regarded as diametrically opposed
to the integrative function of citizenship.
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Apart from the fact that the perception of the public domain as a 'neutral'
and impartial political space that is free from particularity is highly
contested", it is also questionable whether special rights for minority
groups inevitably contradict the aim of integration. Will Kymlicka (1995) for
example has argued that special rights for minority groups - both with
regard to overcoming inequality and expressing diversity - are in most
cases a means of integration and do not necessarily 'pull society apart'.
Thirdly, as mentioned above, citizens' participation is in general defined
as an activity that transcends particularity and is directed at the common
good of society. Most members of ethnic minorities are however
predominantly involved in 'particularistic' politics. The reasons for this can
be identified on three levels: a) ethnic minorities are excluded from the
formal national political level. Only recently have political parties for
example in Britain and in Germany made significant efforts to encourage
membership of ethnic minorities; b) particularistic politics reflect the
position of ethnic minorities in societies and can be regarded both as a
struggle against discrimination and disadvantage and as a strategy to
protect their immediate interests. In many cases crucial services - such as
employment schemes for ethnic minority youth, health provision for
women or refuges for battered women - are not, or only poorly, provided
by the mainstream, owing to negligence or ignorance. As a result
particularistic engagement is made necessary either by demanding these
services or by taking the initiative and by establishing and providing the
services by the groups themselves. The refusal to call such activities
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'citizens' activities' perpetuates the exclusion of minorities by defining
their interests as inessential for the wider community; c) political
engagement is not in all cases directed at the situation of the country of
residence. Members of minority groups are in many cases involved in,
and support a political project in their country of origin or with their
originating community - such as the Kurdish diaspora.
SUMMARY
I have sought to show that various forms of citizenship have existed over
time and that the content of each form that citizenship has acquired,
depends on distinct structural conditions. The emergence of the nation
state therefore gave rise to particular forms of citizenship but is not the
place of birth of citizenship per se. As citizenship started to move beyond
city borders some five hundred years ago, it is unlikely that national
borders will remain its last 'container'.
An analysis that focuses on the content of a modern, nationally bounded,
concept of citizenship and its application in poly-ethnic societies comes to
the conclusion that its main elements - in particular citizenship's link to
membership in a national community, its claim that equality of status is a
guarantor of equality of opportunity, and its perception as a form of
political participation that transcends particularity in order to secure a
common good - stand in tension with the realities and needs of societies
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that are characterised by a heterogeneous ethnic mix. As a result, such a
conception of citizenship leads to the exclusion of minority groups and
migrants.
However, an analysis of citizenship should not stop at this polnt, By also
giving analytical focus to the structural conditions of citizenship and by
conceptualising citizenship as a flexible and shifting concept, it is possible
to discuss the shortcomings of modern citizenship in immigration
countries not only with regard to their exclusionary outcome, but at the
same time to identify them as a motor for possible changes in the concept
of citizenship. It is against this background that I argue that first, the multi-
layered character of politics and international migration movements result
in a crucial transformation of the concept of citizenship; and that second,
this transformation is both mediated and enforced by political actors - Le.
ethnic minorities - whose agendas and activities both cross territorial
boundaries and challenge the notion of a national-community.
Finally, a synthesis of liberal and republican traditions of citizenship
provides an analytical tool with which to critically discuss those accounts
that render citizenship obsolete and that state that citizenship is going to
be overtaken by rights that are defined at the international or the
supranational level (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994). As we have seen,
rights are only one aspect of citizenship. An analysis that is exclusively
based on 'rights', neglects the 'active' dimension of citizenship that allows
us to incorporate the role played by members of ethnic minorities in
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transforming the concept of citizenship. Furthermore, it underestimates
the importance of a 'spatial notion' of citizenship, i.e. the national or local
political arenas, that still shape both the living conditions of ethnic
minorities and their subsequent struggles for equality. These points will be
central to the following discussion on ethnic minorities and citizenship
policies in Germany.
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2 For the following account see Bendix 1977, pp. 39-89. For a historical analysis of
the transformation of citizenship into a nationally based concept see Gellner 1983;
Hobsbawm 1990; Mann 1986; Marshall 1950; Turner 1986.
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Chapter 4
IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN GERMANY
"Cynically you may want to say that Germany produces
its foreigners itself. Well, a large part of them. And the
fact that the children march with a foreigners' status
through the nurseries and schools, that is preposterous,
that is hostile to integration to the utmost" (Interview with
Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997, author's translation)
It is well known that German immigration and citizenship politics are
dominated by the proclamation and repetition of a series of myths which
are permanently contradicted by reality, most importantly that 'Germany is
not a country of immigration', or that its population is 'ethnically
homogeneous'. As a consequence of such 'politics of repression' both the
settlement of immigrants and continuous migration flows into Germany
have, by definition, not become central fields for political intervention.
The espousal of a "counterfactual ideology" in the German partisan
discourse on immigration and settlement (see Faist 1994a) led in 1991 to
the stepping down of Liselotte Funcke from her office as the 8eauftragte
der Bundesregierung tur die 8elange der Auslander. Although seven
years have gone by since her resignation the explosive force of the
wording of her press release at that time continues to remain relevant as it
is both a telling account of government and party politics vis-a-vis ethnic
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minorities in the late 80s and early 90s and as - in the absence of
fundamental shifts in this area since its publication - it emphasises most
forcefully where urgent action has to be taken up by the new German
government:
In particular the lack of support both on the part of the
government and the political parties make the work of my office
more difficult. In their endeavours for the integration of the
foreign population and the tackling of xenophobia, the
Aus/anderbeauftragten on the national, regional and local level
as well as those who work in various associations and interest
groups ... towards a peaceful social existence, feel themselves
abandoned by official institutions. ... An encouragement to
promote integration is hardly recognisable, the same can be
said as regards effective measures against, and sufficient
protection from, xenophobic youth gangs.... Despite all efforts,
an Aus/anderbeauftragte of the government who is hardly in
contact with the government and who is not involved in
governmental decisions cannot meet the demands that are
requested of her office .... by the German and the foreign
population or by interlocutors from abroad..." (official press
release, Bonn, 19.6.1991, quoted in Nirumand 1992, pp. 214-
215 - author's translation)
What is most strikingly conveyed in this statement is the utter disinterest
in matters concerning immigration on the part of the government and main
political parties and the fact that the Auslenderbeeuttreqto, by her own
admission, has had little support by the political establishment on all
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levels of German politics and enjoys only a very peripheral, if not
negligible, role in the political decision-making process.
This chapter deals with one cruciai aspect of immigration policies and - to
use Funcke's expression - a possible tool to assist ''the peaceful social
existence" of Germany's heterogeneous population, namely the country's
politics of citizenship. These are characterised by highly restrictive
approaches regarding the acquisition of citizenship by birth and, until the
beginning of the 1990s, through naturalisation. The central part of the
following analysis consists of a discussion of fundamental principles
guiding German citizenship policies. In this context, first I will summarise
Germany's main immigration flows and provide some basic data
concerning the country's ethnic minority residents, including a brief
discussion of the legal ramifications that result from their status as
Auslander. Second, the legal framework for the allocation of citizenship in
Germany will be outlined. Here, the naturalisation procedure shall be
explained and recent data presented. Against the background that in
particular the question of dual or multiple citizenship has become crucially
relevant in Germany, I will thirdly discuss both legal and political aspects
regarding this issue.
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POST-WAR IMMIGRATION TO GERMANY
BASIC DATA AND A BRIEF OUTLINE OF KEY POLITICAL
PRINCIPLES
Since the end of the Second World War Germany has experienced
significant immigration - indeed with an intake of more than 20 million
people between 1945 and 1992 it has by far the largest number of
migrants in Europe (FaBmann 1992, p. 473). In a very simplified manner,
we may distinguish five distinct immigration cycles: 1) the immigration of
approximately 12 million 'ethnic German' Vertriebene and Flilchtlinge,
which lasted until 1961; 2) the recruitment of contract workers,
predominantly from Europe's periphery during the economic boom of the
1960s and their transformation from a rotatable workforce into immigrant
communities following the halting of recruitment in 1973; 3) the influx of
asylum seekers - a migratory flow which started to display significant
changes in its causes, countries of origin and numbers in the 1980s; 4)
the immigration of 'ethnic German' Aussiedler and Ubersiedler, a
perpetual feature in Germany's immigration history; and 5) the new intake
of short-term contract workers as well as undocumented workers
predominantly from countries of the former Eastern Bloc.
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Table 1: 'Foreign' Population (in total and selected countries) living
in Germanyat 31.12.1996
Nationality Total Number Per cent
All EU Nationals 1,839,851 25.2
Austria 184,933 2.5
Greece 362,539 5.0
Italy 599,492 8.2
Portugal 130,842 1.8
Spain 132,457 1.8
All Third Country Nationals 5,474,195 74.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina 340,526 4.7
Croatia 201,923 2.8
Iran 111.084 1.5
Morocco 82,927 1.1
Poland 283,356 3.9
Romania 100,696 1.4
Turkey 2,049,060 28.0
Vietnam 92,291 1.3
Yugoslavia 1 754,311 10.3
All nationalities 7,314,046 100.0
Source: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Aus/anderfragen 1997, p. 50
In December 1996 approximately 7.3 million 'non-Germans' were resident
in Germany, constituting 8.9 per cent of the population. A quarter of this
segment of the population are EU citizens. People of Turkish origin
comprise the largest ethnic minority group with 2.05 million (28 per cent),
followed by - if the numbers are added together - those
immigrants/refugees who originated in countries of the former Yugoslavia
(1,3 million; 17.7 per cent) (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung tur
Auslendertreqen 1997, p. 50).
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In 1992, approximately 40 per cent of the 'non-German' population were
younger than 25 years old, more than 70 per cent were of 'working age'
(18-65 years)." Two-thirds of all children of 'non-German' parents were
born in Germany and will be brought up there (Beauftragte der
Bundesregierung ftlr die Belange der Auslander 1995, p. 16). In 1995,
they constituted 13.1 per cent (99,714) of all children born in Germany.
This figure does not include the offspring of mixed parentage (Beauftragte
der Bundesregierung fOrAuslanderfragen 1997, p.23 and p.27).3 At the
end of 1996 more than 50 per cent of all 'non-German' residents had been
living in Germany for at least 10 years, and nearly one third (29.2. per
cent) for more than 20 years. However, it is important to note that these
numbers are affected as they a) simply include the age of 'non-German'
children born in Germany as 'duration of residence' which is obviously
misleading; b) also reflect more recent migratory flows into Germany
consisting of asylum-seekers, refugees from the former Yugoslavia, and
short-term contract workers who have been living in Germany for a
maximumof four years (23.8 per cent). Regarding more specific numbers,
i.e. those of former migrants from Turkey and their offspring, it becomes
clear that nearly two-thirds of all persons of Turkish origin have been
resident in Germany for more thant 0 years, or were born in Germany and
are older than ten (1,271,183). (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung ftlr
Auslendertreqen 1997, pp. 83-87).
The fundamental principal guiding governmental reaction to migratory
movements is the differentiation between those migrants who are 'ethnic
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Germans" and those who are not, or - to be more precise who originated
outside the European Union. On the level of domestic integration policy
as well as with regard to border policies there has been a clear division of
strategy between policies directed towards 'ethnic peers', and those
towards 'non-Germans' - an emphatic integrative concept versus an
exclusionist head-in-the-sand approach and an open-door policy versus a
fortress mentality."
Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe are officially not perceived as
immigrants because they belong by definition to the German
'Volksgemeinschaft', and by migrating are simply rejoining their 'natural'
community. This view is best expressed in the words of Alfred Dregger
(Christlich Demokratische Union - CDU): "Germany is the Heimat of all
persecuted and oppressed Germans" (quoted in Tichy 1993, p. 34 -
author's translation). Although this doctrine - combining the concepts of
Volksgemeinschaft and diaspora - is constitutionally institutionalised, it is
nevertheless regarded sceptically by the bulk of the affluent German
population." The policy implication of this doctrine is and remains - albeit
after the end of the Cold War increasingly reluctantly - the provision of a
comprehensive support system to guarantee a smooth and quick
integration of 'ethnic German immigrants' coming from the East. By
definition they have the right to claim German citizenship and therefore
receive automatic access to various state support and integration
programmes.
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For those migrants 'lacking German roots' the situation is rather more
complex. Clearly, former 'Gastarbeiter' from EU Member States, their
offspring and new EU immigrants have over time benefited from EU
cohesion processes. They have both a secure right of residence and can
access most citizens' rights (with the exception of taking up employment
as a civil servant and voting in national elections). The impact of EU co-
operation and cohesion upon the situation of this particular group of
immigrants goes however beyond such mere legal aspects: by belonging
to a wider European project they are increasingly portrayed and perceived
as 'insiders' who in their values, religion, looks or socialisation share an
imagined European heritage and future outlook. Thus, in the case of EU
nationals previously established borders between 'us' (in this case the
Germans) and 'them' have started to become blurred.'
Looking at the situation of ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees who
are not holders of a European passport, policies are essentially
exclusionary, either internally in the form of their legal status and the
absence of measures accommodating their specific situation or externally,
by implementing sophisticated means to close Germany's borders.
Clearly, as mentioned in the previous chapter, non-EU immigrants and
refugees cannot be treated as a 'homogenous' group but they differ
significantly as regards their legal status (e.g. Third-Country-Nationals,
refugees, asylum seekers, undocumented migrants) and their experiences
with the wider German society. In this context differences may occur for
example on the basis of the individual's profession, educational
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background, his/her country of origin, or for example their physical
appearance.
Those residents in Germany who are of Turkish origin have in general a
rather secure residence status and have gained access to a whole range
of rights that were previously reserved for formal German citizens (for
example social rights). Against the.background that their legal status - like
that of EU nationals - is nearly congruent with the formal citizen status
some scholars, in particular Yasemin Soysal (1994), have argued that
Sfaafsangeh6rigkeif has therefore lost its importance for former
'guestworkers'. From my point of view such a conclusion can be criticised
on several accounts: On the one hand it does not reflect current trends in
the actual numbers of applications for naturalisation which show that in
particular persons of Turkish origin are increasingly interested in taking
up German citizenship (relevant data, both quantitative and qualitative will
be provided in the course of this and the following chapters). On the other
hand, a discussion of citizenship policies should not only consider the
question of whether a particular group may benefit from having access to
formal citizenship or not. In particular in the academic fields of social
theory and political sociology issues of a more fundamental nature have
to be addressed at the same time: these concern first of all a) the current
gross democratic abuse of denying the franchise to a significant group of
Germany's population and b) the country's official definition of 'who
constitutes its people' that is based on ethnicity and that is thus
repressing its heterogeneous reality. Currently, an ideology of exclusion
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has been incorporated in law that in turn reinforces ideas of 'belonging'
and 'otherness'. Both in Germany's citizenship policies and in its
Auslandergesetzgebung "... lst . die Ausgrenzung zur Rechtsform
geronneri' ("... exclusion has developed into a legal norm", Sollner 1994,
p. 307 - author's translation) and violates the principles of the democratic
basic order (demokratische Grundordnung).
Before going into the more specific debate around citizenship, I would like
to briefly outline the remaining crucial material differences between the
formal status of a citizen and that of an ~uslander' - again with the
exception of EU citizens. This short exposition will help to understand why
- contrary to Soysal's hypothesis - formal citizenship still seems to matter
for a large number of Germany's ethnic minorities.
The legal status of an 'Auslender' is regulated primarily in the German
Austenderqesetz; which was revised in 1990. This law regulates questions
concerning the granting of residence permits to, and expulsion of,
'foreigners' (with the exception of EU citizens). It is also a means of
controlling the influx of new migrants - both by defining visa policies and
regulations concerning family reunions, and by providing some exceptions
to the general suspension of Gastarbeiter recruitment. The disadvantages
or even threats that result from the Auslanderstatus can be identified on
two important levels:
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Firstly, as mentioned already, some rights are restricted to German
nationals, most importantly the right to vote or to stand for election;
becoming a civil servant; or the unconditional right to remain, leave and
return to Germany. Furthermore, with regard to the establishment of the
European Union and the abolition of internal borders, non EU-citizens
living in Germany also face restrictions to their right of free movement
within the EU as well as in their ability to take up employment in any of the
member states of the European Union.
Secondly, the Auslanderstatus goes hand in hand with the formal
necessity of applying for, or extending permits to stay in Germany. This
can entail exposure to rather long-winded and often irritating or even
humiliating bureaucratic procedures: each 'visit' to the Auslanderbeh6rde
becomes a clear manifestation and a vivid experience of not being a fully
accepted member of German society. Over and above this, as long as a
person is officially defined as an Auslander he or she can in extreme
cases be expelled - this threat. even applies for children of former
'guestworkers' who were born in Germany. According to the
Austenderqesetz, the denial of a residence permit, rejection of an
application for a more secure status, or, in the extreme, authorisation for
expulsion can be based on the following: political activities in
contradiction to Germany's constitution; participation in violent political
activities; appeals for, or threats of, violence in realisinq political aims;
serious offences; dependency on social welfare. The safest residence
status is the Aufenthaltsberechtigung according to Paragraph 27 AusiG.
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As a general rule the Aufenthaltsberechtigung is granted after eight years
of legal residence.s Additional requirements are that the person who
applies for such a status is not dependent on welfare; that he or she has
contributed over 60 months to the state pension scheme; and that he or
she has not committed a serious crime during the past three years before
applying. In December 1994, 536,112 persons of Turkish origin,
approximately one quarter of the 'Turkish' population resident in
Germany, held this status (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr
Aus/anderfragen 1997, pp. 88-91). Those immigrants who have an
Aufenthaltsberechtigung are in a relatively secure position and cannot be
expelled for minor legal offences. However, people with more insecure
and often shorter-term residence permits (holders of an
Aufenthaltserlaubnis according to Paragraphs 15 and 17 of the AuslG -
these are particularly young persons of ethnic minority origin - de-facto
refugees, or asylum seekers), who have to renew the right to stay, are in a
more tenuous situation. Theoretically, they can for example be victims of
expulsion if they are long-term homeless.
Until recently (15th of January 1997) children of parents who originated in
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, or the former Yugoslavia (the non EU
'economic boom' recruitment countries) were in principle exempt from
applying for any kind of residence permit. However this exemption was
annulled by the previous conservative government and since then even
children who were born in Germany have to apply for an
Aufenthaitserlaubnis.
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Although many sources insist that various types of long term residence
permits effectively provide equivalent rights and protections to those of
the formal citizen's status - at least insofar as residence and crucial social
rights are concerned - a sceptic may well be prompted to ask why in that
case there is such an evident reluctance on the part of the German state
to legislate to formalise that parity. A good example of the practical limits
in the absence of any such parity and therefore of the scope for extreme
decisions that are still at the discretion of local and regional
bureaucracies, is the recent expulsion of a fourteen year old male
teenager of Turkish origin undertaken by the Bavarian government in
November 1998. His parents have lived in Germany for more than thirty
years, and he himself was born there. Muhlis (Mehmet) A. committed 62
criminal offences and initially the Bavarian government intended to expel
not only him but also his parents for "gross violation" of parental
responsibility. This was prohibited by the Administrative Court. At the time
of writing the teenager who hardly speaks Turkish lived in a hostel in
Istanbul as his relatives were reluctant to accommodate him (Der Spiegel,
23.11.98, pp. 28-29).
I would rather do time in Germany than being free in Turkey
... I have been born and brought up in Germany. I don't know
anything else (Muhlis (Mehmet) A. quoted in Der Spiegel,
23. 11.98, p. 29 - author's translations).
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In Mehmet's case the Bavarian government consequently followed the
approach of defining 'foreigners' in principle as 'guests', regardless of
their place of birth or the length of their residence in Germany. These
'guests' are told to leave the moment they trespass the 'unwritten laws of
hospitality'. In a report published in 1993, the Beauftragte der
Bundesregierung fur die Belange der Auslander highlights this problem:
In the case of foreigners who have become criminal
offenders and who are long term residents in Germany and
particularly in the case of those who have been born or
brought up here, expulsion ought not be considered an
applicable measure, because it would amount to their
banishment. Young criminal foreigners have to be dealt with
appropriately. But they are - so to say - "our" criminals. An
expulsion of the problem by expelling the people ought to be
prohibited (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur die Belange
der Auslander 1993, p. 21- author's translation)
However, as long as a statement like this can only be made by using the
subjunctive, a legally established right to reside in Germany that is
equivalent to that of German citizens is wantinq."
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THE CURRENT LEGAL BASIS REGULATING CITIZENSHIP AND
NATURALISATION
The bone of contention in the German discussion about the integration of
already settled migrants has been and still is the question of citizenship.
In principal, we can distinguish two diametrically opposed views. The first,
held by the dominant parties of the previous government coalition (COU
and CSU), views the granting of citizenship as the formal manifestation of
an already accomplished integration process - that is to say its crowning
achievement. The second, which is represented by both parties forming
the new government as well as by the FOP and the POS, sees the
process reversed - here, cltizenshlp is perceived as a prerequisite for the
process of integration.
In terms of international comparison the German concept of citizenship is
exceptional in four respects: First, the attribution of citizenship is still
exclusively based on descent (ius sanguinis); the German approach is not
combined with the principle of ius soli as is the case for example in Britain.
This legal provision turns the offspring of 'non-German' residents - the
second and third generation - automatically into 'foreigners' and can be
regarded in many respects as racist because it confers a hereditary
character to a legal status (see Neuman 1995,p. 33). Second, Article 116
of the German constitution defines who is German on the basis of ethnic
affiliation, and accords to ethnic Germans the automatic right to become
German citizens. Third, until the beginning of the 1990s naturalisation
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procedures have been extremely restrictive and as a result the number of
naturalisations of persons who lack German 'blood' remained low. Fourth,
of the Member States of the Council of Europe which ratified an
agreement to avoid multiple citizenship in 1963, only Germany, Austria
and Luxembourg still proclaim this principle as a matter of law
(Hailbronner 1992).
The principles of the German approach to citizenship are regulated by
different segments of law, the Reichs- und Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz
(RuStaG) and the Aus/andergesetz as well as a sophisticated corpus of
administrative rules (EinbOrgerungsrichtlinien - EbRh. By definition we
have to distinguish between the acquisition of citizenship by birth and its
acquisition via naturalisation. A central legal source for citizenship is the
RuStaG from July 1913 (in its current version from June 1993). According
to paragraph 4(1) of the RuStaG, the attribution of citizenship is, as
mentioned above, purely based on the ius sanguinis. This means that only
those persons who have at least one German parent automatically
become Germans by birth. Since 1993 children who have been born out
of wedlock are treated squally."
With regard to naturalisation, the German citizenship law distinguishes
between two kinds - naturalisation on the basis of a legal claim and on the
basis of discretion. The former case applied until 1993 almost exclusively
to those persons who are Germans according to Article 116 of the
German constitution without holding German citizenship." According to
72
Paragraph 6 of the Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der
Staatsangeh6rigkeit (StaReG - Law of the Regulation of Questions
Regarding Citizenship) a 'German' without German citizenship has the
right to be naturalised unless he or she is considered to be a threat to
German security (Fleischer 1990, p. 320). The number of naturalisations
on the basis of a legal claim accounted to 80 per cent of the total number
of naturalisations in 1990 (81,140 out of 101,377). Persons who have
been naturalised in this way came predominantly from the former Soviet
Union, Romania and Poland. During the years 1991 to 1993 - a period
during which data on the kind of naturalisation contains some
inconsistencies and changes (see Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur
Auslanderfragen 1997,p. 60, fn 1)- the number of persons who originated
in these three countries and who were naturalised on the basis of a legal
claim amounted to 109,063 (77 per cent of all naturalisations) in 1991;
137,314 (76 per cent) in 1992; and 145,285 (72 per cent) in 1993.
Until 1993 non 'ethnic German' immigrants - apart from marginal
exceptions - could only be naturalised on the basis of discretion.
According to Paragraph 8 of the RuStaG, 'foreigners' who settled
permanently in Germany can be naturalised if they meet the following
conditions: 1. legal competence according to the laws of the country of
origin and to those in Germany; 2. good reputation; 3. ability to finance
him- or herself as well as dependent family members; 4. evidence of
accommodation. In comparison with Paragraph 9 of the RuStAG which
regulates the naturalisation of the foreign spouse of a German citizen,
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Paragraph 8 does include the legal requirement to give up the original
citizenship in those cases where the applicant does not lose it
automatically by becoming German." In addition to the above mentioned
laws, further rules to grant citizenship on the basis of discretion are laid
out in the more complex EinbOrgerungsrichtlinien from 1977.13 In principle,
the decision of the authorities to grant or to deny citizenship has to be
made in terms of whether a naturalisation is of public interest; the interest
of the applicant is not of importance for the decision (Hailbronner 1992,
p.12). Some crucial points of the EinbOrgerungsrichtlinien are: a) the
granting of dual (multiple) citizenship shall be avoided in principle,
although exceptions can be made, b) residence in Germany for
approximately 10 years (this period can be shorter for spouses of German
citizens or for political refugees), c) evidence of 'sufficient'
accommodation, d) good reputation, e) financial independence and f) a
high degree of integration (attachment to Germany). Attachment to
Germany is not necessarily only related to matters such as residence,
language, economic security etc., but can also embrace questions of
political and cultural orientation (see Hoffmann 1990). The regulations of
the EinbOrgerungsrichtlinien are subject to the interpretations, political
considerations and levels of goodwill of the various highly autonomous
state (Land) authorities (see Hagedorn 1998, pp. 53-55>.14
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Table 2: Naturalisations from 1974 to 1990
Year Naturalisation
total by discretion15
1974 24,744 12,488 (0.3)
1975 24,925 10,727 (0.3)
1976 29,481 13,134 (0.3)
1977 31,632 13,535 (0.3)
1978 32,710 14,075 (0.4)
1979 34,952 15,172 (0.4)
1980 37,003 14,969 (0.3)
1981 35,878 13,643 (0.3)
1982 39,280 13,266 (0.3)
1983 39,485 14,334 (0.3)
1984 38,046 14,695 (0.3)
1985 34,913 13,894 (0.3)
1986 36,646 14,030 (0.3)
1987 37,810 14,029 (0.3)
1988 46,783 16,660 (0.4)
1989 68,526 17,742 (0.4)
1990 101,377 20,237 (0.4)
Source:Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur Aus/anderfragen 1997, p. 60
At the end of 1990 only 0.4 per cent of the total 'non-German' population
resident in the country had been naturalised which does not stand in any
relation to the number of people who - at that time - have lived in
Germany for ten years or longer and who therefore fulfilled the major
formal requirement of length of stay. For residents in Germany who are of
Turkish origin the following picture emerges:
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Table 3: Naturalisations of Residents of Turkish origin (1981 to 1990)
Year Total number Naturalisations
of residents of
Turkish origin
total number legal claim discretion
1981 1,546,280 534 4 530
1982 1,580,671 580 12 568
1983 1,552,328 853 7 846
1984 1,425,798 1,053 11 1,042
1985 1,401,932 1,310 7 1,303
1986 1,434,255 1,492 15 1,477
1987 1,453,708 1,184 9 1,175
1988 1,523,678 1,243 18 1,225
1989 1,612,623 1,713 16 1,697
1990 1,694,649 2,034 18 2,016
Source: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOrAus/anderfragen 1997, pp. 48-50, p.
65
By 1990, only about 1,6 per cent per cent of all persons of Turkish origin
residing in Germany (approximately 28,000 since 1970) gained German
citizenship, compared to more than 60 per cent who would have fulfilled
the condition of a minimum of 10 years residence in Germany. Looking at
a survey that was carried out in 1986, 6.2 per cent of Germany's
immigrants from former recruitment countries (eight per cent of persons of
Turkish origin) were interested to become Germans. As Ttvennera: points
out, this figure is both higher than the actual number of naturalisations but
at the same time it "is only a small minority of those who in reality are
settling down in Germany" (Thranhardt 1992a, p. 176).
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What were the reasons for the low interest in applying for German
citizenship at that time? In the absence of adequate representative
studies that combine qualitative and quantitative methods any such
analysis has to remain speculative. I would argue that against the
background of very restrictive - and expensive - naturalisation procedures
until 1990 most members of ethnic minority origin did not contemplate
naturalisation because a) they could not consider it to be a realistic and
accessible alternative to their 'Austenderststue'; b) given the fact that
naturalisation includes in general the legal necessity to give up the
original formal citizenship - a point that will be discussed below - they did
not want to become exclusively a formal member of a society whose
political establishment so obviously discriminates against them and does
not consider them as full and welcomed members;16 c) in particular the
first generation of immigrants were afraid of loosing essential rights in
their country of origin by giving up thelr previous nationality; d) in the light
of their exclusion in Germany, formal links to their country of origin - most
obviously symbolised in the form of a passport - were considered as an
important part of personal identity; e) for those immigrants who had a
secure residence permit the formal status as a German citizen was not
considered to bring about essential advantages in everyday life.17
In the early 1990s the previous conservative/liberal government
introduced legal changes which brought about significant changes both as
regards the accessibility of the naturalisation process and the attitude of
ethnic minority members towards citizenship. It would be an exaggeration
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to describe this move as a watershed in German citizenship policies - the
use of this idiom will hopefully become appropriate in future discussions
of relevant legislation to be introduced by the new government - but so far
the international debate has tended to neglect these developments
uninhibitedly.
At that time two 'gates' were established which give former 'guestworkers'
and their offspring for the first time the right to claim citizenship. According
to the new Ausliindergesetz (1991) and the Gesetz zur Anderung
asylverfahrens-, ausliinder- und staatsangeh6rigkeitsrecthlicher
Vorschriften which came into force July 1st 1993, two groups of
'foreigners' are legally entitled to naturalisation (paragraphs 85 and 86 of
the Ausliindergesetz); in both cases, the fee for naturalisation is minimal -
it amounts to 100 DM.
a) Paragraph 85 is in particular designed to facilitate access to citizenship
for the children of immigrants, i.e. the second and third generation.
Accordingly those young persons between 16 and 23 who have been
resident in Germany for more than eight years, attended a school in
Germany for at least six years and who have not been convicted of
serious offences have the right to be naturalised. If an applicant was
convicted for minor offences and has been sentenced by a juvenile court
to detention, community work or fines up to a certain maximumamount as
well as suspended sentences up to six months, these do not have an
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impact. In the case of more serious charges, the decision is made on an
individual basis.
b) Paragraph 86 - or rather 86(1) introduces the right of naturalisation for
those immigrants who have been resident in Germany for at least 15
years, and who possess a residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis or
Aufenthaltsberechtigung) with the provision that the following two
requirements are fulfilled:
1. Absence of a conviction for a serious criminal offence;
2. Financial independence of the applicant, which also guarantees
sufficient financial means for family-members who are entitled to
maintenance.
The claim to naturalisation is an individual right of the applicant. Minor
children under 16 and spouses who have been living in Germany for less
than 15 years are not automatically granted German citizenship. If they
wish to become German citizens but do not fulfil the requirements of
paragraphs 85 or 86 AuslG, they can become naturalised on the basis of
discretion according to Paragraph 86(2) AuslG: For the naturalisation of
the spouse it is generally sufficient that she/he has lived in Germany for
five years, provided that the partners have been married for at least two
years. The period of five years may be reduced by one year if the
marriage has lasted four years, the partner has lived in Germany legally
during this time and holds an independent residence permit. Minor
children are naturalised if both parents (or a single parent) become
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German. If only one parent has been naturalised, and the other does not
live with the children in Germany, the minor child who shall be considered
for naturalisation has to have lived in Germany at least half of his/her
lifetime. In this case, the law provides that all children living in Germany
shall be naturalised.
A look at the latest data that reflects the naturalisation of persons on the
basis of Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Aus/andergesetz shows that a)
formal citizenship politics in Germany are at long last getting ready to
move towards a more inclusive concept and b) that members of ethnic
minorities, particularly of non-European origin, take advantage of their
right to naturalise. In 1994 nearly 43,000 persons were naturalised
according to Paragraphs 85 and 86 (10,419 Paragraph 85, 24,995
Paragraph 86(1) and 7,570 Paragraph 86(2). In 1995 the numbers of
individuals who took up German citizenship and made use of this
particular legal path amounted to 53,383 in total (12,141 Paragraph 85;
27,952 Paragraph 86(1); 13,290 Paragraph 86(2» (Beauftragte der
Bundesregierung fur Aus/anderiragen 1997,p. 68). In the case of persons
of Turkish origin we can see that in 1995 nearly 20,000 persons were
naturalised on the basis of a legal claim (this includes Paragraphs 85 and
86(1» compared with 18 individuals in 1990. 10,898 people gained
German citizenship on the basis of discretion (this includes those who
have become naturalised according to Paragraph 86(2» which when
compared with the numbers in 1990 is an increase of approximately 500
per cent (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fUr Aus/anderiragen 1977, p.
80
72). In 1995 43 per cent of all naturalisations on the basis of paragraphs
85 and 85 consisted of persons of Turkish origin. In comparison,
European citizens living in Germany are far less interested in taking up
German citizenship. In the same year, for example only two per cent of all
persons naturalised under the above mentioned legal clause were of
Italian origin (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr Aus/anderiragen 1977,
p.72).
THE QUESTION OF DUAL OR MUL TIPLE CITIZENSHIP
Both Paragraphs 85 and 86 require the applicant to give up his/her
previous citizenship. This point - together with the absence of an
additional ius soli rule - can be identified as an important political issue in
the current German debate. In order to justify its reluctance to
accommodate dual citizenship, the German government both emphasises
its objections to the principle (Le. questions of loyalty, diplomatic
protections, liability to tax, conscription, or extradition; see Lower 1989)
and refers to national" and international law, in particular to the
'Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military
Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality' passed by the Council of
Europe in May 1963. This convention includes as its most important
clause the following: that citizens of one of the contracting nation states
who gain the citizenship of another signatory country are not allowed to
hold more than one of the contracting nations citizenships if they are older
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than 18 (in special cases this regulation is also applicable for minors) (see
Article 1 of the treaty). The treaty was ratified by Belgium, the FRG,
France, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, Austria and the
Netherlands. Britain, Spain and Ireland signed only the second part of the
Treaty which regulates the conscription of persons holding multiple
citizenship (Hailbronner 1992, p. 24). The application of the treaty is
unambiguously limited to those countries which are signatory states: thus
according to international legal definition it would not be a matter of
violating law to grant German citizenship to citizens of the former
Yugoslavia or Turkey in addition to their original citizenship (Hailbronner
1992, p. 28). As we have seen above, Yugoslavia and Turkey were the
most important non-EC recruitment countries, and their citizens comprise
the majority of long-term 'foreign' residents in Germany.
The convention does not rule out the retaining of the original citizenship in
the course of naturalisation per se, but allows exceptions. Furthermore,
the convention was not meant to rule out multiple/dual citizenship by birth,
as a result of the juxtaposition of the ius sanguinis and the ius soli
(Hailbronner 1992, pp. 24-29). In this context it is important to point out
that due to migratory movements and international
relationships/marriages, multiple citizenship occurs to an increasing
degree as a result of the competing citizenship allocations of different
sovereign nation states, causing multiple citizenship in the millions.
German law does not take account of dual citizenship achieved by birth:
thus, in many cases children of mixed parentage automatically acquire
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two citizenships. Moreover, it is of no importance for the attribution of
citizenship by birth if a second citizenship is gained on the basis of ius soli
at the same time.
A brief look at the numbers of marriages between a German and a non-
German partner as well as of children of mixed German/non-German
parentage in just one year may illude to the potential scale of children with
dual citizenship. In 1994 for example more than 50,000 Germans married
a partner with a foreign passport (in Germany).19Of these 3,992 Germans
married partners of Turkish origin. tn the same year approximately 44,000
children were born to a married couple consisting of a German and a non-
German partner. These constituted nearly eight per cent of all children
born to married couples in Germany in the course of that year
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr Auslanderfragen 1997, p. 31).
Furthermore, if we look at the marriages between Germans and non-
Germans over four decades, we can see that between 1950 to 1990
approximately 1 million international marriages have been consummated.
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr die Belange der Auslander 1995, p.
106). Multiplied by today's birth-rate the number of children born in this
period who might potentially be holders of two passports would account to
1.8 million
In addition to the 'natural' emergence of dual citizenship, a second source
lies in the fact that dual citizenship is allowed in many cases in the course
of naturalisation. For instance 'ethnic German' immigrants who hold a
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legal claim to citizenship do not have to give up their original citizenship,
and as Hailbronner has pointed out, it can be assumed that most of them
retain this in addition to their German citizenship and pass it on to their
children (see Hailbronner 1992, p. 17). Between 1973 and 1993 more
than 800,000 naturalisations on the basis of a legal claim (almost all
ethnic Germans) have been carried out (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung
filr Ausliinderfragen 1997,p. 60).
Regarding naturalisations granted discretionaryly, as well as according to
Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Auslandergesetz, again there are many
exceptions that might lead to the tolerance of dual citizenship of the
naturalised 'new member'. In general, dual citizenship is tolerated if the
law of the country of origin denies the right of giving up citizenship, if it
regularly causes insurmountable hindrances in doing so, if the surrender
of the original citizenship causes unreasonable hardship (see for details
Einbilrgerungsrichtlinien 5(3) and/or if there is a special public interest in
naturalising a certain person (sportspersons are particularly eligible under
this clause, even more so shortly before the World Cup and the Olympic
Games). According to paragraph 5(3)3 of the Einbiirgerungsrichtlinien
'unreasonable hardship' does not for example, include economic
disadvantages in the country of origin (e.g. the loss of the right to
hold/purchase property or the right of inheritance) and the rules demand
that "[t]he naturalisation applicant must be prepared to bear such
consequences of a change of citizenship, insofar as the attainment of
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German citizenship can also frequently be economically advantageous."
(see EinbtJrgerungsrichtlinien - author's translation)
In 1994 of the 13,404 naturalisations of persons of Turkish origin that
were carried out on the basis of a legal claim in more than 40 per cent of
the cases dual citizenship was tolerated (see Beauftragte der
Bundesregierung fUr Ausliinderfragen 1997, p. 65 and p. 73). However,
the decision of whether and to what extent, dual citizenship is tolerated is
again subject to wide interpretation and varies tremendously from
Bundesland to Bundesland. In particular Berlin has adopted a
comparatively tolerant approach as regards dual citizenship (see
Ausliinderbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin 1994,p. 14)
In addition, amongst persons of Turkish origin it is very common to hold
on to their original citizenship by exploiting loopholes in the existing legal
regulations. In general Turkish applicants for German citizenship re-apply
immediately after their German naturalisation for their - temporarily - 'lost'
Turkish citizenship. Turkey allows dual citizenship and the procedure is
more or less a formality once the question of the military service has been
resolved. This practice is well known and the official German side
maintains a diplomatic silence in the face of it.
There are no official statistics regarding the number of persons who live in
Germany and who hold two or more citizenships. The latest publication of
the Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr Auslanderfraqen estimates that
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their number amounts to 2 to 2.5 million persons - which from my point of
view may well be a rather conservative estimate (Beauftragte der
Bundesregierung fur Auslendettreqen 1997, p. 57). However, even in the
absence of an exact quantification I have tried to demonstrate that the
stated policy of the previous German government to avoid, or to deny the
legal validity of, multiple citizenship does not reflect the reality of multiple
citizenship. It is tolerated de facto as a result of mixed relationships and
the juxtaposition of ius sanguinis and ius soli, as well as the large-scale
naturalisation of ethnic Germans and - on a far smaller scale - exceptions
are allowed in the naturalisation of 'foreigners'. In this last case however,
dual citizenship is contingent upon the 'generosity' or rigidity of the
authorities in charge. I would argue that, despite their claims to the
contrary, the previous government did not see the 'problem' of multiple
citizenship as one of principle and international law but rather imposed it
as a politically-inspired hurdle to the naturalisation of permanently settled
migrants.
But how crucial is it for members of ethnic minorities, in particular for
those of Turkish origin, to retain their citizenship of origin, or in other
words, how effective is the official rejection to tolerate dual citizenship in
preventing individuals from making use of their right to naturalisation? We
have seen that since the introduction of legal changes in 1991 and 1993
the numbers of applications for naturalisation have increased significantly
but are still far lower than the number of persons who are legally entitled
to apply. This phenomenon is in general put down to the formal rejection
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to tolerate dual citizenship as a matter of principle. In addition to the
statistics the focus of most immigrant associations in their proposals to
reform the German citizenship law on the question of dual citizenship
rather than ius soli is seen as an indication of the exclusive importance of
dual citizenship amongst residents of Turkish origin.2o
However, in my interviews with various immigrant organisations in Berlin
as well as members of political parties or trade unions it became clear that
the focus has shifted somewhat in the past three years. Clearly, dual
citizenship is - as a matter of principle - still considered to be an important
issue because it signifies multiple identifications of, and interests amongst
the ethnic minority population that transcend national borders. Its official
toleration is seen as an important statement suggesting the respect and
tolerance of these developments as features of Germany's social reality.
But on a daily level, and here I mean on the level of individual/familial
strategies to improve conditions in the country of residence or birth, the
political demand for dual citizenship appears to be of lesser concern. On
the one hand, as Mehmet Oaimagiiler (FOP) points out, most Berliners of
Turkish origin have dual citizenship either officially or unofficially (see
above) and in their case "... reality has long overtaken the discussion."
(Interview with Mehmet Oaimagiiler, 29.5.1997). On the other hand, over
the past years Turkey has introduced important legislation that
guarantees naturalised Germans of Turkish origin the possibility to retain
crucial rights in Turkey (such as the right to re-migrate or to resettle, or
inheritance rights) and opting for German citizenship no longer goes hand
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in hand with a legally disadvantaged situation in Turkey. According to
Kenan Ko/at from the TOrkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB - Turkish
Association of Berlin and Brandenburg) the passing of this legislation has
made it easier for Berliners of Turkish origin to opt for German citizenship.
(Interview with Kenan Kotet, 25.4.1997) An analysis of recent Berlin data
and qualitative interview material in the following two chapters will provide
more detailed insights and illustrations regarding this matter.
SUMMARY
After the Second World War Germany experienced immigration flows that
have led over time to a crucial and irreversible change in the composition
of its population. Many of these immigrants, namely ethnic Germans 'who
came in from the Cold' were greeted by effective state intervention in the
form of comprehensive support schemes (on the legal, economical and
social level), In comparison, 'non-German' immigrants, with EU-citizens
constituting a special case, have been confronted with an exclusionary
approach which has shifted and evolved (often on an ad hoc basis) to
serve the political and economic climate of the day (Blaschke 1993, p. 8).
The polity's repression of de facto immigration and Germany's poly-ethnic
reality is most clearly manifested in the legal and political approach
towards formal citizenship.
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I have argued that more accessible citizenship policies, both regarding
the acquisition of citizenship by birth and naturalisation procedures, are
an essential step towards improving the situation of already-settled ethnic
minorities in Germany. Clearly, as has been demonstrated by classical
countries of immigration, such as the USA, the granting of formal
citizenship to immigrants and their offspring is by no means the
K6nigsweg (ideal way) of finding a political solution for societies that are
divided along ethnic/racial lines. The apparent limits of the modern
concept of citizenship in bringing about social equality - as discussed in
the previous chapter - can however not be employed as a justification for
denying full legal and political rights to particular groups of a country's
population. Not only are further changes in German governmental
approaches towards formal citizenship long overdue but they are urgently
needed to rectify current democratic abuses by incorporating ethnic
communities politically and legally on an equal basis. Such reforms are
also a necessary symbolic step: an ideology of exclusion which is
incorporated in law reinforces ideas of 'otherness' versus 'belonging'. In
this respect, access to citizenship for permanently settled former
immigrants and their offspring can help to stimulate the design of new
policies which more adequately responds to the challenges of poly-ethnic
societies. Via citizenship, ethnic minorities are formally recognised as
permanent and full members of German society, and are equipped with a
complete set of formal political rights to shape political agendas of the
future. Furthermore, a relaxation of restrictive citizenship legislation may
help to erode the pervasive national stereotype of what constitutes
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'Germanness' - thus far a static notion, which contradicts the actual
heterogeneity of Germany's population.
After this general introduction into German politics of citizenship I will now
turn to policies adopted on the Lander (Berlin) and the local (Kreuzberg)
level. In chapters six, seven and eight the analytical perspective will then
change from one that focuses on 'citizenship from above', Le.
governmental approaches, to 'citizenship from below', namely the
interests in, and attitudes towards, citizenship of Berliners of Turkish
origin.
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ENDNOTES CHAPTER 4
From 1993 onwards Yugoslavian nationals consist of persons from Serbia and
Macedonia (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fUrAuslanderfragen 1997, p. 51, fn 8).
2 These numbers apply only to the 'old Bundeslander, Le. West-Germany.
Here, I mean children of a German and a 'non-German' parent as they are3
automatically granted German citizenship (since 1993 in the case of children born out of
wedlock to a German father and a 'non-German' mother).
4 These consist of expellees (Vertriebene) in the aftermath of World War II,
refugees (FIOchtlinge) and migrants (Ubersiedlen from the former East Germany and
ethnic German resettlers (Aussiedlen from Eastern European countries.
5 Efforts to further the integration of ethnic German immigrants should not only
however be regarded as an expression of 'ethnic preferences' but must be placed at the
same time within the political context of the Cold War era. When applying such an
extended analytical framework it does not for example come as a surprise that the
conservative German government started to limit financial aid for ethnic German
Aussiedler in the early 1990s, introduced an immigration quota for this group, and
requested the passing of a basic German language test as a prerequisite for the
immigration for ethnic Germans who live in Eastern Europe. In addition, integration
measures that were implemented for FlOchtlinge and Vertriebene who came in the
aftermath of the Second World War were also facilitated by the intervention of the Allied
Forces in Germany.
6 Rather than embracing their 'ethnic fellows' warm-heartedly, the 'indigenous'
German population reacts with strong resentment against the arrival of Aussiedler who
come predominantly from the former Soviet Union, Poland and Romania. They are often
perceived as, in effect, the 'welfare scroungers' of an affluent society to which they did
not contribute. This popular tendency can even be extended to the case of East
Germans (Ossis), viewed by Western German popular opinion as constantly whining
people who are unable to take the initiative to improve their life but nurse their feelings of
being 'betrayed' and 'colonised' by the West.
7 However, those EU citizens who differ from a perceived European 'norm' (white,
Christian) are in many cases still constructed as outsiders on the basis of their physical
appearance, their language, or religion.
8 For spouses of German citizens, or for political refugees for example, it is
possible to gain an Aufenthaltsberechtigung after five years of residence.
9 More critical examples with regard to the insecurity of residence are outlined in
Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung tar die Belange der Auslander, In der
Diskussion: Das Auslandergesetz. Erfahrungen nach drei Jahren, Bonn, May 1994 (for
example, authorities do not provide sufficient information about the potential residence
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status that non-Germans would - on application - be entitled to; problems regarding the
question of residence permits for young minority members or for the elderly who would
like to spend time in both their country of origin and Germany).
10 Until July 1st 1993 children born out of wedlock of a German father had to apply
for German citizenship according to Paragraph 10 RuStAG. Since 1993 children born out
of wedlock of German mothers or fathers are treated equally - Principle of the
Gleichbehandlung nichtehelicher Kinder.
11 Art. 116(1) of the German constitution states that Germans are those persons
who either possess German citizenship or who are FWchtlinge and Vertriebene of
German origin (including their spouses arid offspring).
12 However, against the background that according to the Einburgerungsrichtlinien
multiple citizenship should be avoided in principle (EbRI No. 5.3) also the 'foreign'
spouse is expected to give up his or her citizenship of origin in the process of
naturalisation. See for a comparison of Paragraphs 8 and 9 RuStaG, Renner 1993.
These administrative rules had to be introduced in order to co-ordinate the praxis
of naturalisation in the different German Lander. The latest version of the EbRI is from
13
20.1.1987.
14 Differences regarding the numbers of naturalisation are not necessarily
exclusively a reflection of attitudes of the various Liinderregierungen vis-a-vis
naturalisation. Other factors - that may have an additional impact - are linked to the
seize, the country of origin, or the length of stay of minority populations in one of (West)
Germany's Lander. Furthermore, Ttuennerdt points out that although regional differences
exist it is surprising "that by and large Bundeslander do not make full use of their
constitutional rights and they do not implement naturalisation policies ... that they think
would be right". In this context Thranhardt also emphasises that party differences
towards citizenship and naturalisation that are stated on the national level are only partly
reflected in governmental decisions on the regional level (Thranhardt 1998a, p. 1(}).
15 As per cent of the 'non-German' population.
In a parliamentary speech in favour of dual citizenship, Burkhard Hirsch (FOP)16
summarised this point: "Do we accept a person fully and without reservations as German
if he is called Ozturk and can be recognised by his physical features as an Anatolian,
once he gave up his Turkish citizenship and dares to see his future exclusively in
Germany? It is hypocritical of us to demand this decision from a foreigner as long as we
ourselves are not open enough." (Burkhard Hirsch (FOP), minutes of the German
parliament, 225th sitting, April 28, 1994, protocol 121225, p. 19409, author's translation)
17 In chapter 6, I will provide some empirical illustrations of these reasons.
18 The legal basis for excluding the option of dual citizenship is expressed in
paragraphs 9(1) and 25(1) of the RuStAG. Furthermore, it is written down in item 5.3. of
the Einburgerungsrichtlinien (Hailbronner 1992, pp. 13-14).
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19 Looking at the overall numbers of marriages between Germans and non-
Germans in 1994 we can see that as many German men marry a 'foreign' partner as
German women. However, this varies considerably when we regard more specific
numbers. For example, during that year 864 German men married a woman of Turkish
origin, compared to 3,128 German woman who married a 'Turkish' partner (Beauftragfe
der Bundesregierung fOrAus/anderfragen 1997, p. 34).
20 This emphasis was for example reflected in the petition for a Referendum
Doppe/fe StaatsbOrgerschaft (referendum on dual citizenship) which enjoyed the strong
support of main immigrant associations. Within eight months, more than one million
signatures were collected supporting the passing of legislation to officially allow dual
citizenship in Germany. The signature lists were for a while displayed in a glass container
in front of the Reichstag in Berlin.
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Chapter 5
BERLIN: NATIONAL CAPITAL OR
MULTICULTURAL METROPOLIS?
"Wir konnen einer Nation, die sich selbst
sucht, als Hauptstadt Halt geben. "
('~s the capital we can reassure a nation that
is in search of itself." Jorg SchOnbohm, Berlin's
Minister of the Interior, author's translation)
Like other world metropolises Berlin's cityscape is both the product and
the reflection of international migration movements. The slogan
"Immigranten schaffen eine Metropole" ("Immigrants build a Metropolis,,1)
takes concrete form in nearly every sphere of Berlin's city life. Its most
recent - and most literal - expression can be observed at 'Europe's
biggest construction site', the Potsdamer Platz. Here, Irish, Italian, Polish
and Turkish workers rebuild the new - and old - city centre of a unified
Berlin. What was formerly a deserted 'cold-war' zone adjacent to the
Berlin Wall has now become a site that both symbolises the reconciliation
between East and West and exhibits most powerfully Berlin's attempt to
present itself as a global European metropolis. Critics of the architectural
design around the Potsdamer Platz argue that it's foremost intention is to
provide a certain image of Berlin - namely that of a highly evolved, global,
dynamic, safe and immaculate city for the next millennium - rather than
meeting the needs of, and providing urban space for, its population. For
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them the new Potsdamer Platz is the architectural manifestation of the
'two-thirds society', excluding those who are either not considered, not
able, or who do not want to be, part of Berlin's newly promoted image
(Rada 1997,p. 13).
The question, whether or to what extent Berlin's ethnic minorities -
particularly those who came from Turkey and their offspring - are part of
the city's officially promoted image is the central concern of this chapter.
Currently, more than 200 different ethnic minorities live in Germany's new
capital. Contrary to the widespread Anglo-Saxon cliche about ethnic
relations in Germany, on a daily level the presence of ethnic minorities is
an accepted and common fact for Berlin's 'ethnic German" population.
This acceptance can hardly be described as a form of 'living together' let
alone as genuine tolerance, but after nearly 40 years of every-day
experience the co-existence with former migrants from Greece, Italy,
Yugoslavia and also Turkey is for most German Berliners a prosaic
matter-of-tact." To quote one of the young persons with whom I conducted
an interview: "If you live in Kreuzberg, the living together with foreigners is
a part of you" (Interview with F., 9.5.1997). However, this matter-of-fact,
i.e. the city's poly-ethnic character, seems to be overlooked - or repressed
- by Berlin's political establishment. Like its national counterpart, the city
government - a coalition of Christian and Social Democrats with Eberhard
Oiepgen (COli) as the city mayor - perceives Berlin exclusively as the
'capital of the Germans', that is of those who were born German. As a
result, on the level of city-politics those matters that are both of crucial
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concern for ethnic minorities and incisive for developing political
strategies that adequately respond to the needs of a poly-ethnic city are
assigned to the periphery. Indeed, one cannot help thinking that a
particular poster billboard campaign initiated by the Berlin
Auslanderbeauftragte (Barbara John) during the early nineties was
somewhat dislocated: These posters were designed to promote
multiculturalism in Berlin and had slogans such as "Miteinander leben in
Berlin" ("Living Together in Berlin") or "Wir sind Berlin: Wir sind helle und
Dunkle" ("We are Berlin: We are Light and Dark"). Rather than showing
them in tube stations, so that a wide spectrum of 'common' Berliners were
exposed to and could learn from them, it might have been more useful to
adopt a more targeted approach and to display the posters prominently in
various buildings of the city-government.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the significance of immigration
for the city's demographic development, its post-war immigration history,
the socio-economic position of immigrants, and political responses to
immigration. Beyond the sheer provision of basic data this analysis is
crucial for an understanding of the local context (that of the city of Berlin
together with one of its districts - Kreuzberq - where more than 20 percent
of all Berliners of Turkish origin live) whibh - as I will argue - plays a
crucial role in shaping the interests and identifications of Berliners of
Turkish origin and in influencing the direction of their social and political
activities. What will become clear in the course of this chapter is that with
regard to its poly-ethnic reality Berlin remains a 'divided city': Its
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government holds on to the principle of the primacy of the nation and - as
reflected in the opening quote - perceives Berlin as the urban epitome of
an ethnically defined German nation. In contrast, parts of its population
and sections of its bureaucracy - in particular the Aus/anderbeauftragten
on the city and local level - seek to develop arrangements that both
reflect and can cope with the reality of immigration.
POST WAR IMMIGRATION TO BERLIN
Historically, Berlin has been predominantly the destination for migrants
from Eastern Europe." According to JOrgen Fijalkowsky, the city gained its
"central-European multicultural character" immediately after the
foundation of the German Reich (1871) with the immigration of a high
number of workers from Silesia and the Prussian part of Poland
(Fijalkowsky 1994, p. 422). Between 1871 (when Berlin became the
capital of the German Reich) and 1919, its population increased from
900,000 to 3.7 million people." By 1910, more than 80,000 Berliners
spoke Polish as their first language (most of them however had German
citizenship) and constituted the city's largest minority (Pfleghar 1993, p.
10). During the Weimar Republic groups of Russian emigres who fled
Bolshevik rule, a significant number of Eastern European Jews and
groups of other Eastern European minorities settled in Berlin." The brutal
end to this period of the city's poly-ethnicity came after 1933 when nearly
all members of the city's minority population had to flee, were deported or
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were executed in concentration camps. At the same time, the Nazi regime
exploited masses of forced labourers in its gigantic war industry and by
the end of 1943 approximately 345,000 forced labourers - mainly
prisoners of war from the Soviet Union - worked in Berlin (Pfleghar 1993,
p. 11).
After the war, these workers were - as Displaced Persons - returned in
large numbers to their countries of origin; some emigrated to third
countries and only a few remained in the city. Between 1945 and the
construction of the Berlin Wall in 1.961Berlin's population remained - with
the exception of the presence of allied troops and their families - more or
less exclusively 'German'. During the immediate post-war years and until
1961, the great majority of Berlin's immigrants were German refugees
(Vertriebene) from formerly occupied territories of Nazi Germany - most of
them from Poland - and refugees (FWchtlinge) from the 'Soviet Occupied
Zone' (later the German Democratic Republic - GDR).7 In addition, a
number of West-Germans who were attracted by higher wages and state-
subsidies migrated to Berlin. Against the background that Berlin had
initially no shortage of immigrants, but also because the city's economy
was - due to its isolation - an economic latecomer in joining the German
'Wirtscha ftswunder', it was only after the construction of the Berlin Wall in
1961 that Berlin followed the West-German example and called on labour
from the European periphery. Given the city's late adoption of the
'Gastarbeitersystem' the workers who came to Berlin were migrants from
those countries with whom the German government had concluded
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recruitment treaties during the 1960s. These countries were in particular
Turkey (1961) and Yugoslavia (1968).8 From the very beginning labour
migrants from Turkey constituted the largest group of migrants: In 1965
approximately 3,000 workers from Turkey had joined Berlin's workforce. In
1969 their number had increased to 24,000, and to 79,000 by 1973
(Wilpert & Gitmez 1994, p. 342). .
Migrant workers initially lived in special workers' accommodation and
were by definition - as they were seen as a rotating workforce - not offered
services such as language classes or training schemes with a long-term
perspective of integration. Unlike in other West-German cities where
mostly male, young and single migrants worked as unskilled labour in the
mining and steel industry and in construction (see Cohn-Bendit & Schmidt
1992, p. 122-128), Berlin's textile and precision engineering industry hired
a high number of female contract workers who were considered more
suitable for this type of work. Given the high proportion of female
migrants, in comparison to their counterparts in West-Germany, contract
workers in Berlin started families at a very early stage and moved quickly
from workers' hostels into cheap flats in inner-city areas (Blaschke,
unpublished manuscript, pp. 1-2). In 1973 more than 40 per cent of
migrant labour from Turkey was female and at the same time at least
three quarters of married Turkish nationals lived with their spouses in
rented flats in West-Berlin, particularly in the district of Kreuzberg (Wilpert
& Gitmez 1994, p. 342; Stahr 1993, p. 52).9
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Following the halting of recruitment in 1973 and the increased immigration
of family members that was permitted by family unification laws, migrant
labour became increasingly settled in Berlin. The transformation from a
thus far 'temporary' workforce into a community of immigrants is reflected
in various areas such as demographic shifts and the emergence of
community structures. Furthermore, an increasing trend towards social
stratification among immigrants from Turkey can be observed in the
period following: they were no longer exclusively employed as unskilled
and semi-skilled workers but started their own small and medium sized
enterprises and became teachers, social workers, doctors or other middle
class professionals.
It is important to highlight at this stage the remarkable diversity of what is
often - and inadequately - referred to as 'the Turkish community' in Berlin.
Apart from age (i.e. first, second and third generation), class and gender
differences, questions of ethnic, political and religious affiliation and
resulting differences in attitudes towards politics both in Turkey and in
Germany, all call the analytical value of such generalisations into
question. Apparent boundaries within the 'Turkish community' are drawn
for example between members· of the Kurdish minority and Turks,
'Kema/ists' who support a clear division between state and Islam and non-
secular Muslims, or between Sunnis and Alevis. These divisions reflect
key problem areas both within Turkish politics - namely the relationship
between state and religion, Turkey's minority politics and tensions
between conservative and liberal forces - and show the significance of
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Turkish' conflicts beyond national boundaries as they affect
identifications and interests of Turkish nationals abroad.
At the same time when former Gastarbeiter and their families gradually
completed their settlement process, Berlin began to experience a radical
change in its immigration flows: During the 1980s the city became the
destination for refugees and asylum seekers. This development was in
many respects related to West Berlin's geographical location and its
special status. Equipped with transit visas for East-Germany, refugees
arrived at East-Berlin's airport Scnoneteki and were than able to enter
West-Berlin by using the suburban rail and subway network that was not
controlled by West-Berlin border police and that connected the Eastern
and Western parts of the city. Between 1985 and 1989 approximately
75,000 asylum seekers arrived in Berlin (predominantly from India, Iran,
Lebanon, Poland and Sri Lanka). According to a fixed distribution quota,
most of them were then sent further to one of the other Lander and
approximately 9,000 remained in Berlin (Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin
1995, p. 52). Despite substantial constitutional changes restricting the
right of asylum on the national level, between 1990 and 1995 nearly
100,000 persons applied for asylum in Germany's new capital, most of
them now came from Bulgaria, Romania, the former Soviet Union, former
Yugoslavia and Vietnam (Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1997).
In comparison, immigration played a negligible role in the GDR and in
East Berlin. In 1971/1972 the first 1,000 contract-workers were hired from
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Poland. Starting in the mid-seventies the GDR government concluded
government agreements with Algeria, Angola, China, Cuba, Mozambique,
Mongolia and North Korea. Until the 1980s many of these contracts were
defined as vocational training and as such regarded as a special form of
development aid. However, one can say that - as in the capitalist West -
contract workers were mainly employed in jobs which were both 'deserted'
by the indigenous population and vital for the production of main supplies
- on the national level two thirds worked for example as shift workers in
the textile, car and chemical industry. Conditions written down in their
contracts reflect the official pseudo-commitment of international solidarity
and understanding, a good example here is the 'pregnancy prohibition' for
Vietnamese women: "Vietnamese 'women who do not take advantage of
the possibilities of contraception or abortion, will return home earlier"
(agreement between Vietnam and the GDR, 1987, quoted in Tichy 1993,
pp. 157-158, author's translation). Contract workers were subjects to a
strict rotation system and control by the East-German government; they
normally lived in total isolation from the indigenous East Berlin population
and were put up in ghettoised worker accommodation. By 1987 the
biggest group of contract workers in East-Berlin were Vietnamese, in 1989
more than 10,000 'auslandische Werktatige' (the equivalent to the West-
German Gastarbeiter) and a furth~r 3,000 employees of foreign firms who
worked in East-Germany on the basis of various foreign trade agreements
were resident in East-Berlin (Pfleghar 1993, p. 17). After 1989 the
situation of former contract-workers and the question of whether they
should be allowed to stay on in unified Germany became a fiercely
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debated issue and was accompanied by a stream of violent racist attacks
in the East. Instead of offering the possibility of settlement - this certainly
would have been diametrically opposed to the principles of German
'immigration' policies - the government remained in the best tradition of
exclusionist and ad-hoc policies. According to what was called the
'humanitarian response' thumenltere Losung) only those workers who
were able to secure a permanent job were allowed to stay beyond the
duration of their contract, all others were expected to leave. As reflected
in the latest figures of asylum applications (see above) many Vietnamese
workers attempted to avoid deportation by applying for political asylum; in
addition Cubans and North Koreans were called back by their respective
governments (Senatsverwaltung fur Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und
Technologie Berlin 1995, p. 16). In 1995 approximately 4,000 former
contract-workers lived in Berlin, of these 3,500 were from Vietnam.
According to the Berlin Auslanderbeauftragte 2,200 Vietnamese and
about 100 Angolan and Mozambican persons were able to secure a
particular form of residence permit (Aufenthaltsbefugnis)
(Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1995,p. 18).
Before and after the 'Wende' in 1989, Berlin continued to experience a
significant inflow of German immigrants. Jochen Blaschke points out that
in the case of ethnic German diaspora immigrants from Eastern Europe,
Berlin was merely a "transit lounge" and few German Aussiedler actually
settled in Berlin but moved to West-Germany (Blaschke, unpublished
manuscript, p. 4) However, the author highlights in the same paper that
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West-Berlin was the main destination for many East-Berliners and the
intellectual GDR elite who either emigrated or fled after the construction of
the Wall in 1961 or who were expelled as political opponents. The fierce
and emotional debate about the role of East-German literati and the
dissentient 'aesthetic avant-garde' as informers for the East-German
Staatssicherheitsdienst (state security service) that involved primarily
East-German artists and intellectuals who had settled in West-Berlin
displayed the city's significance as a 'bohemian escape'. 10
During the 1990s at least four new groups of immigrants can be identified:
a) On the one hand illegal or undocumented workers who work mainly in
construction and in the service sector as well as providing domestic
services; b) On the other hand short-term contract workers predominantly
from countries of the former Eastern Bloc are hired for employment for up
to 18 months. Potential employees have to be skilled and between 18 and
40 years old. In addition, for seasonal employment, workers from Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and the former Yugoslavia can be
hired for up to three months; c) In 1995 approximately 32,000 refugees
from the former Yugoslavia lived in Berlin on the basis of an insecure
residence status (Du/dung). Most of these refugees originate from Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. These refugees are in an extremely
precarious situation, as most of them do not hold an entitlement to work
and in particular young persons over the age of 16 have almost no
chance of finding a vocational training place. According to the office of the
Aus/anderbeauftragte several thousand young adults are affected by this
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situation (Ausliinderbeauftragte Berlin 1995, p. 20); d) Berlin has become
an important centre for the reception of Jewish quota refugees. By May
1997, more than 72,000 Jewish persons from the (former) Soviet Union
were allowed to immigrate to Germany. Of these approximately 8,000 live
in Berlin (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr Ausliinderfragen 1997, p.
307; Ausliinderbeauftragte Berlin i997).11
IMMIGRANTS IN BERLIN - A PROFILE
Today, approximately 3.5 million people live in both parts of Berlin (2.2
million in the West and 1.3 million in the East). Of these, in June 1996,
439,795 were 'non-Germans' constituting 12.8 per cent of the population.
The great majority of them live in the former West Berlin (369,518 or 17.2
per cent of the population in the W.est)and only 70,277 were registered in
the Eastern districts of the city. Compared with other main German cities
Berlin has the eleventh highest percentage of ethnic minority residents
(27.9 per cent in Frankfurt, 23.3 per cent in Stuttgart and 22.3 per cent in
Munich). Persons of Turkish origin comprise the largest group with
137,674 (31.3 per cent), followed by people from the former Yugoslavia
with 78,620 (17.9 per cent) and from Poland (29,606, 6.7 per cent).
[due to printing problems the following p. 106 became p. 107]
105
PAGES
MISSING
IN
ORIGINAL
~ ..... 1.0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ..... .....N N N N N N N c::i
CII en 1.0 ~ ..... ..... ..... C") ~
~
N en ..... ..... 0 C") N .....~ 1.0 en en C\!. C") 00 1.0ai ai en ai 0 ci aie ...... .....
~ 1.0 C") C") C") ~ ..... 00 NN N N N N N N N
~
~ ..... ;1; ..... ~ N N 0N ...... C") 1.0 C") N
! 00 0 ~ ..... O. 00 C") 1.0.a:i ai ai en ..... ..... ci ............ ...... .....
1.0 1.0 ~ <0 en ..... ..... 0
~ ....: ..... cO cO cO cO Lri N......
b 0 C") ~ ..... en ~ 1.0 ......fi 0 ...... N N N ..... C")<0 0 0 ~ O. <0 ...... .q:_'0 cD ai ~ ..... 0 ai ...... 00Q. N N N C") N N
~ C") C") ~ ...... en 00 .....~ ..... ~ ..... ..... cO ....: cO ('I')..... ...... ..... ..... ..... ...... ...... N
~
.~
~ C") <0 C") N 0 0 0
§ i ..... 00 ~ 1.0 en N ~ <0..... ...... 0 en <0. <0N 1.0 ci C") 00 00 ..... cD01 ~ 1.0 ..... ..... ..... ..... <0 ......
~
..... 0 0 ..... CC! ~ ~ ~~ cO cO ~ C") ..... ..... cO ~C") C") C") C") C") C")
~ N 00
..... en en ~ 00 <0en C") 1.0 1.0 00 ..... 1.0 .....
~ 1.0 ..... .q:_ en 00 <0. 1.0 ........: 00 00 00 ..... ..... ~ C""it: C") C") C") C") C") C")..... ...... ..... ..... ..... ..... ......
:
<0 ..... ..... N 00 1.0 00 .....
i 1.0 ..... C") 0 en en ..... .....C") en <0 N <0 ..... 1.0 N
{!. Lti 1.0 8 en· Lti ai ai ci1.0 00 ..... C") C") ~ .....C") C") ~ ~ ~ ~
... .. ~ CO) : ." co
~
~~
G)
= = =G) G) G).. .. .. .. .. .. lU
......o-
Residence Status And Naturalisations
Berliners of Turkish origin in general show both the longest periods of
residence and the highest percentage of persons who were born in Berlin.
Figure 1: Length of Residence of 'Turkish' Berliners and Number
of Persons of Turkish Origin Born in Berlin (31.12.1995)
o Born in Berlin. More than 20 years D 1()'20 Years rJ1I5-10Years. Less than 5 Years
Source: Ausltinderbeauftragte Berlin 1997
Unlike the data that is available on the national level, Berlin's authorities
do not simply include 'non-German' children who were born in Berlin into
the statistics on 'length of stay' (see previous chapter) but list them in a
special category. Hence, looking at this Berlin graph the striking fact
becomes explicit that nearly one third of 'Turkish' Berliners were born in
Berlin (40,043)13.In addition a further 43 per cent (59,514) have been
living in the city for more than 10 years, and another 13 per cent (17,925)
for 5 to 10 years. This leaves just 15 per cent of Berliners of Turkish origin
with a shorter-term residence of less than 5 years.
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In 1995 34,819 Berliners of Turkish origin held the unbefristete
Aufenthaltserlaubnis, and 39,723 were holders of an
Aufenthaltsberechtigung. In comparison with other German Lander, the
proportion of minority members in Berlin, particularly those of Turkish
origin and from the former Yugoslavia, who hold a secure residence
permit is the highest (see Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1994,p. 13)
As I have argued in the previous chapter, the fact that Berliners of Turkish
origin hold in general a rather secure residence permit should - as a
matter of principle - not serve as an excuse or academic rationalisation
that renders the acquisition of formal German citizenship obsolete. If we
move beyond the simple day to day practicalities of life - where the
residence status may well be sufficient for the individual to get on with life
or even to prosper - and enter a discussion of essential principles in
democratic societies we are faced with serious objections. First, as
pointed out before, there is no legal parity between a secure residence
status and that of a citizen. The difference manifests itself in the absence
of particular rights for Germany's ethnic minority population (especiatly for
those who are not EU-citizens) and, in the extreme, in the threat of being
expelled from Germany. Second, an absence of ius soli elements in
citizenship laws and the legally endorsed inheritance of a 'foreigners'
status' as well as bureaucratic hurdles in the context of the naturalisation
process imply the danger of defining members of the population in certain
national boundaries as insiders or outsiders along ethnic lines.
109
Looking for example at the recent implementation of 'Regelungen zum
Aufenthaltsrecht fiir minderjiihrige Kinder aus der Tiirkei, Marokko,
Tunesien und Ex-Jugoslawien' (Regulations of Residence for Minors from
Turkey, Tunisia and former Yugoslavia) formulated in January 1997, we
can see how, for ethnic minority members in Berlin, such a manifestation
of exclusion has become an offensive experience. According to these
regulations parents who originated from these three countries have to
apply for a residence permit for their children, even if these were born in
Germany; such a permit was not necessary before. Without debating the
motives that led to the implementation of these regulations, I would briefly
like to pay attention to the bureaucratic practice - as chosen by the Berlin
Senate - according to which Berliners of Turkish origin actually acquired
this permit.
Let me start with a scenario that the Berlin Senate could have adopted
had it wished to mitigate the effects of the new regulations and to
reassure members of ethnic minorities of their unconditional acceptance
as 'ecnte Berliner' ('real Berliners'). Germany has an extended system of
registration policies that apply nationally. Every resident - German or non-
German, short-term or long-term, regardless of age - has to be registered
at his or her current address with the police, and the authorities have to
be informed within a few weeks about any change of address (a German
bureaucrat would be dumbfounded if he or she found out that this form of
registration is unheard of in Britain). Against the background of this
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sophisticated system of compulsory registration the Berlin authorities
could have automatically sent resident permits for minors - without any
application procedure - to the families in question. However, instead of
choosing this bureaucratically uncomplicated option, the Berlin Senate
informed persons who were affected by these regulations in writing and by
public announcement and asked them to call at the Berlin authority for
foreigners to acquire such a permit." As a result thousands had to start
queuing in the early morning hours in order to acquire a permit for their
children and were once again reminded that even being born and brought
up in Germany, or in this case in Berlin, does not go hand in hand with
being an accepted and full member of society by law.
With this one, they show us again that we don't belong to
them. Now my boy keeps asking me whether they'll send him
away.... Damn! Why don't they just - at least - send us that
thing: 'Sorry folks - Kohl makes us do this but we'll make it as
easy as possible for you'. (Interview with M. 26.5.1997)15
With regard to citizenship, until 1995 Berlin has been the Bundesland with
the highest number of naturalisation on the basis of discretion compared
to the national average (Hagedorn 1998, p. 53).16 In addition, it has -
again compared to other German Lander- the most generous practice vis-
a-vis tolerating dual citizenship and has most effectively encouraged
Berliners of minority origin to use their right to naturalise according to
Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the Auslenderqesetz. However, before providing
some recent data, let me point out at this stage that the practice of
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relatively positive citizenship policies in Berlin is largely due to the
persistence and commitment of Berlin's Aus/anderbeauftragte (Barbara
John), her office and many of the Ausliinderbeauftragte on the municipal
level. Looking at some activities of the Senate - and in particular the
Senate of the Interior - we can see that attempts to promote naturalisation
were not necessarily on everyone's mind.
Take the case of Berlin Kreuzberg in 1993/94. On the initiative of its
mayor the municipality started an advertising campaign to inform people
of the regulatory framework introduced by Paragraphs 85 and 86 of the
Ausliindergesetz. The naturalisation office initiated a direct mailing
campaign, including both an information pamphlet as well as the official
citizenship application form to Kreuzberg's ethnic minority residents who
fulfilled the official requirements for claiming a right for naturalisation. The
immediate return, i.e. completed application forms - although low in real
terms - nevertheless exceeded the number of applications for the months
before by 300 percent (183 and 161 in January/February 1994 compared
with 60 and 64 in November/December 1993 according to the internal
statistics of the Bezirksamt Kreuzberg Berlin). Rather than perceiving the
increase in the interest in German citizenship as a welcome development,
the Berlin Ministry of the Interior intervened immediately to reprimand
Kreuzberg's mayor and to inform him that sending an application form by
letter without individual counselling was illegal.
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Since the legal changes introduced in 1991 and 1993 (when for the first
time two groups of 'foreigners' became legally entitled to naturalise, see
chapter 4) Berlin has seen a significant increase in the number of
naturalisations.
Table 5: Naturalisations in Berlin by Discretion and According to
Paragraphs 85,86 Ausliindergesetz (1990 to 1995)
Year Total numbers of From Turkey
naturalisations by
discretion and
according to §§ 85,
86 in Berlin
1990 3,12317 554
1991 5,671 1,354
1992 8,767 3,326
1993 7,976 4,102
1994 6,620 3,330
1995 7,710 5,196
Source: Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1997
Of these in 1995, 1,446 (19 per cent) were naturalisations of Kreuzberg's
minority population. At first glance this increase may seem to be rather
insignificant because the number of naturalised 'Turkish Berliners' is still
low in comparison with the total number of Turkish Berliners as only
approximately nine per cent of those who were eligible, i.e. who lived in
Berlin for at least 10 years -acquired the German passport. However,
apart from the fact that one should interpret these figures as significant
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trend shifts, it is important to point out that the number of completed
naturalisations does not reflect the number of naturalisation applications
that are currently with the local registry offices. Many observers assume
that this number is so high that in return it creates a delay in processing
the claims. According to Eckhardt Barthel (SPD) - a member of the Berlin
Senate - currently it takes 9-10 months to process an application
(Interview with Eckhardt Barthel 30.4.1997). Most applications are based
on Paragraphs 85 and 86 AuslG which give the applicant the right to
naturalise, and on this basis one might expect a far more exceptional
increase in the numbers of naturalisations during the next years. In fact
Riza Baran, member of the Berlin parliament estimates that two thirds of
Turkish Berliners will become naturalised within the next 10 years (Riza
Baran, unpublished manuscript); the former chairman of the TtJrkische
Gemeinde Berlin, Mustafa 9akm~koglu, anticipates that within the next
three to five years approximately 70-80 per cent of Turkish Berliners will
be naturalised (Interview 24.4.1997).
Aysin Inan of the Turkish Women's Association put an example to me that
may illustrate the extensive interests of Berliners of Turkish origin in their
new right to take up German citizenship:
On one occasion I was really taken by surprise. And actually
I was a little angry with myself because I had not got my act
together then [to apply for cltlzenshlpl, Well, there was this
woman who comes here. She can't read and she can't write,
but she was committed to getting this passport and she
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asked us to fill in the forms. Well I did that and sent her back
to YorkstraBe [location of Kreuzberg's registry office]. And
she came back with a polite note written by one of the
employees regarding those things that were missing. Very
simple. I was so embarrassed, why had I not thought of that.
Well this woman, like many elderly, considers naturalisation
when she becomes a pensioner. (Interview with Aysin Inan,
TOrkischer Frauenverein, 12.5.1997)
I have argued in the past (Brandt 1994) that due to exclusionary German
politics the interest on the part of 'migrants' in applying for naturalisation
has remained very low, especially because of the necessity of giving up
their citizenship of origin. Clearly, the sharp increase in applications for
naturalisations contradicts such a point of view and I will explain
differences in attitudes in more detail in the next two chapters. In addition,
it appears that a growing number of Turkish Berliners no longer insist on
holding on to their Turkish nationality. Nationality seems to become more
and more instrumental, Le. used as a means to gain access to rights. In
this context the recent introduction of the so called 'Rosa Karte' ('Pink
Card') by the Berlin Senate that - as a result of bilateral agreements
between Germany and Turkey - guarantees naturalised Germans of
Turkish origin crucial rights in Turkey (such as the right to return, the right
to work, the right to own land, the right of inheritance etc.) may well playa
significant role in decreasing the interest in holding the Turkish passport.
Certainly for Kurds in Berlin, who by definition did not positively identify
with their Turkish passport, the Rosa Karte might prove to be an incentive
to become exclusively German on paper:
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I too have now applied for the Rosa Karte. Then I won't need
my Turkish passport. As a Kurdish woman I have anyway
never been proud of this passport. Each time I fly to Turkey I
am a little afraid. You know my political views and my work.
As a Turkish national they could have caused me trouble at
anytime. If you are a holder of dual nationality, [once in
Turkey] you cannot get the protection of the German
embassy (Interview with G., female, 21.5.1998).
Spatial Distribution and the Situation in Kreuzberg
Regarding the spatial pattern of minority settlement, city districts with
more than 10 per cent non-German residents are Tiergarten, Wedding,
Kreuzberg, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf, Sch6neberg, and
Neuk6l1n.
Figure 2: German and 'Non German' Residents in Selected
Districts of West-Berlin (30.6.1996)
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In each of these districts the largest group of 'non-Germans' consists of
residents holding a Turkish passport. The percentage of ethnic minorities
in Tiergarten is 26.1 per cent (24,320 in absolute numbers of which 8,623
- or 35 per cent - are persons of Turkish origin), Wedding 28.8 per cent
(47,341/24,332 - 51 per cent), Kreuzberg 33.6 per cent (51,990/28,913-
56 per cent), Charlottenburg 18.6 per cent (33,412/7,547 - 23 per cent),
Spandau 11.8 per cent (25,762/8,829 - 34 per cent), Wilmersdorf
(18,824/2,176 - 11.6 per cent) Sch6neberg 22.6 per cent (34,119/12,051
- 35 per cent) and in Neuk611n19.5 per cent (61,044/26,904 - 44 per
cent).
These figures mirror both the spatial pattern of settlement starting in the
1970s and the process of social stratification amongst Berliners of Turkish
origin and their distribution through the city thereafter. As mentioned
above, in the late 1960s and early 1970s most 'guestworkers' who started
to have families and to settle down in Berlin moved from workers'
accommodation to inner-city redevelopment areas. It was not however
simply the search for affordable rents that caused the original settlement
of 'guestworkers' in areas like Kreuzberg, Wedding, Tiergarten and
Neuk611nbut rather a conglomerate of reasons: the Berlin politics of
redevelopment during the sixties and seventies were characterised by
extreme measures. Once redevelopment areas were identified, the
houses in these areas were basically left to deteriorate. As a result
affluent tenants moved into districts that guaranteed a higher quality of
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living space, others, like elderly people or low-income households who
legally could not be forced to move, stayed on. Consequently, until the
houses became empty and could be demolished, many of them were left
half-unoccupied for a long period of time. In this situation the interests of
the Sanierungsgesellschaften (redevelopment companies) on the one
hand and the needs of migrants on the other overlapped. In order to
acquire rental income for houses that were to be demolished,
Sanierungsgesellschaften needed tenants who could not afford to be
fussy about the quality of their accommodation and who showed a high
degree of 'flexibility' in moving at short notice from one flat that was to be
demolished to the next. Their interest was met, though by lack of choice,
by the needs of many 'guestworker' families, who were a) looking for
cheap accommodation, b) still considered returning to their countries of
origin in the foreseeable future, and c) who had already experienced
discrimination during their search for flats on the private market (Stahr
1993, pp. 52-56).
According to Stahr (1993) the move of 'guestworkers' into quarters with a
high percentage of old and run-down buildings took place in a very short
period of time. Within two years (from 1969 to 1971) the percentage of
non-German residents in some areas of the districts of Kreuzberg and
Wedding increased from 15 per cent to 30 per cent and from 15 per cent
to 28 per cent respectively (Stahr 1993, p. 53). Alarmed by the spatial
concentration of minorities in certain areas, in 1975 the Senate of Berlin
introduced a ban against further settlement of non-European minorities in
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Kreuzberg and in Wedding (Zuzugssperre). According to this ban only
children and teenagers under the age of 17 were allowed to join their
parents which caused "grotesque situations" in the cases of spouses and
of children who were older than 16 who wanted to join their families
(Senatsverwaltung fOr Stadtentwicklung, Umweltschutz und Technologie
Berlin 1995, p. 28).18
The ban was modified in 1977 and repealed in 1990. Opinions regarding
the 'success' of this policy are - with the exception of official reports -
unified in their assessment. Minority members who were still in need of
moderate rental accommodation either moved into other districts with old
and derelict housing (e.g. Sch6neberg and Neuk6l1n)or were forced to
deceive the authorities by officially registering in districts that were not
affected by the ban and to move illegally into flats in Kreuzberg and
Wedding.
What remained for many was the realisation of being second
class citizens who were not allowed to live where they
wanted to - a constitutionally attested right for all Germans
(Stahr 1993, p. 55, author's translation)
Strolling through parts of Kreuzberg today, any observer realises that
immigration from Turkey has left its mark on the district. This is
particularly true for some areas around Kottbusser Tor, G6rlitzer Bahnhof
and Schlesisches Tor (the former Kreuzberg 3619). Clearly, although it is
as much a cliche as it is inadequate to equal the atmosphere in some of
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Kreuzberg's streets to that of Turkish cities, as a first impression this
comparison comes to mind easily. Some streets are lined with retail shops
and offices whose owners are exclusively of Turkish origin. Next to
grocer's shops and Doner Kebab stalls are Turkish banks and insurance
companies, travel agents who advertise cheap flights to Istanbul, Izmir,
Marmaris and Ankara, import-export businesses, Turkish teahouses with
groups of men playing backgammon or cards, and undertakers offering
Muslim funerals in Berlin or Turkey. Many residents and shoppers
converse in Turkish, the graffiti on the walls display Turkish slogans that
advocate anti-imperialist and Marxist struggles, the murder of Kurds,
Kurdish autonomy, or support for the Grey Wolves. "You can do
everything the Turkish way from birth to death" (Interview with Ms Josten,
Kreuzberg's Auslanderbeauftragte, 13.S.199n.
Yet, it would be wrong - as Blaschke has pointed out - to define Kreuzberg
on this impressionistic glance as a 'Turkish' ghetto. Berlin's population of
Turkish origin is "differentiated not only in social terms but also with
regard to its distribution through the city. Berlin has always been covered
by a network of familial and sociatrelatlons of the immigrants." (Blaschke,
unpublished manuscript, p. 2). Figure 2 shows that a significant proportion
of Turkish Berliners live in 7 out of the 12 West Berlin city-districts rather
than being concentrated in just one or two dlstrlcts." Furthermore, the
application of the term ghetto in general goes hand in hand with the
description of its population as an 'underclass' which - using Wilson's
(1987) definition - would be an inappropriate representation of
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Kreuzberg's population as many areas of Kreuzberg are still socially and
ethnically mixed. In addition, the German welfare state offers - in contrast
to the USA - a substantial social safety net and has for a long time
financed a number of local autonomous minority initiatives and projects
that offer crucial services to the minority population.
However, today there is a genuine fear that this mixing is currently in
danger of vanishing as the middle class - particularly of German origin but
also minority residents - are moving out of the district in growing numbers
(many middle-class Berliners of Turkish origin for example move to
Charlottenburg, a largely affluent and central district in the West of
Berlin). Many areas of Kreuzberg and its population appear to be caught
in a vicious circle consisting of high long term unemployment, the erosion
of the local tax base, cuts in financing social facilities (such as youth
centres, kindergartens, advice centres, etc.), decline in school standards,
loss of the middle class population and the influx of disadvantaged, low
skilled new immigrants. Recent facts about the social situation in
Kreuzberg speak for themselves: at the beginning of 1997 the
unemployment rate in Kreuzberg was 28,1 per cent, 35 per cent for the
minority population; by the end of February 1997 one third of Kreuzberg's
unemployed members of ethnic minority groups had been without a job for
more than a year (half of those persons who were 50 years and older
were long-term unemployed). In Germany, Kreuzberg (together with
Berlin's district Tiergarten) has the highest percentage of residents who
require forms of social benefits (15..8 per cent); of these nearly 50 per cent
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are long-term unemployed and 45 per cent are members of ethnic
minorities. Kreuzberg has the lowest monthly per-capita income in Berlin
with 1,158 DM (approximately £400) and its average household income is
2,200 DM (£750). Between 30th June 1994 and 30th November 1995 564
non-German persons (from outside Berlin) took up residence in
Kreuzberg, at the same time 1,424 Germans decided to move out. Nearly
60 per cent of all children in state kindergartens are of minority origin. On
average 44.6 per cent of all pupils in Kreuzberg are 'non-Germans', in
some schools their percentage is as high as 70 per cent, some classes
consist exclusively of pupils of minority background. "By taking a look at
Kreuzberg, and by walking throuqh the district, I am surprised that
Kreuzberg can still function the way it does." (Interview with Ms Josten,
Kreuzberg's Aus/anderbeauftragte, 13.5. 1997)21
Plainly the concentration of on the one hand ethnic minorities and on the
other of low- and semi-skilled workers has meant that Kreuzberg has been
comparatively worse hit by a crisis in Berlin's manufacturing industry and
the relative shift to services. In addition some bigger local Kreuzberg
companies - for example Bosse an electrical goods producer - moved out
of Kreuzberg after the fall of the Berlin Wall. For various reasons it was
easier and cheaper for them to relocate their production to Berlin's
surrounding countryside in the former East-Germany: a) initially the
wages were lower than in the West; b) companies did not have to meet
certain production conditions - e.g. with regard to noise pollution - that
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exist in central city areas; c) they could benefit from state subsidies
allocated to companies producing in one of the neue Bundeslender.
The local Kreuzberg councillor (member of the
Bezirksverordnetenversammlung) ozcen Mutlu posed some parliamentary
questions in December 1996 to Kreuzberg's mayor. Answering his
question concerning the reasons for unemployment amongst Kreuzberg's
minority population, Franz Schulz (Kreuzberg's mayor) mentioned as
explanation for the disproportional high unemployment rate of 'non-
Germans': a) relocation of production (see above example), b) closure of
companies/factories, c) lack of educational and vocational skills, d)
comparatively less regional mObility22,e) limited access to further
education, and f) replacement of Turkish employees by East-Berlin
Germans."
The Labour Market
A brief look at the West-Berlin labour market - where 90 per cent minority
employees work - shows the following: In June 1996 80,849 'non-
Germans' were employees covered by social security
(sozialversicherungspflichtig bescnettiqte Arbeitnehmer - approximately
ten per cent of the workforce). Of these 34,615 (43 per cent) were
Berliners of Turkish origin.
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Figure 3: German and 'Non-German' Employees in Selected
Sectors of West-Berlin's Economy (30.6.1996)
ServiceSector Manufactaing Ccnstruction Commerce
D Employees ofTurkish Origin
• Non-Gennan Employees (Excluding
Turkish Nationals)
ID Gennan Employees
Source: BezirksbOrgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg 1997
In 1996 more than 40 per cent of all 'non-German' employees worked in
the service sector (33,537 in absolute numbers, these are 11.8 per cent of
the total workforce in this sector). They were in particular employed in
cleaning services and in the restaurant business. Of the 'non-German'
service sector workforce, 36.3 per cent were of Turkish origin; of these
approximately 40 per cent worked as cleaners. Looking at manufacturing
- where about one quarter of ethnic minority employees were employed in
1996 - we can see that 55 per cent of the 'non-German' manufacturing
employees are of Turkish origin, who worked in particular in the food
processing, electronic and synthetic industry. Twelve per cent of all
officially employed minority members found work in construction; again of
these more than 40 per cent consist of immigrants from Turkey and their
offspring. The fourth most important economic sector for ethnic minority
employees is commerce, where eight per cent were employed -
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constituting six per cent of the total workforce in this sector, of these 42
per cent are Berliners of Turkish origin (BezirksbOrgermeister von Berlin-
Kreuzberg 1997).
Thirty-nine per cent of non-German employees were ethnic minority
women (31,331, of these 13,846 - 44 per cent - were Turkish nationals).
Like their male counterparts, women work predominantly in the service
sector, in manufacturing and in commerce. Their numbers are particularly
high in electrical goods manufacturing, health care, cleaning services and
in the hotel and restaurant business. Most Turkish women for example -
nearly 30 per cent - work in cleaning services (3,991 in absolute
numbers).
The number of employed members of West-Berlin's minority population
has been decreasing since 1990 and - as expected - their unemployment
rate is both considerably higher than that of their German counterparts
and it increases more rapidly. In September 1996, 28.8 per cent non-
German residents were unemployed compared to 16 per cent of Germans
seeking employment (BezirksbOrgermeister von Berlin-Kreuzberg 1997).
In September 1995, 38 per cent of unemployed minority members in the
Western districts of Berlin were women (11,901). Furthermore, the
disproportional increase in unemployment does not affect all age groups
in the same way. In particular young minority members who are between
20 and 25 years old are unsuccessful in finding jobs
(Auslan'derbeauftragte Berlin 1997).24
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The information provided so far about the general legal and socio-
economic situation of minority Berliners, particularly of Turkish origin, has
sought to capture some important facets of their experiences and
circumstances in Berlin. In the next part I would like to turn to the content
and the extent of official responses that deal with multi-ethnic urban
realities.
THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE
Berlin both prides itself and is· often singled out for its degree of
institutionalised 'multi-culturalism' (see for example Vertovec 1996; or
Lorbeer 1993) as part of the city's 'public sphere'. Shining examples of
such institutions are the Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Werkstatt der
Kulturen, Radio MultiKulti and a new Turkish-German radio station - its
producers are still searching for a name - that will be 'on air' in April 1999,
AYPA- TV, the Berlin Carnival or the German-Turkish Europaschule in
Kreuzberq." At the official level, the best known institution that seeks to
represent and to promote multi-culturalism is the office of Berlin's
Auslanderbeauftragte. In the following I will first outline the work of this
office. However, without any intention of belittling or diminishing the
importance of the Commissioner's work, an analysis of the official
response to immigration cannot just focus on official institutions of multi-
culturalism that promote - by definition - a positive image of the city's
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heterogeneity. In order to get a more comprehensive picture, we need to
use a wide-angle perspective that does not only depict the idyllic
components of the landscape but also potential waste disposal or
construction sites that may expose a less favourable image. In order to do
so, I will secondly examine the official handling of one conflict that has
arisen between the government and a number of ethnic minority
organisations, namely the question of religious education in Berlin's
primary and secondary schools.
Representing Immigration: The Office of the Commissioner for
Foreigners' Affairs
After the election victory of the Christian-Liberal coalition in 1980, Berlin
was the first Bundesland that set up its own position of an
Ausliinderbeauftragte in 1981. At the national level this post had been
established in 1979 (Fijalkowsky 1994, p. 432). According to Thomas
Schwarz, the introduction of this post - which has been filled since its
establishment in Berlin by Barbara John - represents a shift from
"Ausliinderpolitik als Problem staatlicher Planung' ("foreigner politics as a
problem of governmental planning") to that of "Beauftragtenpoliti/('
("politics of representation") (Schwarz 1992,pp. 121-130). The framework
of the 8eauftragtenpolitik envisages to a certain degree an official
institutionalisation of representing the interests of migrants and
mlnorltles."
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The office of the Berlin Auslanderbeauftragte is part of Berlin's
administration, and is currently assigned to the Senate Administration for
Social Affairs, hence the Commissioner's position is not a political but an
administrative one. Starting off as a mediator between the city government
on the one hand and minority organisations on the other, Barbara John's
office attempted initially to establish and intensify contacts with minority
organisations in Berlin. It is important at this point to explain briefly the
wider political situation in which this shift to the Beauftragtenpolitik took
place. At the beginning of the 1980s the Berlin government introduced
significant changes regarding the financing and structure of its welfare
policies. In this context it started to finance numerous self-help
organisations in order to delegate some sections of welfare provision in
the form of social services from the state to the private level. As Blaschke
has pointed out, this form of welfare politics has to be seen as part of the
overall conservative-liberal strategy of deregulation that became the
economic canon at the same time (Blaschke, without year). As a result of
this strategy existing immigrant organisations received financial
institutional support for providing special services to Berlin's ethnic
minority population - such as language classes, youth centres, or various
advice bureaux - and new local organisations were established with the
same purpose (I will discuss the formation and the work of immigrant
organisations in greater detail in chapter 8). Against the background that
an increasing number of ethnic minority organisations became actively
involved in social affairs - and hence in the politics - on the local and the
city level, the office of the Auslanderbeauftragte was the designated
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"buffer" between the interests and demands of minority organisations on
the one hand and those of the city government on the other (Blaschke,
without year).
During the brief government of the Social Democratic-Green coalition from
1989 to 1991 a new work-dimension was introduced. As Schwartz and
Vertovec have pointed out, in particular some members of the Green
Party were influenced by British, and especially Dutch concepts of anti-
racism and multi-culturalism and the Green coalition partner envisaged
the application of similar approaches in Berlin (Vertovec 1996, p. 388).27
However, by the end of this coalition in 1991, such concepts had not
developed beyond the articulation of rudimentary ideas and were only
partially integrated into the work of the office of the Auslanderbeauftragte.
This original function of the Commissioner's office - its role as mediator -
has remained an important facet of its work. Currently 25 ethnic minority
groups are consulted regularly on local issues (Anh6rung der
Auslanderverbande). In addition, the Commissioner's office continues to
grant financial subsidies to a number of projects. For example in 1994,
nearly 60 ethnic minority projects received financial support which
amounted to a total of 6.55 million German marks. These consisted of 14
social service stations, 15 consultation projects, 6 education projects, 17
social and cultural projects, 5 neighbourhood projects, and one youth
project. A further 36 projects that focused primarily on the support of
young members of ethnic minorities, on "intercultural encounters" and on
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anti-discrimination policies, but that were not necessarily provided by
ethnic minority organisations, were financed (Auslanderbeauftragte
1995a).28
Apart from these tasks the role of the Auslanderbeauttraqte also includes
the development of measures against racism. In this context Barbara
John's office seeks to promote approaches to tackle racism in "everyday
situations", Le. unequal treatment or confrontation with racist insults or
threats in the areas of work, education, vocational training and in
community services and leisure establishments (such as discotheques
and restaurants) (Barbara John 1994, p. 25n. In this context her office
has founded the Arbeitsgruppe zur gewaltfreien kulturiibergreifenden
Verstandigung (Project for Non-Violent Intercultural Understanding).
Amongst other things, this project advises and documents individual
cases of ethnic discrimination; it sets up arbitration talks in conflict
situations; it holds discussions for example with public housing authorities
(in order to improve the access of ethnic minorities to adequate rented
accommodation), with discotheque owners (about young men of Turkish
origin who are not allowed into a number of these establishments) and
representatives of the Berlin administration; it offers 'Training Courses
Against Discrimination and Violence' for juvenile offenders; it liases with
the Unabhangige Kommision zur Verhinderung und Bekampfung von
Gewalt in Berlin (Independent Commission for the Opposition and
Prevention of Violence in Berlin); and it seeks to raise awareness and
tolerance via information and public relations work (Barbara John 1994,p.
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261). Information and public relations work includes the publication of a
monthly magazine (Top Berlin International- Ein Informationsforum) that
informs both about legal and political developments regarding the
situation of 'non-German' Berliners and about social and cultural events.
Furthermore, Barbara John's office produces and distributes educational
videos and information pamphlets about single minority groups in Berlin,
or about access to naturalisation, educational services etc. She publishes
information letters in various lanquaqes on family planning, Aids or other,
more general, health care provisions.
As Steve Vertovec (1996) has described in his article 'Berlin Multikulti;
Germany, "Foreigners" and "World-Openness"", the office of the
Auslanderbeauftragte ran various poster-billboard campaigns in order to
promote multi-culturalism amongst Berlin's population. Vertovec calls this
the "space-changing multi-culturalism" of the office "that has sought to
change the space between peoples' ears - their fundamental thoughts
about social categories and processes affecting their city." (Vertovec
1996, p. 391). In order to change "the space between officials' ears" which
- as I would argue - seems to be a much more difficult enterprise, the
office commissions academic studies on particular issues concerning the
situation of ethnic minority Berliners. With this it attempts to highlight the
need for the development of policies targeted at Berliners of ethnic
minority background and to inform their shape and content.
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The work of Barbara John's office- who is a member of the CDU -
regarding the integration of ethnic minorities is not undisputed amongst
her party-colleagues who are currently the dominant partner in Berlin's
coalition government. During a party day held by the CDU Berlin some
members who are more on the right of the party's political spectrum,
criticised Ms John for the promotion of an "identitiitslose Multikultur" (a
rnultl-ethnic culture without identity) (die tageszeitung, 4.6.1997). The
most forceful and effective way to express their misgivings is clearly the
introduction of financial cuts of John's already extremely meagre budget:
Let us look at an official statement of the Ausliinderbeauftragte where she
points out that:
"...substantial subsidies for welfare institutions and self-help
organisations are an effective and long-term device for the
integration of foreigners and ethnic minorities short of full
equality under the law." (Aus/iinderbeauftragte Berlin
1995a).
Yet, since 1994 the budget of Barbara John's office has been the object of
financial cuts. Currently her office receives eleven million German marks
(a little less than four million pounds - a decrease of nearly one third
compared to the budget in 1994) and was even threatened of being
closed down in Summer 1997 (die· tageszeitung, 4.6.1997). Clearly, these
cuts are not exclusively an attack on the Commissioner's office but have
also affected other parts of Berlin's administration (in particular the areas
of education and special programmes for women). However, the size or
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amount of means and resources that are provided for the implementation
of particular policies are in general rather telling reminders of what
governmental priorities are.
Repressing Immigration - Views Expressed by the Berlin
Government
In April 1997 Berlin's Minister for the Interior (Jorg Scnonbonm - CDLi)
published an article in the newspaper Berliner Morgenpost that - from my
point of view - summarises succinctly the official approach of the Berlin
government vis-a-vis integration pollcles." Under the title: "Integration ist
keine EinbahnstraBe" ("Integration is not a one way streef' - Berliner
Morgenpost, 25.4. 1997) Scnonbcbm accused "groups of foreigners" of
keeping themselves in isolation from the German majority population and
thus of establishing themselves permanently as "alien elements".
According to him, "migrants" should instead "be prepared to adjust to the
local conditions and way of life." Furthermore, the desire to retain
particular identities should not be used as a pretext "for cutting
themselves off from German culture and customs in a self-isolating
manner". He concludes:
The capability of societies to integrate is limited. The higher the
percentage of foreigners the more difficult it becomes to
integrate them. If the German society feels overstrained, its
willingness to open up and to show tolerance cannot be
,secured. Rapidly increasing numbers of foreigners can cause
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fears of being threatened and swamped (Berliner Morgenpost,
25.4.1997, author's translation).
Or in other words: the capablllty of constructing any society as an
ethnically homogeneous entity is limited. The higher the percentage of
immigrants the more difficult it is to promote an ethnically defined notion
of a nation state population. As long as 'the primacy of the nation' - as
expressed in Scnonbonm's statement - is the underlying rationale for
governmental politics, the reality of immigration and the development of
corresponding strategies are by definition repressed and societal conflicts
become preconditioned.
This repression manifests itself in crucial areas of political decision-
making that in turn shape access to full citizenship by Berlin's ethnic
minority population. Take the example of Kreuzberg: as described above,
the district is in urgent need of substantial financial support to improve the
educational and employment opportunities of its population and also to
provide targeted social services. Yet, despite an aggravation of
Kreuzberg's overall socio-economic situation, we have seen that the
budget for financing various self-help organisations, that have thus far
provided crucial services, has been cut substantially over the past years.
The negative impact of these cuts is particularly acute in the former
Kreuzberg 36 with a high proportion of 'non-German' residents who can't
express their dissatisfaction with governmental priorities at the ballot
box.30.
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The conflict that has arisen around the subject of Islamic education in
Berlin's schools may illustrate the static thinking of the city's current
government. As secularisation in Germany - in comparison to other
European nation states - took place at a rather late stage, the Protestant
and the Catholic Churches are still closely interlinked with the state
system and the distribution of resources. In most German Bundeslander-
apart from Berlin and another city-state, Bremen - religion is a
compulsory subject in school. This is not the case in Berlin (and Bremen).
However both Butuieslender have concluded a contract with the Catholic
and the Protestant Churches that allows them to offer religious education
on a voluntary basis.
This principle has not been extended to the study of Islam at Berlin's
schools, whose instruction is confined to mosques and their Koran
schools. During the past years in particular organisations of Berliners of
Turkish origin, have criticised this practise as an unequal treatment
towards different religions and have demanded a re-examination of the
current situation. According to the government the problem that has to be
dealt with, is of a legal nature - in order to allow Islamic studies at
schools, the government needs the equivalent of a 'church' to complete a
contract. Against the background that in Islam no such equivalent exists,
the discussion has reached "an unfortunate stoppage" (Interview with
Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997). Currently, there are three options that are
contemplated:
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• The government could assign the monopoly of Islamic education to
one of the many Islamic groups that exist in Berlin (or even to one of
the two secular immigrant organisations that have articulated their
interest). Such a step will however undoubtedly cause tremendous
conflict not only amongst these organisations but also between them
and the city government;
• Religious education could be made compulsory which allows the state
to control the training and selection of the teachers as well as the
curriculum. Such an option is strictly rejected by the Social Democratic
coalition partner as a matter of principle;
• Religious education that is divided along confessional lines and
teaches the respective dogmas could be substituted by a more general
educational option that may for example focus on the history and
philosophy of religion. This option would constitute the most
fundamental shift as it questions the established relationship between
church and state in Germany and also involves significant changes
regarding for example the teacher training programmes. It is rejected
by both the CDU and the SPD (partly again as a matter of party
principles and in light of the assumed outrage that would be shown by
the Christian churches) as well as by Islamic groups such as the Milli
G6riis.
Clearly, I am not suggesting that there is an easy solution to this particular
conflict of interests. However, from my point of view this example shows
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the following: both coalition partners, the CDU as well as the SPD
exclusively contemplate a settlement of this situation within the
parameters of their traditional party doctrines and interests. Rather than
regarding it as a priority to bring about a change that ends the unequal
treatment towards different religions in Germany and will also
institutionalise cultural heterogeneity in Berlin's schools, for both parties
their most vital interest is the preservation of existing party principles - in
which ethnic minorities hardly playa prominent role.
SUMMARY
In this chapter I have provided basic information regarding Berlin's
immigration record as well as the legal and socio-economic position of
Berliners of Turkish origin with the objective of giving an understanding of
the local Berlin context. An outline of their disadvantaged position is
necessary for grasping attitudes of Berliners of Turkish origin vis-a-vis
German citizenship. As we have seen, a growing number have already
opted or applied for German citizenship because they regard- as I will
seek to illustrate in the following chapter - access to formal citizenship as
an effective strategy to improve their living conditions and their standing
in German society.
Regarding the question posed in this chapter's title - 'Berlin: National
Capital or Multicultural Metropolis' - the answer has to remain at least
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ambiguous: Immigration has undoubtedly transcended Berlin's
appearance and social life beyond a 'national' image. Apart from obvious
manifestations that can be observed in the city's demography or its street
scenes, various institutions of multi-culturalism have emerged both at the
unofficial and the official level: So far, my focus has been on the latter and
official responses that deal with poly-ethnic structures can be categorised
as follows: first there is the 'policy of representation' in the form of the
office of the Berlin Aus/anderbeauftragte and its counterparts at district
level. Second, since the 1980s Berlin has adopted an approach to support
and promote 'self-help initiatives' that benefited the establishment of
minority organisations. Thirdly, Berlin is supporting various cultural events
and institutions that aim to reflect the city's multi-cultural character.
However, the effectiveness of an official institution of multi-culturalism
such as the Commissioner's office is conditional upon the poliflcal will of
the city government. This - as we have seen - in general represses the
fact that Berlin continues to be a city of immigration and does not alter its
political priorities accordingly. Looking at some 'hard' governmental
choices, Le. the provision of means and resources for the implementation
of Barbara John's working agenda, or, as pointed out in the example of
religious education, when confronted with a conflict that challenges
established national tenets, the lack of a commitment to multi-culturalism,
defined here as a strategy "to overcome nation-state traditions in the
context of ongoing immigration (Blaschke 1993, p. 12), becomes
indisputable.
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Up to now I have outlined primarily the governmental response to
immigration, both at the national and the Lander-level. In the following
chapters I will turn to the strategies applied by Berliners of Turkish origin
to cope with and to alter the given political framework.
139
ENDNOTES CHAPTER 5
This slogan was taken up as a book title by the Berliner Institut fOr Vergleichende
Sozia/forschung 1994.
2 Here, the term 'ethnic German' does not, as in the previous chapter, refer to
'ethnic German immigrants' but to those residents in Berlin who have acquired German
citizenship by birth.
3 This statement needs however some modification as it a) applies primarily to
West Berlin's 'ethnic German' population. The situation in East-Berlin, where after 1945
immigration was by comparison insignificant and where a settlement of migrants has
taken place only marginally, is clearly different; b) this acceptance is exclusively limited
to former Gastarbeiter and their offspring and does not include migrants who arrived
more recently, for example asylum seekers and refugees, short term contract labour
from the former Eastern Bloc, undocumented immigrants or Romanies.
4 Already before the establishment of the German Reich, Berlin had been at
particular stages of its history a poly-ethnic city. After the Thirty Years' War, the Prussian
government started to promote immigration ('Peuplierung?; for example, Dutch skilled
workers were recruited to build the city canals. After 1671 Berlin experienced an
increased immigration of Jewish families; in 1685 (after the Potsdamer Edict of
29.11.1685) Huguenots who had to flee France found asylum. Around 1700
approximately thirty per cent of Berlin's population consisted of Huguenots.
5 This increase reflects in particular the immigration of the impoverished rural
population.
6 In 1928 approximately 130,000 people who were not holders of a German
passport lived in Berlin (Pfleghar 1993,p. 11).
7 After 1945 tens of thousands of German refugees arrived in Berlin every month;
even between 1949 and 1961 more than 1.6 million refugees came to West Berlin. Most
of them were - according to a quota system - distributed to other areas of West Germany
(Pfleghar199~p. 1~.
8 For example migrants from Italy, with whom Germany had concluded a
recruitment treaty in 1955, were in comparison to their numbers in West Germany a
minority in Berlin.
9 According to a publication by the Senatsverwa/tung fOr Stadtentwick/ung,
Umwe/tschutz und Techn%gie Ber/in (1995), in 1974 only 7.4 per cent of Berlin's
Turkish population still lived in workers' accommodation (p. 26).
10 See for example Dietze, G. (1993) 'Die hilflose Wiedervereinigung.
Systematische MiBverstandnisse west- und ostdeutscher Intelligenz im Fokus der
Dichter-Spitzel-Anderson-Debatte', in: Bothig, P. and Michael, Klaus (eds.) MachtSpie/e.
LiteratiJr und Staatssicherheit (Leipzig, Reclam), pp. 28-36.
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11 For further information on Jewish immigration into Germany see: Harris, P.
(1997) 'Jewish Migration to the New Germany: The Policy Making Process Leading to the
Adaption [sic] of the 1991 Quota Refugee Law', in: Thranhardt, pp. 105-147.
12 For the years 1991 until 1995 the data was taken at 31st of December of each
year; in 1996 at the 30th of June.
13 In 1996, more than 16 per cent of children under 15 years were from an ethnic
minority background, of these 44 per cent were of Turkish origin; in contrast, at the same
time only 3.7 per cent of Berlin's elderly population (60 years and older) did not hold a
German passport (of these 26 per cent were of Turkish origin) (Auslanderbeauftragte
Berlin 1997).
14 See 'Messages of the Auslanderbeauttraqte' in Top. Berlin International, No.4,
1997 (Berlin, Senat Berlin).
15 More critical examples with regard to the insecurity of residence are outlined in
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr die Belange der Auslander (1994) Mitteilungen der
Beauftragten der Bundesregierung far die. Belange der Auslander, In der Diskussion: Das
Auslandergesetz. Erfahrungen nach drei Jahren, May (Bonn) (e.g. authorities do not
provide sufficient information about the potential residence status that 'non-Germans'
would - on application - be entitled to).
16 Since 1996 Hamburg has become the Land with the highest naturalisation rate
(Thranhardt 1998a, p. 1()).
17 In 1990, these naturalisations are all on the basis of discretion.
Non-Germans who were holders of an unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis were not18
affected. However, against the background that most non-European migrants had only
arrived in Berlin by the end of the 1960s only very few Turkish Berliners - due to their
shorter residence and, correspondingly, their different residence status - were for
example able to benefit from this exemption (Senatsverwaltung fOr Stadtentwicklung,
Umweltschutz und Technologie Berlin 1995, p. 28).
19 Until recently Kreuzberg was divided into two postal areas, Kreuzberg 36 and 61,
with the former being by comparison the poorer district with a higher proportion of ethnic
minority residents.
20 Here, I have left out the district of Wilmersdorf that is included in Figure 2, as
only 1.5 per cent of all Turkish Berliners live there.
21 Some of the above mentioned data on Kreuzberg has been presented during the
course of this interview. Other facts have been collected from a) a note of the Bezirksamt
Kreuzberg to the Auslanderbeauftragte Kreuzberg from 3.4.1997; b) a written answer by
Kreuzberg's mayor (26.3.1997) to the parliamentary question no. 73 of the Kreuzberg
local councillor Ozcan Mutlu from 16.12.1996.
22 Ms Josten, Kreuzberg's Auslanderbeauttraqte, mentioned in the interview that I
conducted with her in May 1997 that many of Kreuzberg's minority residents are for
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example reluctant to move to East-Berlin or to East-German areas in close proximity to
Berlin, because of fear of racist attacks. However, looking at the establishment of ethnic
businesses in Berlin's Eastern part (e.g. food stalls, restaurants, grocer's etc.) the
mobility of minority small entrepreneurs appears to be higher than of Germans (see
Blaschke, unpublished manuscript, pp. 9-10).
23 Written answer by Kreuzberg's mayor (26.3.1997) to the parliamentary question
no. 73 of the Kreuzberg local councillor Ozcan Mutlu from 16.12.1996.
24 I will discuss the situation of young Berliners of Turkish origin in more detail in
the following chapter.
25 a) The Haus der Kulturen der Welt is located in Berlin's former congress hall
(due to its architectural design commonly referred to as the 'pregnant oyster') and is a
venue for conferences, exhibitions and performances; b) a similar programme is offered
by the Werkstatt der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin's district Neukolln; c) Radio MultiKulti has
been in existence since 1994 and is the first public radio station to broadcast in 16
languages with programmes made by and for (mostly) members of ethnic minorities; d)
this new radio station that has just received its licence has been founded by young
('second generation') journalists of Turkish origin. e) A YPA- TV is a small TV channel (run
by two dedicated journalists) that broadcasts local 'multi-cultural affairs' for 400 minutes
per week. 1) the Berlin Carnival was launched in 1996 and has been promoted as the
multi-cultural happening in the city. It takes place in Kreuzberg, but - and this may not
come as a surprise - does not really raise the interest or support of Kreuzberg's
population of Turkish origin; g) the Deutsch- Turkische Europaschule in Kreuzberg
opened in 1996 and offers education in German and Turkish. (see for further information
Lorbeer 1993,Seidel-Pielen 1995, Vertovec 1996)
26 In addition - as painted out before - nearly all of Berlin's city districts have their
own local Auslanderbeauftragte.
27 A central figure in this context was - among others - Peter Finger who
established Berlin's first anti-racist telephone helpline. Finger - who had lived and worked
in the Netherlands - was strongly influenced by Dutch anti-racist discourses.
28 Furthermore, in the same year the Senate Administration for Youth and Family
Affairs supported approximately 35 initiatives for children, young persons and women;
the Senate Administration for Labour and Women financed about 25 projects targeted at
vocational training, educational and leisure activities (Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin
1995a).
29 The motive for scnonootun'e article was provided by a demographic forecast on
the number of 'foreigners' in Berlin undertaken by the Senate of Berlin. According to this
forecast - whose underlying premises do not contemplate the possibility of naturalisation
- by 2010 approximately 17.4 per cent of Berlin's population will be constituted of
'foreigners' (Rada 1997,p. 205).
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30 The gaps that are created by the withdrawal of public funding are partially filled
by activities of organisations that are - for a complex set of reasons - independent from
(German/Berlin) governmental subsidies. One of these organisations is the Milli G6riis,
which is closely linked to the former Islamic Turkish Welfare Party. Over the past years
the Milli G6riis has established numerous social institutions, such as kindergartens,
women's' health centres, youth training and employment schemes etc. which have
proved to be popular amongst Kreuzberg's population of Turkish origin. The activities of
the Milli G6riis are closely monitored by both the Landesamt and the Bundesamt fiir
Verfassungsschutz (internal intelligence agencies on the Lander and the national level -
equivalent to MI5) ) which classify the Milli G6riis as an Islamic fundamentalist
organisation and thus as a potential threat to Germany's democratic constitution
(Landesamt fiir Verfassungsschutz 1994).The increasing popularity of the Milli G6riis is
seen as evidence that a high number of Berliners of Turkish origin actively support and
believe in fundamentalist Islamic ideas and that they not only turn away from German
society but even threaten it. Clearly, such an interpretation - that is articulated across the
political lefVright divide - strengthens an image of Berliners of Turkish origin as 'different'
and 'not belonging to the German mainstream'.
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Chapter 6
AGENTS OF CHANGE:
YOUNG BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN
AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP
"Es ist nicht in unserer Hand, daB wir Auslander sind. "
("It is not up to us that we are toreiqners", Interview
with young women of Turkish origin, 14.5.1997)
PRELIMINARIES
"Dangerously Different - The Failure of the Multi-Cultural Society" - so the
headline of the weekly German magazine Der Spiegel on the 14th of April
1997. The triptych style cover pictures at its centre a young woman
furiously waving the Turkish flag (similar to the French 'Marianne' but,
unlike her, with a clear negative connotation), to her right a group of
pubescent males who hold knives and clubs, to her left girls with
headscarves fully absorbed with the reading of the Koran. The message is
clear, Turkish youth is nationalistic, violent and prone to religious
fundamentalism. Furthermore, although Germany has attempted to
integrate them into its society, they are both too different and too unwilling
to make such venture a successfui undertaking. "Years of effort to further
integration have apparently come to naught." (Focus, no. 31, 28.7.1997,
p.26),
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The media portrayal of young persons of Turkish origin as 'assassins of
multi-culturalism' is - besides being undoubtedly beneficial for circulation
figures - a convenient way to pass over any shortcomings and
inadequacies of German integration policies. It is not 'us', the majority
population and its political establishment, that can be held responsible,
but 'them' who abuse 'our' hospitality. Furthermore, it constructs these
young people as threats to individual safety,
Currently, youth gangs terrorise Berlin's trendy discos and its
upmarket restaurants. The offenders speak with a Berlin
accent ... The investigators suspect that the gangs consist of
young foreigners who have been brought up in Berlin.
(Focus, no. 31, 1997, p. 24 - author's translation)
and - over and above this - as a 'menace to society' on the whole by
endangering democratic principles with so called fundamentalist Islamic
ideas. The latter point is central to Wilhelm Heitmeyer's study
Verlockender Fundamentalismus (Seductive Fundamentalism, 199i) in
which he examines the situation of young people of Turkish origin in
Germany.
His main hypothesis is that this group asserts the superiority of Islam and
displays a severe and dangerous potential for religious violence. Both
characteristics reflect - according to Heitmeyer - hostile attitudes towards
integration and democracy and can be put down to a complex set of
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factors: xenophobic violence; experiences with discrimination in private
life; negative consequences of societal modernisation processes; retreat
into ethnic enclaves; rejection of modern educational values; and a vast
potential for family conflicts (Heitmeyer 1997,pp. 183-184).
Heitmeyer's study may be regarded in part as a valuable contribution to
the academic and political debate around issues concerning minority
youth as it exposes the degree of discrimination and exclusion
encountered by persons of Turkish origin. However, from my point of view
this line of argument merely gives a veneer of liberal progressiveness to
an infamous example of islamophobic alarmism disguised as 'objective'
scholarly work," On the one hand, the analysis is based on the
unquestioned assumption that an Islamic orientation is anti-modern and
by definition diametrically opposed to democratic principles; on the other,
the study displays a breathtaking selectivity in the usage of its own
empirical findings. Examining for example the political orientation of young
people of Turkish origin, one survey question lists three main German
political parties (GOU, SPO, DIE GRUNEN), trade unions" and various
Islamic or Islamic-nationalistic organisations (such as the Milli G6nls and
the Grey Wolves4). The teenagers and young adults are asked to indicate
the extent to which these groups represent their interests and are given
the possibility of selecting more than one group. Looking at the results,
the Social Democratic Party proves to be most popular (44.1 per cent
think that the SPO represents their interests either we" or partly), followed
by the Grey Wolves (35.7 per cent); the Green Party (34.4 per cent) and
146
the Milli Gonss (33.4 per cent) (Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 276-276).
Astonishingly however, Heitmeyer and his co-authors choose to focus
exclusively upon the popularity of the Islamic/nationalistic organisations -
rather than analysing the wide spectrum of answers - and come to the
conclusion:
[t]he fact that particularly organisations such as the Milli
G6rOs and the "Grey Wolves" meet the approval of young
persons is without doubt a further indicator for the readiness
of Turkish youth to turn to Islamic-fundamentalist positions. It
remains however unclear how firm or infirm this orientation is.
(Heitmeyer 1997,pp. 140-141 - author's translation)
That young persons were at least similarly approving of two mainstream
German parties neither enters the' text nor the analysis and remains
hidden in the annex (see Heitmeyer 1997,pp. 132-142and annex 3). This
- as Birgit Rommelspacher points out - not only distorts the actual
empirical findings, it also fails to ask important questions that might have
elucidated the interests, experiences and expectations of young persons
of Turkish origin in a more detailed and accurate way (Rommelspacher,
die tageszeitung, 29.4.1997).5
As indicated in the title, this chapter does not focus on Islamic orientations
amongst young Berliners of Turkish origin, nor is it a critical analysis of
their depiction in journalistic or academic work. Rather, it seeks to discuss
both the politics and the transformation of citizenship through an analysis
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of the situation and attitudes of these young people. The question may
arise, how relevant the introductory remarks are for the rest of this
chapter, or if they are at all. There are two reasons for choosing this
particular 'overture': First, it is necessary to emphasise the alarmist tone
of the current public debate. Clearly, such blatant work is not
representative for the respective· academic discussion in general,6 but
ideas - like those proposed by Heitmeyer - that equate Islamwith violence
and that identify young people of Turkish origin as protagonists of
religious violence, make it onto the front-pages of newspapers and are
crucial for shaping, or rather manipulating, public opinion. They in turn not
only influence policy makers but also - and this may be in many respects
of more relevance to young Berliners of Turkish origin on a daily level -
teachers, potential employers, classmates, social workers etc. and
condition the social context that young people encounter and in which
they act.
Second, in particular Heitmeyer's analysis is of relevance as it integrates
two widespread images of 'Turkish' residents in Germany, namely as
victim and as aggressor. The first is the portrayal of ethnic minorities as
being passive and suffering from discrimination and exclusion (or - in the
case of Turkish or Muslim women in general - as being oppressed by
traditional patriarchal structures). The second - the image of the active
aggressor - perceives activity exclusively in negative terms, as
'dangerous', 'violent', 'fundamentalist', 'anti-modern' or 'anti-democratic'
conduct,' Discussions that are caught in the simple dichotomy of "pity and
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contempt" (Horrocks and Kolinsky 1996)8 reflect the common assumption
that German residents of Turkish origin lack any positive potency to shape
both their individual lives as well as to transform social reality in Germany
in a way that is of value for the whole society.
In this chapter I will seek to challenge this dichotomy. My main argument
is that young people of Turkish origin - rather than being anti-modern
protagonists - mediate and enforce the transformation of one of
modernity's central projects, namely citizenship. Correspondingly the
chapter is mainly concerned with young people's attitudes towards, and
actually applied strategies with reqard to, formal citizenship. However,
although being agents, these young people do not act in a vacuum but
within a concrete context of material conditions and social relations. Here,
limits to their actual enjoyment of substantial citizenship, in particular in
the area of education, are crucial for both the direction and the scope or
effectiveness of their agency. This issue will be touched upon before
concluding this chapter.
YOUNG BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN AS AGENTS OF CHANGE
In 1996, more than 150,000 Berliners who were younger than 25 years
old did not have a German passport (17.3 per cent), of these 42 per cent
were of Turkish origin.
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Table 6: Young Berliners under 25 According to Age Groups and
Nationality (30.6.1996t
Age Group All Germans Ethnic Minorities of Turkish origin
Nationalities
Younger 140,460 111,201 79.2% 29,259 20.8% 12,699 9.0%
than 5
5-10 185,482 156,521 84.4% 28,961 15.6% 13,588 7.3%
10-15 185,065 160,466 86.7% 24,599 13.3% 10,538 5.7%
15-20 178,237 150,345 . 84.4% 27,892 15.6% 12,450 7.0%
20-25 190,885 149,349 78.2% 41,536 21.8% 13,967 7.3%
Total of 880,129 727,882 82.7% 152,247 17.3% 63,242 7.2%
under25
all age 3,438,838 2,999,043 87.2% 439,795 12.8% 137,674 4.0%
groups
Source: Austenderbeeuttreqte Berlin 1997
As will be illustrated in the following, tables like this that distinguish
Germany's population according to their nationality will in the medium and
long-term become a thing of the past, as the number of persons of
minority origin who take up German citizenship is steadily increasing and
this is particularly the case for young people of Turkish orlqln."
F. is one of those young Berliners who has opted for German citizenship.
He is an 18-year-old Kurdish man who - at the time of the interview - was
in the 12th year of a Gymnasium in Kreuzberq." Just one year of school
ahead of him, he is busily drawing up future plans. He would like to study
political science, economics and law - a combination that is possible in
the Ge~man university system - and, like most ambitious future students,
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he wants to spend at least one year of his studies in England or the USA.
F. is an only child and was born in Germany. His parents are Kurdish, his
mother migrated to Germany in 1972 and his father came as a student six
years later. Currently his father works part-time for an insurance company
as well as being self-employed, while his motherworks as a housewife.
F's main desire is to become a successful politician. After having been
active in various Alevi and Kurdish organisations he decided 'to go
mainstream' because he thought the former organisations too "home-
orientated" (heimatorientiert).
I stopped working with these organisations because I
realised that it was not my thing. They are rather home-
oriented and I want to change something in Berlin.... Well,
I have been born here ... I don't think of Turkey primarily,
but of Germany. (Interview with F., 9.5.1997)
Now he participates in meetings of the Social Democratic Party in Berlin's
district Sch6neberg and intends to become a full party member soon.
Questioned whether the SPD is the only party he could imagine himself
working with, F. admits that he may as well be a member of the Green
Party but that the Social Democrats offer - from his point of view - better
career prospects as they have not yet attracted as many active members
of ethnic minority origin as the Green Party.
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If you look at the SPD now, you won't find a foreigner who
has really made it ... however, it is beneficial to have a
Muslim who does not believe, and on top I am Kurdish.
There aren't many Kurds in the SPD. Most join the PDS or
the Greens. That might be a reason, well my advantage, that
they [SPD] let me go to the top. ... I have all these
advantages. If I use them properly, then, may be I am able to
make it. (Interview with F., 9.5.1997)
Though being very career orientated, F. rejects emphatically any
suggestion that he may just want to use politics to further his own
achievements. For him it is crystal-clear that he wants to get involved
because he wants to change politics in Germany and - to some extent - in
Turkey. But at the same time he is not interested in being just a token
bystander in any political party, but - being very confident and ambitious -
he wants to lead from the front. F. is passionate about politics - he is
already elected as vice-student representative of his school - and
despises politicians who do not act according to principle but because
they just want to remain in power. This - according to F. - is not only a
malaise of politicians who are members of the majority population but it
applies at the same time to the few elected members of the Berliner
Abgeordnetenhaus (the Berlin parliament) who are Germans of Turkish
origin. Asked whether he models himself on one of these three, F. just
shakes his head:
Oh no, absolutely not. I don't like their politics ... because
they are two-faced. They present themselves very differently
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in public than what they really are. For example Ismail Kosan
[Green Party] defends the Alevis and says he will change
this and that for them. But in reality he does not want to do
that, he is only interested in their votes [once they can vote].
Most politicians conduct politics, well, how did Weber put it
again? Well, most politicians live off politics and not for
politics... that's just not me, that's why I want to have a job as
well.
F. and his whole extended family applied for German citizenship very
shortly after the legal changes were introduced in the early 1990s. For
several years now, F is holder of a German passport but is not quite sure
whether he would call himself 'German' - "may be a Kurd with German
citizenship?" The decision to apply for citizenship was easy for him. His
parents, who clearly want to retire in Germany, thought it may be
beneficial for the family and F. regards it as a technical requirement. Apart
from being a prerequisite to enter parliamentary politics, he enjoys
travelling in Europe without having to apply for visas for the non-
Schengen countries and looks forward to being a first-time-voter.
Like F. and his family, in the recent past many Berliners of Turkish origin
have made the decision to apply for a German passport. As pointed out in
chapter 4, Germany has seen quite a startling - though in the international
debate much neglected - shift regarding the attitudes of minority members
of Turkish origin towards German citizenship. This shift is particularly
apparent in Berlin where citizenship policies have been more accessible
than in most other German Bundeslender (with the exception of
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Hamburg). According to a survey conducted in 1993 in Berlin, 66.3 per
cent of young Berliners of Turkish origin (18-25 years) had already
applied, intended to apply or were thinking of applying for German
citizenship (Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1994). Such a development
would have been unimaginable ten years ago12 and the obvious question
to ask concerns the reasons for this shift which, as I will attempt to
illustrate in the following, is influenced by a multitude of factors.
The increase in both the interest in, and the actual numbers of
applications for, German citizenship, mirrors three crucial developments:
a) the transformation of initially temporary migrants into immigrants; b)
legal changes in Germany that make formal citizenship more accessible,
and c) bilateral agreements between Turkey and Germany as well as
decisions taken by the Turkish government that regulate or guarantee
rights for the Turkish diaspora in Turkey. Furthermore, it reflects actual or
perceived differences regarding the rights formal citizens enjoy in
comparison with residents that are not holders of the country's passport
they live in. The example of EU-citizens residing in Germany
demonstrates that the smaller these differences are, the lower is the
interest in applying for naturalisation (see chapter 4).
When the government introduced changes in the Einbilrgerungs- und
Staatsangeh6rigkeitsrecht that gave two groups of so called foreigners the
right to become naturalised, a rudimentary - alas still restrictive _
framework to make citizenship more accessible was provided. Yet, the
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response from people of minority origin was initially indifferent and
interest in German citizenship remained low. As pointed out before, many
commentators, including myself, put this response down to the rejection of
the German government to formally - apart from a few exceptions -
tolerate dual citizenship (see Brendt 1994).
However, with the advantage of hindsight, this single cause explanation
needs some modification. This is particularly the case in attempting to
analyse the attitudes of young people: dual citizenship is on the one hand
a means to retain access to rights in Turkey. At the time when the new
naturalisation rules were implemented, Turkey had not yet fully introduced
important legislation that guaranteed naturalised Germans of Turkish
origin the possibility to retain crucial rights in Turkey (such as the right to
re-migrate or to resettle). Therefore, to become exclusively German meant
to opt for a legally uncertain status' in Turkey. Yet citizens' rights in Turkey
are - on a practical and material level - only of importance if individuals
intend to make use of these rights by living for longer periods in Turkey.
This, as has been pointed out by numerous studies, does not apply for the
great majority of young people of Turkish origin who only intend to go to
Turkey for short holidays.
o. (16, female) and T. (16, male) for instance both go to a Gesamtschule
in Kreuzberg and cannot imagine living in Turkey. T. thinks that Turkey is
too old-fashioned for him. Wanting. to become a computer programmer, he
would rather go to England, "... they are more advanced there". In
ISS
addition, his Turkish is - according to himself - not sufficient to pursue a
professional career in Turkey. Although the same can be said about his
English, T. is convinced that it makes more sense to invest time to
learning English than to improve his Turkish (Interview with T.,
29.5.1997). O. in comparison is frustrated about being depicted as a
German, or as someone who 'does not belong', when she is in Turkey.
This in many respects parallels the experiences she makes in Germany.
Her rather negative and superficial impressions do not turn Turkey into a
country she wishes to reside in on a permanent basis:
Well in Turkey it is like this, 'she is from Germany, so she is
German, she does not belong to us' ... that hurts! Well in my
case, when I was in Turkey one time, and walked around
[they said] 'ugh, look at her, she isn't a Turk of pure race ...
And I think that is totally stupid, what kind of an attitude is
that that they have over there .... I just couldn't live there. I
am used to a totally different world. I only experience Turkey
in summer, on holidays, and I never see the real Turkey. If I
was to move there all of a sudden, I just couldn't cope with
that. ... (Interview with 0., 29.5.1997)
B., a 22-year-old young man, who is Alevi and was born in Berlin,
articulates the same attitude. He is currently unemployed and wants to get
into a further education course for social work. B. has lived for four years
in Turkey - between 1985 and 1989 - and has made up his mind. Although
not being happy with his situation in Germany, he does not contemplate
giving Turkey a second chance:
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Well, I have lived for four years in Turkey. I couldn't take it
any longer and came back with my parents to Germany. You
know [in Turkey], firstly I couldn't cope with the language,
secondly ... well let me say with the culture. For example,
here [in Germany] I have been in a class with 12 persons.
There, all of a sudden I was in a class with 65. And then
these uniforms and the strict discipline. That was just too
much for me. Well, that was just beyond the bounds, so
much that I couldn't stand it. (Interview with B., 6.6.1997)
From my point of view, in particular the initial indifference of young
Berliners of Turkish origin to make use of their right to become naturalised
cannot be easily put down to their attachment to, or interests in, Turkey.
Rather it has to be analysed within the context of their experiences, and
those of their parents, in Germany. Let me outline two arguments:
First, young people of Turkish origin grew up in a political climate that -
putting it euphemistically - neither 'welcomed' them nor their parents as
rightful and equal members of the German society. As a result, for some
Berliners of Turkish origin, a 'symbolic distance' or undesirability
regarding the acquisition of German citizenship emerged and the call for
dual citizenship became a symbol of asserting diversity and rejecting
French style assimilationist models of integration. In this context, some
young Berliners of Turkish origin regarded naturalisation and the giving
up of the Turkish passport as an act of subordination or even betrayal. N.
for example is a seventeen-year-old female teenager. Nearly every day
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after school (she is a pupil of a Hauptschule), N. goes to a girls' group in
the heart of Kreuzberg, near the tube station G6rlitzer 8ahnhof. During the
interview she mentioned the difficulties she had initially when her parents
told her that the whole family should apply for German citizenship.
Well, I didn't want to be the only one to become German....
You know citizenship doesn't really matter to me. May be
later.... When my parents told me that we should all apply,
well, I didn't know.... If I had told [my friends] that I got
German citizenship, and not the Turkish, I am German now,
they would have called me an ass-kisser. (Interview with N.,
27.5.1997)
Second, however there is a more pragmatic argument to be made: The
exclusionist ideology ruling Germany's Auslanderpolitik found its legal
manifestation in formal citizenship and naturalisation policies which - as
demonstrated before - were for nearly four decades of Germany's post-
war immigration history an insurmountable hurdle for non-German
immigrants and their offspring. In the absence of any viable option to
become naturalised Germans, the idea to apply for a German passport
did by definition not occur to most Berliners of Turkish origin - it was too
remote to become a realistic strateqy." A twenty-six year old male
Berliner of Turkish origin who works part-time in one of Berlin's cafes
explains:
I don't know, I have never thought about having a German
passport.... I really thought it was impossible.... Well you
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know, I just I didn't know a Turk who had done that [become
naturalised]. My parents never mentioned it. ... It was just,
well how can I put it, it was just normal to be a Turk, I mean
to have a Turkish passport and not a German. (Interview
with D., 3.6.1997)
Thus when the changes regarding naturalisation were introduced, the
long established 'legal normality' that citizenship was practically
unavailable had to be offset over time. This was done on the one hand by
various campaigns initiated by the Berlin Aus/anderbeauftragte and her
local counterparts that both inform in detail about the changes and
emphasise the benefits of formal citizenship. Yet for German citizenship to
become a common everyday component for Berliners of Turkish origin a
'critical mass' of applicants is needed, who as neighbours, friends,
relatives or colleagues demonstrate and communicate the availability and
the benefits of formal citizenship and who thus initiate a 'domino-effect'.
As more and more people take up German citizenship because they a)
recognise the benefits of the formal German citizen status compared to
that of a Third-Country-National; and b) because - and this may have
been important for the parents of the second/third generation - crucial
rights can now be retained in Turkey regardless of nationality, negative
connotations regarding German citizenship become less potent and
naturalisation is actually in the process of being redefined as a strategy
by which people of Turkish origin can establish their place within wider
German society.
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A closer look at the attitudes towards citizenship and dual citizenship that
is articulated by young Berliners of Turkish origin today, will help to
illustrate this particular transformation of German citizenship that is
mediated by former migrants and their offspring from Turkey. Let us first
have a look at the decision-making process that leads young people to
apply for German citizenship, or to consider applying. In this context two
questions occur: Who made the decision and why?
As in F's case, who was quoted at the beginning of this section, I would
argue that in most cases it is not the 16-year-old teenager but rather his
or her parents, or other older relatives who take the initiative. Many of the
young people whom I interviewed - particularly those who had not yet
reached majority age - made the point that it was their parents who
decided for the whole family to become naturalised. Even if the parents
themselves are not interested in applying for German citizenship, they
support the naturalisation of their children for a variety of reasons, as is
illustrated in S's case. He is a 17-year-old male pupil of a Realschule in
Kreuzberg. His parents are both already pensioners and would like to
spend half their time in Turkey and half in Germany. S. told me that his
parents do not intend to apply for a German passport, because they feel
too old for such a change. However, they support his application because
they welcome and understand that he wants to stay in Germany and they
are convinced that long-term his chances in Germany will be improved by
having a German passport. Furthermore, they see his application as part
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of a 'family strategy', Le. as a way to secure their own rights in Germany
via the nationality of their son (Interview with S., 3.6.1997).
Clearly, not in all cases do families apply together for naturalisation, nor
should parental support for attaining the German passport be taken for
granted. Some parents may well regard the acquisition of German
citizenship by their children as a threat to family unity or as a potential
loss of parental control. M. (female, 16 years old) for example would like
to apply for German citizenship but her father does not approve of this
step. She explains that she will wait until she is 18 years old and is
prepared to face the anticipated conflict with her father.
No, my father does not allow that... I don't know why, but
somehow he does not want it. I think he is afraid that I will
change and that he might loose me.... You know, he says
'how would that look like,. if we go through the passport
control [at the airport] and you show your German passport
and I show my Turkish passport. How can I prove that you
are my daughter?' ... Well, and he does not trust me. He
does not believe that I won't change. He thinks that I will turn
into a German, go to discos, come back at four in the
morning. (Interview with M., 3.6.1997)
Regarding the reasons why young people agree to become naturalised -
or even initiated the naturalisation process themselves - I would argue
that in general they attach greater importance to their access to effective
rights and that they regard citizenship more in an instrumental way than
,
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as an expression of identity. Being firmly positioned in Germany, young
persons seek to take up the advantages of formal citizen status. "Well
anyway, we have been born here. I want to stay here, I don't want to go to
Turkey. That's why I want the German passport. It is better for me."
(Interview with S., 18 years, male, 6.6.1997). Young people regard the
German passport as particularly beneficial in the areas of employment,
political participation, freedom of movement in the EU, and as a welcomed
respite from bureaucratic procedures that only apply to so called
foreigners. 0., who was quoted earlier, regards citizenship as something
entirely positive because it is of practical value and importance in
Germany. For her the right to vote and to participate in political decisions
is crucial:
I think it [German passport] gives me more possibilities than
Turkish citizenship.... I think I can vote then. I will have
something to say. But with the Turkish citizenship, I can't do
that. ... I want to have a say in the matters that are going on
in the country where I live. I mean, I don't just want to be an
onlooker, 'oh they have elected such and such', and I have
to be happy with that. No, I want to participate, I want to
decide what is going on. (Interview with 0., 29.5. 1997)
The reasons for M. - a 16-year-old female teenager - to apply for the
passport are much more personal, and are closely linked to the violent
death of her brother who was killed in a racist attack a few years ago in
Berlin." M. - contrary to Heitmeyer's general assumption that experiences
of "xehophobic violence" inevitably lead to a "retreat into ethnic enclaves"
162
- intends to forcefully assert her presence in Germany, and in doing this
she regards the formal citizenship as a prerequisite.
Well, my mom has done that for herself and for my sister,
and well, then I said ok. too. It is just like that in Germany, if
you don't have it [the German passport], then you are not
treated like a human being. That's just how they see the
situation. But I do not find that logical. Why do I need the
citizenship, if I have it, I am still considered Turkish. But they
.... this government there, they just can't think. They have
their own ideas.... If you want to have rights, you got to have
it [the passport], otherwise you will never, never have rights.
(Interview with M., 27.5. 1997)
M. even goes a step further. Not only does she want to have the rights of
a formal citizen but she also intends to protect these rights by becoming
part of Germany's executive:
As for employment, you need citizenship. [Employers say]
'No, we don't take foreigners, first we take Germans and
then may be those [non-Germans]...' And you know, I want to
become a policewoman. YQu cannot do that, if you do not
have German citizenship. (Interview with M., 27.5.1997)
Furthermore, the German passport is not only a means to improve
employment chances in the German labour market, but guarantees the
possibility of taking up employment in any country of the European Union.
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Well, in my case it was, I thought, because of the possibility
to travel. And in the future you have the opportunity to work
in other EU countries. That makes a big difference ... may be
I want to go and live outside Germany. And then it can be
decisive for your professional life (Interview with B. male, 22,
6.6.1997)
An additional incentive to become 'German' - and one that should not be
underestimated given the slow and often adverse workings of German
bureaucracy - is the opportunity to escape bureaucratic procedures and to
make time-wasting and often humiliating activities like queuing at the
Auslanderbehorde in order to renew a residence permit, or applying for
travel-visas for non-Schengen countries, a thing of the past. ''The bumf
and so on. If I go away now, I no longer need a visa. It has become more
easy." (F., female 17years, 17, 3.6.97). An explicit example for wanting to
leave the hassle and distinct 'logic' of the German bureaucracy behind is
S's statement. She is a young Kurdish woman (24 years) who currently
studies economics in Berlin. S. got her passport in 1996 and asked why
she initially applied for a German passport she states:
Well, you know to be perfectly honest, it was pure
convenience. Well, because I have spend two and a half
years in Turkey [after having been to primary school in
Germany] ... I did not get an Aufenthaltsberechtigung, but
the whole time only an Aufenthaltserlaubnis that had to be
renewed every two years. And finally they told me, well
because you are in vocational training, and you don't have a
'regular income, we cannot give you an unbefristete
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Aufenthaltserlaubnis. And then I really had had enough. But
imagine, the German citizenship I just got like that, no
problems. That was totally ridiculous. But well ... Well that
was the reason, why I have done it. (Interview with S.,
26.5.1997)
Yet S. offers a second explanation for her decision to get the German
passport. "As a Kurdish woman," she says "I did not feel comfortable with
Turkish citizenship." It is estimated that approximately 40 per cent of
Berliners of Turkish origin are Kurds and/or Alevis. Compared to other
West-German cities this is a very high proportion and it may playa role in
explaining both the higher interest in German citizenship in Berlin and a
less forceful insistence on dual ·citizenship. All teenagers and young
adults of Kurdish or Alevi background to whom I talked raised arguments
why - as being members of groups that are discriminated against and
even persecuted in Turkey - they do not regard it as important to have the
Turkish passport as a matter of principle. Yet again, also more practical
considerations play a role. During meetings with four Alevi male
youngsters, they - like S. - expressed their dispassion to hold on to
Turkish citizenship. Being male and around 18 years old they are however
also liable for military service. By having the German passport they can
choose to do their military service in Germany, or - and all boys wanted to
do that - to do the German community service as an alternative option.
Looking at the reasoning of youngsters of Kurdish background one may
point out that such reasoning argues somewhat against my point of view,
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i.e. that German citizenship is perceived as a positive choice. In their case
it is possible that the German passport is regarded as the preferable
alternative to Turkish citizenship and that - if there were a Kurdistan -
some of these young persons might want to opt for Kurdish citizenship.
Although I regard such a hypothetical consideration as conceivable, I
would nevertheless - against the background of their firm positioning in
Germany - raise my doubts that these young men and women would
select a Kurdish passport instead of a German one.
A certain disinterest in Turkish citizenship is not an attitude exclusively
voiced by young Kurdish or Alevi Berliners, but for reasons that have
been pointed out above it appears to be a widespread perspective.
Nevertheless this does not mean that young Berliners of Turkish origin
reject the possibility of having two passports as a matter of principle,
rather, when confronted with the requirement to opt for one citizenship,
they decide to choose the passport of their country of residence. Being
questioned whether she would like to have dual citizenship, F.(17) says
"Sure, if it was possible, but if not then I will decide in favour of the
German, ... because I live here." (Interview with F., 3..6.1997)15
For the minority of youngsters who contemplate going to Turkey for more
than just a holiday visit, the Turkish passport seems to retain its relevance
despite legal guarantees by the Turkish government for naturalised
Germans of Turkish origin. B. (female, born in Berlin, 16 years) has not
applied for German citizenship as she plans to live in Turkey for some
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years after having completed her erweiterter HauptschulabschluB in
Germany. She wants to go for one or two years (depending on her marks)
to a school for 'Gerrnan-Turklsh' (almancis) teenagers in Izmir. After
successful completion she will be able to enrol in a Turkish university (in
comparison, to gain a degree that allows her to study in Germany would
be a very lengthy and complicated, if not an impossible process). B. is
concerned about her rights in Turkey, but also about being accepted as a
Turkish woman:
Yes, well for me it is [important to have the Turkish
passport]. Well, that is my passport. I am Turkish and this
proves it. And if I have the German, well, of course I feel I
am Turkish, but people in Turkey won't think that I am
Turkish, because I have a German passport. (Interview with
B., 29.5.97)
These examples have illustrated that the young people who have
participated in the interviews apply citizenship primarily in an instrumental
way. I would argue that in their individual strategies these young people
actually both carry out and induce a transformation of citizenship, that has
become - at an abstract level - a major objective of academic debates
around citizenship. Namely, the disengagement or disentanglement of
citizenship and national identity. On the one hand young Berliners of
Turkish origin regard citizenship as a means to gain access to rights and
to improve their life chances in their country of residence. By doing so
they apply citizenship in a way that corresponds with the concept's basic
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meaning, i.e. as an emancipatory tool. On the other hand, as will be
illustrated in the following, matters or expressions of identification are held
apart from, or rather are not blended with, the colour of the passport."
Firstly, all interviewed youngsters assume that for their ethnic German
counterparts they will remain Turks' regardless which passport they are
holding. "Oh well, I am aware that even if I have a German passport, if I
have a fight with a Nazi for example, he won't be looking at my passport
but at the colour of my hair." (Interview with S., 18, male, 6.6.1997). In
addition, leaving aside the question whether it is an autonomous or a
heteronomous definition (eigendefiniert or fremddefiniert), most children
and teenagers who are German citizens also refer to themselves as
Turkish17, or more specifically as Kurdish18 or Alevi rather than as
German.
You mean to say that I am a German? No, I wouldn't. Look
[he roles up his sleeve and points to his upper arm] I just got
this tattoo [an Alevi sword] ... told my mother that it will wash
off.... One wants to present one's identity with pride. Here, I
am an Alevi. (Interview with V., male, 20 years old, 6.6.1997)
Young Berliners of Turkish origin denote their language, their family's
origin, their religions, their names, their looks, their 'different upbringing'
or their relationships with their parents as markers of them being different
from their ethnic German peers. They get angry when being in Turkey and
they are not accepted as Turks by the indigenous population "You know,
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who says that I have to live in Turkey in order to be a Turk?" (Interview
with Y., 16, female, 14.5.1997). In Germany, they have always been
called 'Turkish kids' and find the very idea of labelling themselves as
Germans, quite bizarre. Clearly, their multiple links, interests and
affiliations can become ambiguous in a situation when confronted with
exclusion:
We are caught in no-man's-land. You can't decide whether
you belong here or there. That is somewhat stupid. ... In
Turkey it is like this now, for example when I am there, they
do not accept me as Turkish. They say, 'oh you are a
German and you will remain a German'. What shall I say
against that? And here [in Germany] they don't accept me
either, ... as a German. Then I feel as if I don't belong
anywhere. Do you know what I mean? Well, I do not
necessarily need the Turkish passport, or the German one,
for me it pretty much doesn't matter what I am. The main
thing is that the people who like me accept me the way I am.
I don't need to show any sort of proof that I am Turkish or
German. (Interview with V.,29.5.97).
But in general these multiple commitments and interests are part of young
persons every-day life and to be a German citizen and - at the same time
- to refer to oneselffor example as Turkish just reflects this reality. These
young people in many respects live diversity without taking sides. And
that is exactly what they expect German society as a whole to tolerate.
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So far, I have tried to illustrate that young persons of Turkish origin have -
contrary to the discourse of 'pity and contempt' - sought to apply
citizenship as a strategy to improve their situation and as part of this
process are actively transforming the concept. However, it would be quite
inadequate to exaggerate their agency and not to point out its limits. A
major restraint is certainly the disadvantaged position of young Berliners
of Turkish origin in the area of education, a topic that I will briefly discuss
in the following.
THE LIMITS OF AGENCY - EDUCA TlONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR
YOUNG BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN
Young Berliners of Turkish origin regard the acquisition of a German
passport as an important step to overcome their disadvantaged socio-
economic position. However, by looking at the situation of for example
Afro-Caribbean youngsters in Britain, or Mexican- and African-American
young persons in the USA, who hold the citizenship of the countries they
reside in, the confines of a given legal parity that is not accompanied by a
commitment to social equality become distressingly apparent (see for
example Wrench and Hassan 1996; Faist 1995). Equal citizenship - as
has been pointed out amongst others by Bhikhu Parekh - does not consist
only of a formal dimension but is also concerned with equality of
opportunity, elimination of discrimination, equal respect, "public
acceptance of immigrants as a legitimate and valued part of society" and
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tolerance for norms and values that differ from the 'mainstream' (Parekh
1997, pp. Iv-x).
One of the main areas determining the level of social equality and access
to substantial citizenship in modern, knowledge based societies is
education, or the ownership of knowledge and its accumulation as cultural
capital (Bourdieu 1984). High standards of education are both in the
interest of a) the state (and industry) in order to be able to compete
internationally and b) the individual, as it is nearly impossible to occupy
jobs with a promising future without successful acquisition of knowledge in
schools, colleges, specialised training schemes and universities.
Furthermore, beyond being an instrument for the individual's
advancement, education also improves his or her standing and
acceptance in the wider society. In a situation where the state (in this
case Germany) ignores or renounces the societal value of one or more
segments of its society (here, persons of Turkish origin), it will as a
consequence not show much concern for the advancement of this group
and will ignore the possible need for policies necessary to improve the
educational performance of members of this group. As a result of
educational underperformance, the ability of the individual (or of the
group) to participate competently and fully in German society is restricted
and equal citizenship is wanting.
Exactly this problem unfolds when we look at the performance of children
and young Berliners of Turkish origin in education. Clearly, compared with
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the quality of education that is provided and that is accessible to young
members of the above mentioned.minority groups in the US or the UK, I
would argue that - due to the structure of the German welfare system -
adolescent 'non-Germans' are in general better off, as they benefit from a
mass rather than an elitist approach to education that offers in principle
better access to all segments of society (see Faist 1995). However this
(obviously debatable) argument does not help to overcome disadvantages
that occur within the national context.
The data that is provided in the following will - unfortunately - not include
specific figures that reflect on the situation of young Berliners of Turkish
origin. Yet, various reports of both the Auslanderbeauftragte on the
national level and on that of the Land Berlin have pointed out that they
perform particularly badly in school. Barbara John for example states that
mostly young people of Turkish and Arabic background go to the lowest
form of secondary school, the Hauptschule (see endnote 11 of this
chapter), whereas those pupils who, or whose parents, originated in
Greece, Italy, Iran and Poland constitute by far the majority of non-
German pupils who leave school with a baccalaureate
tAustenaeraeeuttreqte Berlin 1994, p. 18).Thus, the picture that is drawn
in the following does not reflect but can only indicate the educational
abyss as experienced by young Berliners of Turkish origin.
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Table 7: 'Non-German' Pupils in Primary and Secondary Schools
in Berlin (Academic Year 1995/96)
Berlin-West Berlin (West and East)
Type of Total 'Non- % of Total Non- % of
School number of German' non- number of German non-
pupils pupils German pupils pupils German
pupils pupils
Primary 109,152 27,489 25.2 209,341 30,572 14.6
School
Hauptschule 10,202 4,505 44.2 14,039 4,670 33.3
Realschule 14,596 3,325 22.8 29,928 3,461 11.6
Gymnasium 42,816 4,981 11.6 80,882 5,306 6.6
Gesamtschule 25,512 5,533 21.7 51,559 6,290 12.2
Sonderschule 5,434 1,592 29.3 12,647 1,677 13.3
Total 207,712 47,425 22.8 398,396 51,976 13.0
Source: Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1997
We can see that of all non-German pupils who - during the academic
year 1995/96 - went to a secondary school in Berlin," nearly 25 per cent
were Hauptschiiler (compared with 14 per cent of their German
counterparts); 18 per cent went to a Realschule (21 per cent of all
German pupils attended this kind of secondary school); 27 per cent were
at a Gymnasium (compared with more than half of all German youngsters
- 57 per cent); and 30 per cent were pupils of one of Berlin's
comprehensive schools (about 34 per cent of all Germans).
Although the integration into the German educational system of young
people from an ethnic minority background has improved somewhat over
the past years, their educational performance is still significantly lower
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than that of their ethnic German counterparts. This becomes particularly
obvious by looking at the school-degrees of ethnic minority pupils:
Table 8: School-Degrees of 'Non-German' School-Leavers in
Berlin
198011981 1983/84 1986/87 1990/91 1994/95
School-leavers without 39% 35% 30% 24% 20%
degree
HauptschulabschluB 10% 11% 11% 10% 9%
Erweiterter 23% 28% 23% 26% 26%
HauptschulabschluB
RealschulabschluB 22% 23% 29% 28% 32%
Baccalaureate 6% 4% 8% 12% 13%
Source: Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1994and 199-r°
Nearly one third of all 'non-German' pupils leave school with no, or a
rather ineffective school degree. Another quarter acquires the erweiterter
HauptschulabschluB which - as pointed out in endnote number 11 of this
chapter - allows them to continue education. However, from the data that
is available, it remains unclear how many pupils make use of this
opportunity. In 1995 only 13 per cent left school with the baccalaureate. In
actual numbers this means that in .1995 only 473 pupils of ethnic minority
origin (out of a total of 3,590) were able to go on to University, whereas 34
per cent of all German students achieved this qualification at the end of
the same academic year (Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1997).
Looking at the situation in Kreuzberg, the picture - both for German and
non-German pupils - becomes more depressed, which is one of the
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reasons why members of the middle class - as explained in the previous
chapter - seek to move out of Kreuzberg.
Figure 4: German Pupils and Pupils of Ethnic Minority Origin in
Secondary Schools in Kreuzberg (Academic Year
19961199711
Source: Bezirksamt Kreuzberg, Abtei/ung Jugend, Bi/dung und Kultur 1997
If we ask for the reasons for the educational disadvantage of young
Berliners of Turkish origin a complex set of explanations has to be taken
into account. In the following I will briefly outline three of the most
important factors:
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First, as GOlestan GOrbay, the author of the last report of the national
Auslanderbeauftragte on the educational/vocational situation of 'non-
German' adolescents has pointed out, German schools in general are still
characterised by a "monokulturelle VerfaBtheit" (monocultural orientation)
which manifests itself in the schools' structure, their curricula and their
applied teaching methods: a) teachers, of whom most are civil servants,
are predominantly ethnic Germans; b) proposals for 'inter-' or 'multi-
cultural' education are only considered as additional or specific tools, but
- if put to use at all - are not seen as approaches that should be applied
as a matter of course; c) the bi- or multi-lingual abilities of ethnic minority
pupils are not regarded as valuable assets and are not fostered by the
syllabus (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fOr die Belange der Auslander
1997, pp. 17-18).
Policies regarding education - like naturalisation policies - fall under the
sovereignty of the Bundeslander. Therefore, the Berlin government can
introduce comprehensive regulations and policies that depart from the
national dictum. An important legal change in this direction was
implemented in 1996 with an amendment of Berlin's Schulgesetz (law
regulating school education). At that time, a paragraph was introduced
stating that the offers of bilingual education should be made available in
Berlin's schools, provided that it is financially feasible. So far however,
only a few measures are available:
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a) Since the academic year 1992/93, the Berlin government supports
three school models (primary schools) that make children of Turkish origin
literate in both German and Turkish. Another 14 primary schools were
authorised to use bi-lingual teaching material. However, in some schools,
as was highlighted by young people in the course of the interviews,
teachers and headmasters/mistresses not only disregard measures to
promote bi-lingual education but disapprove of their pupils speaking to
each other in Turkish or Kurdish even during the breaks:
What I really don't like is that we are not allowed to speak
Turkish in school. ... Not even during the breaks ... The
teachers don't like it. They always start shouting at us and
threaten us (Interview with M., female, 16 years, 3.6.1997).
Ok, I don't have to speak Turkish to my friend in class, but if
it is only one word? The teacher tells me I will get bad marks
for it ... that she has to understand everything that we say.
But why does she have to? And why can't I talk Turkish to
my friend outside class? (Interview with A., female, 15 years,
27.5.1997).
b) In 1996 a new Europaschule was opened in Kreuzberg which offers
German-Turkish education (other existing international schools offer
education in German and English, French and Spanish).22 According to
Ozcen Mutlu, a local councillor in Kreuzberg, the founding of this Deutsch-
TDrkische Europaschule was however met with resistance by the
government:
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Until that school was founded, we had to fight for two long
years. Because of the Senate. The Senat wanted to keep its
elite schools as elite schools, and as schools for European
languages, and Turkish didn't fit in with their plans at all.
Well, but we have got it running now ... with the support of
parents. One argument [made by the senate] was for
example 'you will never find enough German parents who
want to send their children to a German-Turkish school,
where they will learn Turkish.' The fact was, that more
German parents were interested than Turkish (Interview with
Ozcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997).
The topic of the availability of bi-lingual, or multi-lingual education leads
to the second explanation of the educationai underperformance of young
Berliners of Turkish origin, namely their generally poor language
competence. Many of these young people, or more precisely, those who
are not of a middle class background, are not fully literate in either of the
languages that they speak. Due to the lack of "social capital", i.e.
numerous and effective "contacts and connections outside the Turkish
migrant community" (Gag/ar 1995) young Berliners of Turkish origin often
do not speak German as a daily language before they enter school at the
age of five or six. Furthermore, in the district of Kreuzberg, the use of the
German language is often confined to the classroom as a high percentage
of pupils, are of 'non-German'ffurkish origin and converse with each other
- with or without teachers' permission - in a mix of German, Turkish,
Kurdish or other languages. In three primary schools in Kreuzberg for
example 'non-German' pupils constituted more than 70 per cent of all
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pupils during the academic year 1996/97 (Bezirksamt Kreuzberg von
Berlin 1997). At home, they otten speak Turkish - in most cases
exclusively with their parents and older relatives - at a colloquial level (the
situation is even more complicated for children and teenagers of Kurdish
origin) and with their siblings - as with their friends - a mix of languages:
Well, you know in a way we only speak Umgangssprache
[colloquial language] at home. My parents don't know
German very well, and with me they, well they don't talk to
me in high or perfect Turkish. They think that I cannot
understand that. They just talk in a way that is simpler.
(Interview with 5., male, 17 years, 3.6.199n.
In foreign language [sic] I only know what my father says,
what he says on a daily level. Nothing else. (Interview with
M., 3.6.199n
To make matters worse, many non-German primary and secondary pupils
- almost exclusively of Turkish origin - were taught until recently in so
called Auslanderregelklassen (classes exclusively for 'foreigners'). The
Berlin Schulgesetz incorporated a so called 'quota regulation' according to
which schools were not allowed to have mixed (i.e. German/non-German)
classes with more than 50 percent 'foreigners'. In order to 'protect'
German pupils and to guarantee their quality of education, schools were
in this case requested by law to form classes exclusively for 'foreigners' in
order to comply with the quota (Berliner Schulgesetz, paragraph 35 (2),
Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1994, p. 19). This regulation has now been
abolished and the last pupils who were taught in such classes left school
at the end of the academic year 1996/97.
In addition to the monocultural orientation of the school system and the
poor level of language competence amongst young Berliners of Turkish
origin, a third reason for their disadvantaged educational position is
related to existent negative stereotypes and their exposure to direct
discrimination by teachers. During my interviews with young people, I got
the impression that experiences of discrimination did not seem to be
widespread, but the teenagers repeatedly pointed to more 'subtle'
incidents that are difficult to pinpoint, but that leave them nevertheless
with an impression of being treated differently by their teachers than their
German counterparts.
I don't want to say that all teachers are against Auslander.
But I do think that there are a few at our school. Well I can
feel that. They laugh with the Germans, they are friendly,
they behave totally differently with them. They don't shout
that much when the Germans don't make their homework, or
when they are late. They don't make as many jokes about
them in front of the others.... With us they have a certain
prejudice, because some Turkish youngsters really mess up,
and don't have manners. And they think we are all like that. I
mean, I totally feel that (Interview with E., female, 15 years,
4.6.199n.
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In one particular school the situation was however more obvious. This
was already transparent at my first meeting with the headmaster, with
whom I discussed the purpose and content of the interviews. He was
astonishingly plain and made it very clear, that from his point of view, the
male "Turkish Youngsters" were all troublemakers and should be kept
away from more nalve and vulnerable German children and teenager. The
youngsters themselves (all pupils of an Auslanderregelklasse) pointed out
that they had to "put up" with his remarks nearly every day.
It is as if he has fits in class. Then he just does not stop
shouting. When we come up with the phrase, 'I don't know
that' then he will always tell us, well that is lazy, that is
typically Turkish, what are you doing here? Well what is this
man doing in Kreuzberg? Why doesn't he go? (Interview with
X, female, 16years, June 1997)
SUMMARY
Young Berliners of Turkish origin are in the process of establishing their
place within the wider German society. One area of their 'agency'
concerns the politics of citizenship. Realising the advantages of 'formal
citizenship', they increasingly apply citizenship in an instrumental way as
a tool to improve their situation in Germany. For them the colour of their
passport is not and cannot be an expression of their identity. Their
multiple links, interests, needs and identifications cross national
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boundaries and can by definition not be encapsulated by a printed
document that establishes a formal link between an individual and one
state.
However, although one can regard young Berliners of Turkish origin as
agents who challenge the traditional link between citizenship and national
identity in their applied strategies, it has to be emphasised that they do
suffer at the same time from significant disadvantages that result from a
national paradigm that still dominates the 'content of citizenship'. Hence -
as the brief discussion on educational opportunities has demonstrated -
many youngsters who have opted for German citizenship, because they
hope to improve for example their chances in the labour market, will
inevitably be disillusioned when they realise that the acquisition of formal
citizenship cannot be equated with equal access to substantial
citizenship.
These young persons were able to opt for German citizenship and to
apply it as a strategy when legal changes were implemented by the
German government which led to a more inclusive citizenship legislation.
Their future will very much depend on how quickly and committedly
German politics will react to their needs which go beyond the question of
legal equality. In this context the participation of members of ethnic
minorities at the various levels of politics - the subject of the following
chapters - can be a crucial motor for bringing about further change
182
ENDNOTES CHAPTER 6
This study was carried out in 1995. A total of 1,221 pupils of Turkish origin from
63 schools in seven cities in North-Rhine-Westphalia filled out standardised
questionnaires. The young persons were at the time between 15 to 21 years old
(Heitmeyer 1997, pp. 45-46>.
2 See critical book reviews by a) Birgit Romme/spacher, b) Wolf-D. Bukow & Era/
Yildiz, both in die tageszeitung, 29.4.1997; c) Car/ Ehrig-Eggert, Frankfurter Rundschau,
2.4.1997.
3 In this question the term 'trade unions' (Gewerkschaften) is used as a general
description of the trade union movement and does not refer to specific German trade
unions or the German trade union umbrella organisation (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund).
4 The Milli G6riis is a Europe-wide Islamic organisation with close links to the
former Turkish Welfare Party. The Grey Wolves are directly connected to A/pars/an
Tiirkes' extreme right-wing Party of the Nationalistic Movement (MHP).
5 For example, by naming multiple and very different organisations that represent
their interests, many young people are evidently of the opinion that the Social-
Democrats, the Green Party, the Milli G6riis and the Grey Wolves overlap as regards
content in several respects. A logical follow up question could have been to ask the
young people with which aspects or activities of the Milli GorOs or the Grey Wolves they
agree in particular (Romme/spacher, die tageszeitung, 29.4.1997). Such an inquiry might
have found out that the respondents were not attracted to these organisations for their
so-called Islamic-fundamentalist or nationalistic orientations but for very different
reasons, such as the organisations' social welfare activities on the local level (help with
homework, youth centres, computer classes, etc.). Furthermore, the following questions
are left open: To what extend do the respondents actually know the aims and objectives
of these groups? How firm is their support? Are the respondents likely to retain their
views as adults? Which actual 'form' does such an identification with a political or
religious group take? Do these young people go to meetings, or demonstrations? Are
they actively involved in the work of these groups? Does an active involvement with - for
example - the Milli GorOs go hand in hand with the development of a violent religious
potential in the first place?
6 See for example the work by Bielefeld, U. (1988) /n/andische Aus/ander. Zum
gesellschaftlichen BewuBtsein Wrkischer Jugend/icher in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt);
Boss-NOnning, U. and Schwarz, T. (forthcoming) 'Public Integration of Migrants in the
Federal Republic. Exemplified in Educational and Social Policy' in: Migration.
7 To equate the activity of persons of Turkish origin - or immigrants in general -
with 'danger' is clearly not a new development but corresponds with existing portrayals of
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'Turks' for example as 'criminals', or of immigrants as 'natural catastrophes' who threaten
Europe and Germany in the form of floods and waves.
8 Two further popular depictions are a) that of the generally 'unthreatening exotic
oriental' Turk; or b) the 'Turkish posterboy' who is displayed as an example of the nice,
secular and professional Turk who has just become like 'us' (see for more examples the
ironical glossary put forward by Eberhardt Seidel-Pielen 1995,pp. 41-44).
9 In Kreuzberg, at the end of 1996, 34 per cent of residents under 25 years of age
did not hold a German passport (BezirksbOrgermeister Kreuzberg, 26.3.1997, answers to
questions posed by the local counsellor 6czan Mutlu (Green Party).
10 Furthermore, we can anticipate significant changes in the German citizenship
law to be introduced by the new German government (a coalition of the Social
Democratic and the Green Party). One topic of the Koalitionsverhandlungen
(negotiations between the parties that aim to form a government coalition before the new
chancellor takes up office) was the acquisition and granting of formal citizenship to
immigrants. The new German government intends to introduce ius soli, formal toleration
of dual/multiple citizenship and proposes to grant immigrants the right to become
naturalised after 8 years of residence (Guardian, 16.10.1997).
11 Let me try to summarise some important details of the German educational
system: In Berlin, primary school ends after 6 years (this is different to most other
German Lander where primary school ends after 4 years). At the age of approximately
12, pupils will either enter the dreigliedrige Schulsystem (trinominal system) and be sent
to one of the three following schools: a) the Hauptschule - this is a lower secondary
school for pupils who leave primary school with rather low grades. They attend
Hauptschule for an additional 3-4 years and can attain a normal HauptschulabschluB
(lower secondary degree), or an erweiterter HauptschulabschluB (extended lower
secondary degree) that will enable them to continue education; b) the Realschule -
middle secondary school for pupils with average grades. After successful completion of
the Realschule (after four years) pupils may continue education for a further two to three
years; c) the Gymnasium - a secondary school similar to the British grammar school that
will directly lead to the baccalaureate, which in turn gives unrestricted access to the
university system.
The German dreigliedrige Schulsystem is based upon the traditional assumption
that young persons' abilities can be easily classified as manual, clerical or academic. In
theory, it is possible for very good pupils from the Haupt- and Realschule to switch to the
Gymnasium at any time. This however remains the exception to the rule as pupils do not
only have to overcome major differences with regard to syllabus and curriculum but also
stereotypical assumptions regarding their intelligence and academic abilities, this is
particularly true for HauptschOler.
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After the Bildungsreform in the 1970s a new school type was introduced
representing an alternative to the dreigliedrige Schulsystem, the integrierte
Gesamtschule or comprehensive school. Unlike in Britain, German comprehensives
allow a certain degree of 'streaming'.
In addition to these four main types of schools, at least two more are worth
mentioning, as they will appear in the text: On the one hand the Sonderschule (special
school) for pupils with actual or assumed learning difficulties. Children and teenagers
may be sent to a Sonderschule at any time, most join a Sonderschule from the beginning
or after leaving primary school. On the other hand the Oberstufenzentrum (again a
special form of secondary school with focus on vocational skills) where in particular
pupils from Haupt- and Realschule can attain the Fachabitur (specialised baccalaureate)
that provides access to a Fachhochschule (German polytechnic or university for applied
science).
12 In comparison, in a small survey (n=430) carried out on the national level in
1980, only 5.6 per cent of young people of Turkish origin declared that they intended to
apply for a German passport (11.4 per cent were undecided, and 83 per cent rejected the
idea (Mehrlander 1983, p. 162). Another survey carried out in 1980 (with minority
members of all age groups) by Socialdata found that only 10 per cent of minority
members of Turkish origin were interested in applying for German citizenship, however
nearly 80 per cent wanted to settle permanently in Germany (see StOwe 1992, pp. 52-
53).
13 Furthermore, as pointed out before, given the comparatively secure residence
status that most Turks enjoy, there was also not an urgent pressure from their point of
view to demand or to try naturalisation.
14 More details about her brother's death cannot be provided as this may reveal her
identity.
15 In addition, as polnted out in chapter 4, many Berliners of Turkish origin also
take advantage of a well known and tolerated existing legal loophole, that allows them to
regain their Turkish citizenship after the naturalisation process.
16 Unless - as the last quote has illustrated - they regard the Turkish passport as a
tool in Turkey to prove their Turkishness.
17 "But you know inside, it doesn't really change ... We are anyway Turks. We think
Turkish. With a piece of paper I cannot change my life" (Interview with V., 16, male,
29.5.97)
18 "No, I wouldn't say that I am German. Well, I would say ... I am a Kurdish woman
with German nationality. That's just saying how it is. The Germans don't accept you as
'German' just because you've got a German passport. That isn't the case at all. If they
don't do it, why should I?" (Interview with S., female, 24, 26.5.1997)
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19 I have excluded here the numbers of pupils going to a Sonderschule, as this
category does not make a distinction between primary (up to class 6) and secondary
school.
20 A comparison with data that was available to me on the national level is difficult,
as different categories (regarding the schools degrees) were applied and presumably
variances in the underlying calculations occur. Looking at the data on the national level it
appears that ethnic minority pupils in Berlin perform better than on the national level. For
example according to the Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fUr Auslanderfragen 1997,44
per cent of all non German pupils leave school with one of the two kinds of
HauptschulabscluB (compared with 36 per cent in Berlin); and 20 per cent do not have
any degree when leaving school (this equals the Berlin data). The difference regarding
the former figure might occur due to the following difference: The data that I have used
for Berlin does not include the educational degrees of young ethnic minority people in so
called Eingliederungs- and Vorbereitungslehrgange. These are special courses for 'non-
German' youngsters who have moved to Berlin at the age of 14 or 15. Against the
background that only very few young Berliners of Turkish origin came to Berlin at this
later stage in their life, it does not seem relevant to incorporate these figures. However, if
one does, a picture that is worse than the national average occurs: accordingly, for
example 32 per cent of 'non-German' pupils leave school without any degree
(Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1997).
21 Including those pupils who are in the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th year of Kreuzberg's
Sonderschulen.
22 Information was gathered in interviews with a) Fanem KIeft, chairwoman of both
the national and the Land Committee for Multi-cultural Affairs of the Gewerkschaft
Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW - Trade Union for Education and Science)
(12.5.1997); b) Ozcan Mutlu, member of the Green Party and local councillor in
Kreuzberg (4.6.1997); c) Auslanderbeauftragte Berlin 1994and 1995.
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Chapter 7
TRANSCENDING NATIONAL POLITICS (I):
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF BERLINERS
OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN GERMAN PARTIES
"Aile Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus. Sie wird
yom Volke in Wahlen und Abstimmungen und durch
besondere Organe der Gesetzgebung, der
vollziehenden Gewalt und der Rechtsprechung
ausgeubt." (Article 20, Section 2, German Basic
Law)
Article 20, section 2 of the German constitution defines the German
people as representatives of the authority of the state (Trager der
Staa tsgewalt) and thus constitutionally establishes the principle of the
'sovereignty of the people' (Volkssouveranitat) - "All state authority
emanates from the people". As the political system's democratic
legitimacy derives essentially from the adherence to and the preservation
of this principle, the definition of who constitutes the people and who is a
full member of the democratic polity is of central concern.
The German political establishment as well as the constitutional court
have so far adopted an exclusive and ethnically defined interpretation:
First of all 'the people' are equated with 'the nationals"; secondly, to
become a national has been obstructed by way of restrictive citizenship
politics. As a result, so called 'auslandische Mitbiirget (foreign co-citizens
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or compatriots) are disenfranchised and are almost completely excluded
from the macro-level of political participation, Le. from the Executive, the
ludicative and the Legislature of the state system. "Nearly eight million
people are not allowed to participate in democratic decisions, that is a
democratic deficit, a statement that the German political establishment
does not like to hear." (Interview with Mehmet Oaimagiiler, FOP,
29.5.1997l
In the medium and long-term, Le. within the next five to twenty years, this
democratic deficit is likely to be rectified as a) more and more 'Third-
country-nationals' become naturalised and b) set against the background
of the new German government stating its intention to introduce elements
of ius soli into the German citizenship legislation and to tolerate multiple
nationality. However thus far, only few exceptions to the general rule of
formal political exclusion can be found. Apart from those Berliners of
Turkish origin who have already become naturalised and are allowed to
vote, there are for example a small number of naturalised
parliamentarians of minority origin who have been elected on the local,
Liinder- and the Bundes-Ievel over the past few years. In Berlin, currently
three members of the Abgeordnetenhaus (the Berlin parliament) are
naturalised Germans. Despite these exceptions however, 'participatory
channels' (Ireland 1994) that are open to ethnic minorities - with EU
citizens as a special case - are on the whole located on the meso- and
micro-level of politics (see Uehlinger 1988), Le. third-country-nationals are
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allowed to become members of German political parties," they can take
part in assemblies and demonstrations and they can form their own
associatlons."
In the following two chapters I will seek to discuss the types and content
of political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin on two levels: In this
chapter I will outline the involvement of Berliners of Turkish origin in main
political German parties, i.e. the GOV, FOP, DIE GRUNEN, POS, and the
SPO. Here, particular focus is given to the individual's motive to choose
party politics as a utilitarian form of participation to promote their interests,
and to identify those constituents that transcend German party politics
beyond the traditional perception of 'national' affairs. In the directly related
following chapter, I will turn to the work and political demands of self-
organisations of Berliner of Turkish origin.
It should be noted that I do not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of
the evolution of immigrant politics in Germany or Berlin - like Patrick
Ireland has done for France and Switzerland (Ireland 1994). Such an
analysis - which is clearly of major concern - would have required both a
different methodology and focus. For the purpose of this study I will
merely concentrate on the motives of political participation - defined here
as all voluntary action by individuals or groups that is intended "to
influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of
the political system" (see Vehlinger 1988, p.3) - of members of ethnic
minorities, their demands and ways to influence German politics.
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Particular focus is given to those aspects and activities that surpass the
traditional national conceptualisation of citizens' activities and demands.
BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES
Since an increasing number of ethnic minority members, and in particular
people of Turkish origin, have started to take up German citizenship,
political parties across the ideological divide have begun to turn their
attention to this group of potential new voters. Their vote could become
significant as approximately 1.4 million Germans of Turkish origin are 18
years old and above and could, by opting for naturalisation, cast their vote
in future elections. The parties' tentative attempts to 'court' minorities do
not remain 'unrequited' as - though still small in numbers - people of
Turkish origin join political parties and may act as mediators who bridge
the instituted distance between German political parties and Germany's
ethnic minority population, both regarding the parties' political programme
and their membership composition. In addition to the individual interests
of Berliners of Turkish origin to participate in party politics, many
associations - for example the TOrkischer Bund in Berlin Brandenburg or
the Milli Gores - actively encourage their members and sympathisers to
undertake this step (see chapter 9).
The reasons for the interests of Berliners of Turkish origin to join political
parties, or for their associations to support such a membership are
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complex and include: a) the membership and active involvement in a
political party is regarded as an effective way to demand changes for, and
to improve the situation of ethnic minorities in Germany; b) party
involvement - as some observers argue - can constitute a potent means to
influence German politics vis-a-vis Turkey, either in order to advocate or
to support Turkish government objectives, or as a way to form strong
political alliances against politics in Turkey, in particular against human
rights abuses; c) the political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin
should not only be seen and understood in a mono-political context, that
comprehends their activities exclusively on the basis of ethnic or national
affiliation (i.e. regarding integration and citizenship politics or as political
interests vis-a-vis Turkey). Like for any member of the majority population,
party politics are at the same time an expression of a broader and more
general political agenda and preterences." Mehmet OaimagOler of the
FOP for example expresses this as follows:
I think the same reason why I am a member of the FOP goes
for many other migrants. We are not only politicised around
one subject. If that was the case, I could be a Social
Democrat or a Green politician. Regarding the issues of
citizenship and foreigners, there are no crucial differences.
But - and I say this deliberately - as a German citizen I am
interested in many areas of politics, for example foreign
politics and security. I could never get to like the economic
policy of the Green Party, or the Social Democrats for that
matter.... As a member of the party I do not want to deal and
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be confronted with one. single subject - foreigners."
(Interview with Mehmet DaimagOler, 29.5.1997)6
In the following I will outline the main reasons Berliners of Turkish origin
actively participate in party politics, their level of involvement, political
agenda and the problems they encounter as ethnic minority members in a
predominantly ethnic German party environment. A focus on the
experiences and interests of central individual party members of Turkish
origin has - as explained in chapter 2 - the advantage of gaining empirical
insights about their motives and attempts to alter German party agendas,
which have been neglected in studies and reports that adopt a 'top down'
approach and that examine exclusively, official party politics in areas such
as immigration and integration. Each party shall be discussed separately
and a summary and discussion of more general aspects is provided at the
end of this section. It should be pointed out at this stage that none of the
parties have statistics recording the ethnic affiliation of their members.
Thus it is impossible to provide 'hard data' on the actual numbers of
Berliners of Turkish origin who are members of political parties.
DIEGRONEN
DIE GRUNEN has been for a long time the only party in Germany that
Campaignedstrongly for a fundamental transformation of both Germany's
immigration/asylum and its integration politics, examples have included
the party's commitment to 'open borders', as well as their parliamentary
proposals to introduce voting rights for 'foreigners' (Auslanderwahlrecht)
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and major changes in Germany's citizenship laws. However, for specific
reasons the Green party has so far - particularly at its grassroots levels -
not proven to be popular with Berliners of Turkish origin. These reasons
are related to a) the party's history and its membership composition: as a
child of the 1968 movement the GRUNEN have traditionally attracted
predominantly left-wing middle class professionals and intellectuals": b) its
'open border policies': like their German counterparts many Berliners of
Turkish origin regard new immigrants and asylum-seekers as threats to
their economical well-being; and c) its critical position against human
rights abuses in Turkey.
In comparison with other German parties, the GRUNEN do have however
the highest number of elected representatives in the various local councils
in Berlin (Bezirksverordnetenversammlung) as well as in the Berliner
Abgeordnetenhaus, the city's (Uinder) parliament. One factor that
supported the comparatively higher number of elected Green
representatives is the introduction of a quota system for ethnic minority
members in the late 1980s. At the local level in Kreuzberg for example,
four of the six minority members of the Bezirksverordnetenversammlung
(BVV - similar to the local council) are Grime: Ozcsn Ayanoglu, Umlt
Bayam, Bilkayis Erikli and Ozcen Mutlu. At the Uinder-Ievel two of the
three parliamentarians of the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus who were born
in Turkey belong to the Green party - Riza Baran and Ismail Kosan. And
most recently, at the national political level, the Green party is the only
party who has two MPs in the newly elected Bundestag who are of
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Turkish origin: these are Cem Ozdemir, who has already been MdB
(Mitglied des Bundestags, MP) during the last parliamentary term, and the
newly elected Ekin Oe/igoz. Both were nominated on the regional lists
(Baden-WOrtemberg and Bavaria respectively) of parliamentary
candidates under the proportional representation system.
At the local level (Kreuzberg) of Green party politics approximately thirty
immigrants - of whom the majority are of Turkish origin - actively lend their
support to the political work of the Green party. Ozcen Mutlu is the longest
serving Green BVV member. He is of Kurdish/Alevi origin and migrated
with his parents to Kreuzberg at the age of five. Shortly after the
amendment of citizenship legislation in 1990, he successfully applied for a
German passport. He is now thirty years old and has been a member of
the BVVKreuzberg since 1992.8
Mutlu's motivation to become involved in local politics is based on his firm
conviction that "one can't just moan and hold others responsible for a
deplorable state of affairs. One is under the obligation to take over
responsibility. Be it by way of joining a political party or in any other form
of involvement." Being a local councillor, he is by definition concerned
about the socia-economic situatio.n in Kreuzberg, in particular about its
effects on the local minority population. When he was elected in 1992 he
realised that
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... the reality of the district was not reflected in the work of
the local council. Although one was aware of the fact, that a
third of the local population is of non-German origin,
predominantly Turkish, there was nevertheless no
implementation of policies directed at this group. And we
wanted to change that. (Interview with Ozcan Mutlu,
4.6.1997)
Over the past six years Mutlu and his three colleagues - sometimes
referred to as the 'town hall quadriga' (Der Tagesspiegel, 11.7.1997) -
have predominantly focused on issues of integration of, and service
provision for, the district's ethnic minority population. Amongst other
things the Green minority councillors have committed themselves to the
following: a) they campaigned for the provision of both sufficient and
adequate places for ethnic minority members in local old people's homes;
b) they are actively involved in the planning of the establishment of an
'ethno-medical centre' (Ethno-medizinisches Zentrum Berlin) that shall
adequately address health needs of ethnic minorities (e.g. by providing
training courses for doctors and nurses, or translation/interpretation
services). c) they successfully demanded the distribution of multi-
language information packages on various welfare provisions like for
example social benefits, unemployment money, or pension rights; d) they
proposed a model of collaboration with primary schools in neighbouring
districts in East-Berlin regarding problems that are specifically linked to
the catchmment areas of the schools. As pointed out in chapter 5, in many
of the primary schools in Kreuzberg 60 - 80 per cent of the pupils are of
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ethnic minority origin. In comparison, pupils who go to primary schools in
Kreuzberg's neighbouring Eastern districts are almost exclusively 'ethnic
Germans'. "Why don't we co-operate with these German schools and
send a few Turkish kids [from Kreuzberg] to their classes and in return
some German kids can go to school here? That might help to achieve a
balance." (Interview with Ozcen Mutlu, 4.6.1998); e) they successfully
campaigned for the founding of the Europaschule (European school) in
Kreuzberg with bilingual education in German and Turkish (see chapter
5); f) they criticised the exclusion of young Berliners of ethnic minority
origin from apprenticeships/training programmes offered by the local
administration itself. In 1992 of the 80 trainees only 2 were of non-
German oriqin."; g) a twin-city project was initiated between Berlin-
Kreuzberg and Istanbul-Kadik6y; 10 h) currently, Mutlu and his colleagues
support the establishment of a vocational training centre with 300 places
in Kreuzberg. In this context the district is in negotiations with
corporations and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (lndustrie- und
Handelskammer).
Although Ozcen Mutlu and the three other local councillors' work almost
exclusively in the area of immigration and integration politics they regard
this focus as a matter of necessity rather than as one of choice: "This
limitation [on questions regarding immigration and integration] is
inevitable, we always experience it. ... As long as we are regarded as
exotic foreigners, this won't change. And currently we still are exotic
foreigners." (Interview with Ozcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997) Their "exotic"
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depiction, i.e. their exclusion both as politicians and regarding political
content from 'mainstream politics', is however not only the case in the
context of their work in Kreuzberg's Bezirksverordnetenversammlung.
Also the Green party is - according to Mutlu - still somewhat reluctant to
define 'migration politics' as a central political issue throughout its
programme.
I tell you one thing, also the Greens had to learn a lot, and in
many respects they have done so during the past years. The
Greens are probably the party where migrants have - in
comparison - little problems. But when push comes to shove,
then you are sometimes under the impression that it doesn't
matter whether you try to convince the Social Democrats, the
Conservatives or the Greens. ... For example, we have
criticised very strongly the 'outline of the government
programme' [Regierungseckpunkteprogramm] because the
topic of migration and integration politics is not mentioned
under a specific heading. Such criticism is always articulated
by immigrants. Well, please tell me who else would take it
up? ... They tell me that such issues are dealt with within the
context of other, more general areas [such as social policy,
education etc.], but look at those, nothing is mentioned. Only
when migration has become a truly interdisciplinary political
issue, then they can tell me 'oh well its you again with your
old arguments'. As long as that is not achieved, we will make
respective demands. (Interview with Ozcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997)
For many younger Green politicians or activists who are members of
ethnic minorities, an effective means to integrate their specific demands
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into the general party programme is the organisation Immi-Griln. lmmi-
Griln emerged around 1992/93 as a critical successor to a group called
Yesllteer." It is an independent organisation, closely associated to the
Green party and - unlike Yesilleer - open to members of all ethnic groups.
lmml-Griin is very much a project of the second generation who - and I will
come back to this point - in many respects seek to stand out against the
first generation on three main accounts: they show less support for forms
of political organisation on the grounds of ethnic affiliation; they argue that
the problems they are confronted with in Germany differ substantially from
those of the first generation; and connected to this, they refuse what
constitutes from their point of view the often paternalistic and patronising
behaviour of first generation political activists who claim to speak for all
Turks."
lmmi-Gnm already exists in some West-German Lander and a small
group of young Berliners - so far a core of 15 persons, most of whom are
POliticalscience students - sought to set up a local group in summer 1997.
For them, lmmi-Gtun not only represents a way that helps to articulate
their demands more forcefully within the Green party, but it is at the same
time a forum where interested individuals, who may not necessarily want
to become involved in party politics in general, or Green party politics in
particular, are able to participate. The direct link to a political party is
nevertheless regarded both as a general political statement and as a
prerequisite for political efficiency. Furthermore it serves as regards
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content as a marker that distinguishes Immi-GrOn from many other
immigrant organisations:
I just say one thing: These so-called migrant organisations
have had their day. Perhaps that is also a generation
conflict. I don't know. However, if I look back, they have
already existed for twenty or thirty years. What have they
achieved? ... Why are these organisations still ethnically
based? Turks, Italians, Spaniards - why don't they work
together? These organisations are not effective.... There are
so many problems in this country, so many problems that
directly affect us. And rather than joining forces, regardless
of ethnic origin, they fight each other, the Turks fight
amongst themselves.... If we want to bring about changes in
this society, then we can achieve those changes most likely
by being involved in party politics." (Interview with Ozcan
Mutlu,4.6.1997)13
A similar attitude is expressed by the two 'Lander Greens', namely Riza
Baran and Ismail Kosan, who are members of the Berliner
Abgeordnetenhaus. On the Lander-level in particular two issues constitute
priorities in the work of these two MdAs (Mitglied des
Abgeordnetenhauses - Member of the Berlin Parliament) and at the same
time reflect the main topics of Green discussions in general regarding
immigration and ethnic relations. On the one hand the question of
citizenship (both the introduction of ius soli and formal tolerance of
multiple citizenship) and on the other further immigration, refugee and
visa policies. "When dealing with the issues of foreigners and integration,
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also amongst the Greens, we only have a very selective and superficial
discussion. It concerns either immigration or dual citizenship, nothing
else." (Interview with Ismail Kosan, 28.4.1997)
Ismail Kosan - who is a fist generation Kurdish immigrant - is a long time
member of the Green party and became elected via the Green party list,
i.e. there is no constituency whose direct interests he has to take into
account. Kosan belongs to the left wing of the party that is commonly
referred to as the Fundis (Fundamentalists), declares himself as a "pukka
communist and a 1968 fellow". For him, two issues are of crucial
importance. On the one hand, he is concerned that certain political
principles of the Green party may become neglected, if not given up, in
order to attract the "Turkish" vote:
Efforts are made for example to attract Turks as party
members, or other nation.alities. However, we face the
following problem: if you want to attract these people, then
you have to offer them something. And I don't like the
offering bit. If they accept our party and want to become
involved, well then so they should. I won't make any
compromises regarding our political principles. I don't want
to establish an ethnic organisation. I also don't want to
further my party career by attracting Turks to the party, that
is fatal. ... I don't want to hear any demands that we should
change our politics vis-a-vis Turkey. We don't do that. I don't
do that. If foreign groups want to pressurise us by offering
their votes under certain circumstances, then I am of the
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opinion to do without their votes. (Interview with Ismail
Kosan, 28.4.1997)
On the other hand, and directly related, he sees the danger that Berliners
of Turkish origin retreat increasingly into ethnic enclaves. Here, he
mentions the 'Turkish connections' of immigrant organisations such as the
Tiukiscne Gemeinde zu Berlin or the TOrkische Bund Berlin-Brandenburg
who - as he claims - actively seek the support of the Turkish government
in order to demand rights in Germany:
They negotiate with ministers in Ankara, even conservative
ones, and they want their ri.ghts[in Germany] and wish that
the Turkish state gets involved.... None of them turns to
German politicians. They regard themselves as a part of the
Turkish society, although they live here. That is a
contradiction. (Interview with Ismail Kosan, 28.4.1997)
Two other factors that support the intensification of ethnic boundaries are
linked - according to Kosan - to the increasing interest of young minority
members to Islamic or nationalistic organisations such as the Grey
Wolves and the Milli GarOs due to their exclusion from German society -
here he fully supports the findings of the Heitmeyer study (see chapter 6).
He sees as a further contributing factor the phenomenon that the debates
on both "the political interests of Turks in Germany" and migration policies
in general, are characterised by an inappropriate focus. For once,
regarding the reporting in both the German and Turkish media on political
interests and involvement of Berliners of Turkish origin, 'newsworthy'
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events are almost exclusively concerned with what is commonly perceived
as 'Turkish politics', e.g. Kurdish demonstrations when the PKK (Partiya
Karkeren Kurdistan - The Kurdistan Workers' Party) was banned; the
establishment of a Turkish party in Frankfurt; conflicts within and between
Turkish migrant organisations;14 connections between the former Turkish
Welfare party to Islamic organisations in Germany etc. In addition, rather
than highlighting the needs and interests that minority and majority
populations have in common, emphasis is given to differences as
reflected for example in the debate around religious education in Berlin.
Kosan is in principle against the integration of religion into the public
sphere and opposes religious education of any kind in Berlin's schools.
It is always argued that if we don't offer religious Islamic
education in schools, and control it that way, then the
fundamentalists will do this job.... But why can't people get
involved with other issues, why does it always have to do
with religion and other conservative moral principles? ...
Instead of building churches and mosques we need
kindergartens, we need education... (Interview with Ismail
Kosan, 28.4. 1997)
Riza Baran who came to Germany as a student in 1963 and moved to
Berlin in 1971 adopts a slightly different approach on religious education.
In the 1970s Baran was a founding member of the first Ausliinderbeirat in
Berlin (in Kreuzberg) and later became - like Mutlu in 1992 - a local
Kreuzberg councillor (Baran was at this time not a formal member of the
Green party but stood as their candidate). In 1-995,Baran won the direct
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mandate in a Kreuzberg constituency" and is now one of the three
members of the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus who was born in Turkey. He
ran his election campaign primarily on issues around unemployment,
housing and education and in addition on integration and refugee policies.
Baran's constituency is located in the heart of Kreuzberg 36 where
approximately forty per cent of the population is of ethnic minority origin,
with Berliners of Turkish origin being the largest group. It is - as many
observers would state - very much the Milli G6riis 'heartland' where
religion in general, and religious education in particular, represent crucial
matters. Regarding religious education, for Baran the matter of principle
does not - like it is the case for Kosan - relate to the question of whether
religion is supported in the public sphere or rendered to the private, but it
concerns the equal treatment of various religious faiths:
I am not a religious person myself, ... but if we [the Green
party] are in favour of equal treatment and equality, then we
cannot say this religion [Christianity] is treated one way and
Islam another ... The Green party has many active and
critical Christians. And I just can't understand when people
claim they do not want to have anything to do with other
religions. Like for example Islam. I know that this is a difficult
issue, but we have to deal with it. We don't only live in a
multi-cultural but also in a. multi-religious society. And we
have to confront these questions. Like what do we do with
Islamic education in Berlin? ... We can't go on telling the
third and the fourth generation, well we don't have a
representative [for Islam - see chapter 5] and therefore
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forget about the whole thing. (Interview with Riza Baran,
30.4.1997)
Baran does not put forward a uniform plan himself as a model for religious
education in Berlin. For him it is important to discuss these issues within
the party and to achieve a new consensus that builds the base for future
pragmatic solutions. And according to him, the Green party, at least in
Berlin, does show its willingness to rethink and to reconsider the question
of religious education in schools, as reflected in their parliamentary
question on this topic dealt with by the Abgeordnetenhaus in spring 1997.
In the run up to the elections Baran encountered serious problems
concerning his candidacy. These however were not presented - as some
people had warned him - by Green party members who may have disliked
the idea of a 'Turk' standing for a winnable direct mandate. Rather, it was
the Turkish media (as well as activists from other migrant organisations)
that showed no enthusiasm for the candidacy of a member of 'the Turkish
community in Berlin', for the simple reason that Baran is Kurdish and
moreover, he had been active in Kurdish politics for many years. Baran
was a founding member of the KOMKAR (Verband der Vereine aus
Kurdistan e.V. - Association of Organisations from Kurdistan) but had left
the group when his political agenda shifted more towards affairs in
Germany.16
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Yes, I had difficulties [in the run up to the elections]. I had
founded the KOMKAR, and I was one of the first who had
done something for Kurds here, and who stood up for Kurds
... Certainly, there were voices against me. On T01 [Turkish
satellite TV channel] there. was for example a ban on me.
They invited all of Kreuzberg's candidates, apart from me.
Now that I am elected they invite me, but I am not allowed to
say that I am Kurdish - that wouldn't be the first thing on my
mind anyway.... For example, shortly before the election, the
Hurrylet published an article saying that I am a Kurd, that I
was a KOMKAR member, that I am against Turkey etc. ...
After the election, the president of the Tiirkische Gemeinde
announced in T01 that the Turks have elected Turkey's
enemy. (Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997)
Riza Baran - like his party colleagues - regards a formal party affinity as a
beneficial way to further the demands and interests of immigrants.17 He
points out that the political participation of immigrants has to be regarded
as a process rather than as an already existent and fixed idea when
Turkish migrants first came in the 1960s. "We didn't arrive here with the
idea that we have to get politically involved in one form or another."
(Interview with Riza Baran, 30.4.1997). From his point of view however,
the form of political participation of Berliners of Turkish origin should at
this stage, i.e. as an expression of permanent settlement, be directed at
the political system and the political institutions in Germany in order to
progress:
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We have always been home-orientated. To the extend that
we did not progress in our cultural development. By living in
a different place we have to develop different skills and
strategies. How can I ensure that my children get better
degrees? If I want that, I have to deal with the education
system here. And I have to do it via the institutions that are
important here. It is madness to expect that the Turkish
minister for education can help. (Interview with Riza Baran,
30.4.1997)
With his last remark, Baran criticises part of the supposed approach of
migrant organisations such as the Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin or the
TOrkische Bund in Berlin Brandenburg who - and I will discuss this point
later - are said to attempt to employ their networks with the Turkish
political parties and/or government officials in order to strengthen their
political impact in Germany.
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus - PDS
The PDS is the successor party to the former GDR's Sozialistische
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED). Although a national party, the PDS is
very much a regional force in the .flve new Eastern Bundestsnaer and in
East Berlin. Its political programme is primarily directed at the social and
economic problems in the East that emerged during the process of
German unification. In a simplified manner members of the SED can be
divided into two groups: the vast majority are 0ld18 former SED people for
whom the PDS represents traditional socialist values in post-communist
times. In addition however, the PDS has attracted a small - but publicity
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effective - number of West-German and in particular West-Berlin left-wing
activists. For this group, the party represents a left alternative to the
GRUNEN who - as it is argued - have lost their progressive edge by
taking over government responsibility at the regional and, since
September of this year, also at the national level. From my point of view,
primarily owing to the membership of individuals who belong to West-
Germany's or West-Berlin's 'alternative-left scene' and/or of the few
members of ethnic minorities, questions concerning immigration,
integration and citizenship have been taken up by the party.
Currently, the PDS in Berlin has one AG International (international group)
at the local level in Kreuzberg with approximately 30 members, and on the
Uinder1evel with the same number of people. According to Giyassetten
Sayan, who since 1995 has been a PDS member of the
Abgeordnetenhaus, these groups' work within the party on 'virgin land'
when it comes to questions of integration and citizenship:
It really is like this: One does not really think a lot about the
problems of migrants. The PDS accepts the demands of
migrants straight away. No debate, nothing.... But if you
start talking about it, you will find a certain circle of people
who become interested. Those who like to learn.... [The
PDS] is inclined to accept everything that is articulated by
migrants. (Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5. 1997)
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Having - thus far - a 'card blanche' when it comes to immigration and
integration politics at the Lander- or the national level, is certainly an
attraction to any politician who agrees with the wider political principles of
the PDS. However whether this is a reflection of the party's tolerance and
inclusive dedication vis-a-vis ethnic minorities, or - for the time being - just
a side effect of its political priorities remains open. Certainly, Sayan
expresses "xenophobia" as a serious problem on both the PDS's
grassroots level as well as within the party's higher echelons. Regarding
the party's ability and willingness to deal with "xenophobic" attitudes,
Sayan is however optimistic. One reason for his optimism has to do with
experiences of exclusion that both East-Germans and ethnic minorities
encounter:
There is a certain similarity between the sense of East-
German nostalgia, East-German affectedness that is
negated or ignored by the West-Germans on the one hand
and migrants, who are culturally not accepted by this society,
on the other hand. Migrants and East-Germans are similarly
affected. (Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997)
Furthermore, he also sees the party's traditional focus on international
solidarity as a positive starting point for promoting both tolerance within
the party and adequate integration and immigration policies in the party
programme - with a focus on multiple citizenship and the introduction of
ius soli.
208
The question of 'International solidarity' played an important role in the
election of Giyassetten Sayan as a member of the Abgeordnetenhaus for
the PDS. A former Green party member for fourteen years, he won a
direct mandate in the East-Berlin constituency of Lichtenberg during the
(Land) parliament elections of 1995 with nearly 40 per cent of the vote.
During his involvement with the GRUNEN his political focus was on
internationalism, a topic to which he still remains committed. Like many
other Green party members, Sayan could not really acquire the taste for
the transformation process of the Green party that changed over time from
a grassroots movement to a party in opposition and finally into a party
with government responsibility. "It was this form of power-oriented politics,
that I did not like. The Green party has changed a lot while in opposition -
feminism, ecology - but not as a party that shares government
responsibility." (Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.S.199n
Regarding the PDS as a "real force of the opposition" Sayan decided -
like other former Greens - to make the SED's successor his new political
home. In the run-up to the election Sayan was tenth place on the PDS
Landesliste (nomination on the party list of candidates under the
proportional representation system) but was at the same time approached
at a party day by Lichtenberg's delegates who asked him to compete in
the election to become the PDS direct candidate in their ward. Beating
two other - ethnic German - comrades-in-arms, Sayan was elected as the
direct PDS candidate for this constituency in the second ballot.
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At first glance it may seem both surprising that a West-Berliner of Turkish
origin is asked by an East-Berlin local party section to stand as their direct
candidate, and furthermore, that he is able to win with a safe majority. A
closer look at Lichtenberg may help to explain this apparent contradiction.
Firstly, in various elections since 1990, the PDS has proven to be the
most popular party in this district, it is so to say a 'safe seat'. In the recent
national elections for example the PDS won the direct mandate in
Lichtenberg with 42 per cent of the vote. Secondly, Lichtenberg is a
district with a high proportion of residents belonging to the former GDR's
and East-Berlin's intelligentsia for whom the debate around 'international
solidarity' has traditionally been a central topic. According to Sayan, the
local PDS section was searching for a Betroffenen (a person affected) in
order to symbolise their commitment to international solidarity according
to the concept's traditional socialist meaning - rather than as an indication
of their solidarity and support of immigrants in Germany. Sayan designed
his election campaign accordingly: "The election campaign was difficult. I
have hardly mentioned issues of migration and integration. I primarily
discussed international problems: Israel, Palestine, East-European
countries, the Kurdish question, the Armenian question." (Interview with
Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5. 1997)
Sayan describes himself as a "politician concerned with migration politics"
rather than being "home-orlentated?" and does not see a contradiction
between this statement and his political concerns when it comes to
Kurdish questions. In particular Kurdish politics have become, from
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Sayan's point of view, a German political issue, not only at the level of
international relations and Germany's foreign policies but also "because a
part of the German population is now Kurdish and there is a link."
(Interview with Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997) During his parliamentary
term, Sayan has put various parliamentary questions to the
Abgeordnetenhaus concerning for example, attacks on Kurdish groups in
1995 that were carried out by the Grey Wolves, or more generally on
human rights abuses in Turkey.
An important part of his party work for Sayan lies in the recruitment of
more ethnic minority members for the Berlin PDS. However, he is
convinced that such recruitment cannot be successful merely on the basis
of a political programme. Against the background that parties have for
such a long time ignored and neglected politically interested or already
active minority members, for example, those who participate in migrant
organisations, the establishment of effective direct social networks is a
prerequisite to "bridge the cleft".
Well, those migrants, particularly the first generation, they
really have a totally different political culture and the
structure of political parties have not been adjusted to that.
So they do not attract these people ... For many years,
political parties excluded immigrant organisations. So they
attempted to establish self-defence organisations .... And
this clubbableness is wide spread. The organisations are
small oasis for migrants, and political parties are not willing
to approach them, not even in their programme '" You have
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to put your whole heart into it, you have to approach them
directly, you have to be there and you have to participate.
Otherwise you cannot organise these people. (Interview with
Giyassetten Sayan, 7.5.1997)
Sayan himself is actively involved in one of the Kurdish associations in
Berlin. From his point of view, Kurdish people who live in Berlin are in
many respects more integrated than their Turkish counterparts: "Yes,
there is racism and there are many other problems, but this is not as bad
as what is happening in Turkey. For this reason, the tendency of Kurds in
Germany to integrate is very, very strong." (Interview with Giyassetten
Sayan, 7.5.1997).
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - SPD
Although being traditionally the political home for some former migrants
from Turkey who became involved in SPD politics via their links with trade
unions, today the Social-Democrats still have very few ethnic minority
members, a marginal number of BVV members (since 1995 Ali Aydin in
Kreuzberg and Bilek Kolat in Schoneberg), no elected minority members
in the Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus, nor in the Bundestag. Part of the SPD's
problem may well be linked to its political stand against human rights
abuses in Turkey and its resulting negative image in the Turkish press."
However, in addition to an overall decrease in the numbers of party
members, the SPD clearly fails to attract Berliners of Turkish origin owing
to its disregard of integration policies as a central political issue.
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Kenan Kolat - Bilek Kolat's husband - who is both a member of the SPD
and who is at the same time involved in various immigrant organisations
that will be discussed later (such as the TBB) estimates that in Berlin
currently, no more than 500 party membersare of ethnic minority origin, of
these approximately twenty to thirty persons are actively involved
(Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4. 1997)
As is the case with other German parties, the SPD party programme does
not identify integration and immigration politics as a crucial political issue
and fails to attract the interest of Berliners of minority, or more specifically
of Turkish, origin on this topic. Eckhardt Barthel - who is the SPD's
auslanderpolitischer Sprecher (spokesman on 'foreigner policies') -
describes the - well known - 'populist dilemma' of Volksparteien (people's
parties) when it comes to the question of how to formulate a political
programme that could on the one hand attract the vote of potentially 1.4
million Germans of Turkish origin and not 'alienate' the 'ethnic German'
vote on the other:
When we achieved in 1987 the inclusion of the demand for a
local 'foreigners vote' into the Berlin party programme, and I
tell you we had to slog away for that, I remember clearly one
person, of whom I have always had a high opinion, told me:
'You know Eckhardt, you are right, and you also point out
that these people are politically close to the SPD' ... 'But', he
said, 'on the other hand you have to take a look at the
number of Germans who are not going to vote for us for this
particular reason. And who is the majority?' That was a
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typical argument. And he was not a malicious person, but his
considerations do still play a role. (Interview with Eckhardt
Barthel, 30.4.199n
Kenan Kolat emphasises this point, too. For example in 1997, the SPD
Berlin had drawn up a party paper on education policies. Here, apart from
a half sentence, no reference was made to the specific situation of
Berlin's ethnic minority pupils. For Kolat this reflects the attitude of the
SPD to render the interests of non-German Berliners to the periphery of
its political agenda. In order to give it a more central and prominent role,
Kolat and other SPD members, predominantly of Turkish origin, started in
summer 1997 the process of founding a formal SPD organisation with the
name Deutsch-Plus. Approximately 20 people were involved in its
foundation with the intention of establishing an SPD platform that allowed
a) the party's programme to be altered to include the specific interests of
ethnic minority members more centrally; and b) a change to the way SPD
candidates were (and still are) selected.
Regarding the specific interest of Berliners of ethnic minority origin, Kolat
and his colleagues' foremost demand concerns 'legal equality', i.e. the
introduction of changes in German citizenship laws, in particular the
introduction of ius soli and inclusive naturalisation policies. The question
of dual citizenship is - according to Kolat - no longer of primary concern
as the legal changes in Turkey guarantee extensive rights to naturalised
Germans of Turkish origin. Clearly, referring to experiences in the UK or
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the United States, citizenship can only be the first step to promote
'equality'. But - so Kolat believes - it would be fatal at this stage, when
legal equality has not been achieved, "to try to run before one can walk"
and to focus on issues such as anti-discrimination laws, quota systems,
etc. As long as German society does not accept both formally and
ideologically that
...compatriots of non-German origin are part of the society,
as long as for example educational problems of youth are
defined as a Turkish problem and not as a German problem,
as long as the state categorises everything as a foreigners'
problem, than it is just incredibly difficult to come up with,
and to implement, proper means to tackle [the situation],
simply for the fact that the problem is kept apart. (Interview
with Kenan Kolat, 25.4. 1991)
In addition, supporters of Deutsch-Plus are concerned with one crucial
aspect of the selection process of SPD candidates who wish to stand for
election at the Uindertevel - namely the absence of a Landesliste in
Berlin's SPD - that is a regional list of parliamentary candidates for
election to the Abgeordnetenhaus. Unlike for example, the procedure
adopted by the Green party, within the SPD structure each constituency
draws up its own list of candidates. This poses a serious obstacle for the
chances of ethnic minority members to become candidates for election to
the Abgeordnetenhaus. On the one hand they are only marginally
involved at the grass-roots level, and by definition ethnic German local
activists become elected. Even in the SPD Schoneberg, a local party
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group that appears to include most of the active SPD memberswho are of
Turkish origin (who are at the same time organised in the various
organisations of the TBB) only about ten per cent of active members come
from an ethnic minority background. On the other hand, there is clearly a
scepticism in local party groups as to whether it is tactically sensible to
nominate a non-German candidate, or they may just show outright
hostility. Some members of the SPD - such as people involved in
Deutsch-Plus or Eckhardt Barthel who is the 'spokesman on foreigner
politics' (auslanderpolitischer Sprecher) of the SPD in the Berlin
parliament - campaign vehemently for the introduction of an SPD-
Landesliste in Berlin.
The foundation of Deutsch-Plus and the group's attempt to become a
formal Arbeitsgemeinschaft (organisation) of the SPD in Berlin has
created quite a stir within the party. Some members in particular fear
fragmentation of the group of people within the party who have
campaigned for the integration of 'migration politics' as a central political
topic within the party's agenda. Eckhardt Barthel for example who tends to
oppose the idea of Deutsch-Plus, although he can see the reasons for its
establishment, is concerned that the establishment of a new minority
organisation within the party, will result in the "withering away" of those
already instituted groups where 'ethnic Germans' and minority members
work together.
216
Now we have this one platform, the FachausschuB [special
group working on migration politics], where Germans and
non-Germans work together. Certainly, its work can be
criticised.... And then we get Deutsch-Plus at the same time.
How shall that work? Already not many people come to the
FachausschuB, and I also see how few of the migrants, who
are [SPD] members, actually come to its meetings. If there is
going to be a migrants' group then all migrants will probably
go to their meetings - the Germans will be amongst
themselves, the migrants as well, how shall we work
together? (Interview with Eckhardt Barthel, 30.4.1997)
This however does not convince the supporters of Deutsch-Plus. The SPD
recognises the necessity for young people and women to organise in
specific subgroups, without defining such groups as a danger to the
effectiveness of the party's work. The same - from Kolat's point of view -
should apply for members of ethnic minorities.
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)
The Free Democratic Party has been a party in crisis for the past years
and has been struggling with the five per cent hurdle that is necessary to
become elected at the national and Lander1evel. Part of the FDP's crisis
resulted from the party's role in the national German government. As the
'weak' partner in the government coalition, it was unable and/or unwilling
(because it wanted to maintain the coalition government) to choose a
'confrontational' course with the CDU/CSU in order to remain firm in its
main political principles. One example for the FDP's determination to
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avoid a coalition crisis - or even a possible break in the coalition - took
place in April 1994 (shortly before elections to the German Bundestag). At
that time, the Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fur die Belange der
Auslander - this was until September 1998 Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, a
member of the FOP - intended to propose a parliamentary bill that aimed
at establishing firmly the ius soli for 'third generation' immigrants and the
official toleration of dual citizenship, demands that were (and still are)
strongly opposed by the COU/CSU. The FOP denied Schmalz-Jacobsen
bringing the bill to parliament. Furthermore, FOP parliamentarians voted
against a more or less identical bill that was put forward by the Bundesrat
in the 225th sitting of the German Parliament in April of that year.
Clearly, one problem for the party is that, although we have
a proper agenda, our faction in the Bundestag
[Bundestagsfraktion] does not push this through in the
government coalition. But anyway, none of us is so naive as
to assume that any government coalition in Germany might
collapse because of foreigners' policies. (Interview with
Mehmet OaimagOler, 29.5.1997)
Mehmet OaimagOler who is a lawyer and - like Ozcen Mutlu - a second
generation Berliner of Turkish origin set up in 1997 the Berlin group of the
Liberale TOrkisch Oeutsche Vereinigung (L TO - Liberal Turkish German
Union). The LTO has existed nationally since 1993 and consists of both
ethnic Germans and Germans of Turkish origin. Like lmmi-Grun the LTO
is not a formal FOP association but an organisation with definite and
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articulated Liberal leanings. It remains unclear how many members the
LTO has in general, but in Berlin the group consists of approximately 10
members (the Berlin FOP has according to Oaimaguler only 10 or 15
members who are of Turkish origin). The LTO is closely connected to the
party executive and counts several high-ranking FOP politicians as its
members, for example the former foreign secretary Klaus Kinkel and
Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen.
The reasons for founding the LTO group in Berlin are very similar to those
that led to the establishment of like organisations in other parties. It is
seen as a forum to attract Berliners of Turkish origin to the FOP, to
promote an exchange between them and ethnic Germans, and to
establish a more effective way of advancing questions concerning
integration within the wider party context." Political participation is from
Oaimaguler's point of view an urgent requirement for Berliners of Turkish
origin:
It is just fatal for immigrants if they don't participate in
politics. If they fail to articulate their own interests, who
would do it? Certainly not the majority population by itself....
We try to make it clear to them [immigrants] that they need to
take the initiative. But this implies at the same time the
criticism that - and we say this openly - they can't moan
about German politics if they are not willing to do something.
(Interview with Mehmet Oaimaguler, 29.5.1997)
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For the founder of the LTO Berlin, political work and the "engagement in
Turkish organisations is important" but he strongly emphasises that it is
even more essential to attract Berliners of Turkish origin to mainstream
party politics in order to avoid the emergence of "two societies that exist
side by side." In particular, current debates about the establishment of a
Turkish parliament in Berlin, which is amongst others proposed by some
COU members of Turkish origin, or the emergence of the Tiirkische
Oemokratie Partei (Turkish Democracy Party) in Frankfurt/Main are - from
his point of view - unfortunate developments with potentially disastrous
consequences for the welfare of a multi-ethnic society. Such
organisations would only reinforce the popular image of politically active
"Turks" in Germany as "Turkey's fifth column". In addition he regards such
enterprises in many respects as the "consummation of an ego-trip" that
are merely beneficial for the individual achievements and status of leading
activists. However, he does point out that for example, the representation
of the Turkish Democracy Party in the Turkish press is that of a serious
and significant player in German politics, when in reality ''they have less
influence in Bonn than the local train spotters' association." (Interview with
Oaimagiiler, 29.5.1997)
The LTO regards access to German citizenship as the first step towards
equality and has put it on the top of its agenda. "But", says Oaimagiiler, "it
can't stop there." In order to go beyond formal citizenship and implement
a legal framework that can bring about social equality, he proposes to
adopt the same principles that have guided the Bundesverfriebenengesetz
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(BVFG), the judicial apparatus for the integration of Vertriebene after the
Second World War. The BVFG, introduced in 1953, is an elaborate
blueprint that includes for example special services and assistance in
areas such as education and vocational training. For the members of the
Berliner L TO - who are predominantly students - it is exactly these areas
which are the 'domains a clef' for the future performance of Berliners of
Turkish origin.
Another important issue is the question of religious education and
freedom of worship. Oaimagu/er himself is not a religious person, but he
regards religion as an important part of cultural identity and strongly
opposes the differential treatment of different faiths in Germany.
We lawyers always say, why don't you have a look at the
law, it might help in solving a legal issue. For years, the
German government has shoved the constitution right under
the Muslims' nose and have told them: 'This is our system of
values and you have to follow it.' Now Muslims, and not only
fundamentalists, say: 'Fine, these are the rules, great, it says
freedom of worship and we will take advantage of it.' When
that happens, the same people who flaunted the constitution
in the first place start to differentiate ... All of a sudden
freedom of worship means freedom of Christian worship '"
But the word Christianity is never even mentioned in the
constitution. (Interview with Mehmet Oaimagu/er, 29.5.1997)
Although he would rather not have religious education in German schools
at all, he supports those proposals that demand the right to teach Islam to
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Berlin's' pupils. This includes - according to Oaimagil/er - the advantage
that Islam is not just taught in mosques where religious education can't be
controlled by the state, but also in schools, preferably by German Muslims
who have been trained in German universities.
Against the background that the L TO Berlin has just begun to operate in
1997, as a first step it attempts to become known and to establish a
certain profile. In this context, its current main focus lies in the
organisation of seminars and public debates. Here, they do co-operate on
selective issues in particular with lmmi-Grun but also intend to work with
other organisations, predominantly associations of Turkish professionals,
such as, the Turkish-German Lawyers Association, the Union of Doctors,
the Turkish Association of Entrepreneurs/Employers, or the Turkish
Association of Parents.
Once the FOP has attracted more members of Turkish origin, Oaimagil/er
emphasises the urgency that these members soon have to become
represented in various party committees, become delegates and election
candidates for local, Lander and national elections.
I have been to the last national party conference, there were
620 or 630 delegates and just one Turk amongst them. Well,
in the future, that is not on! You can't have a marvellous
political agenda and at the same time you don't elect the
people [Turks]. (Interview with Mehmet Oaimagil/er,
29.5.1997)
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For the FOP - being a small party - the 'ethnic vote' might be of more
crucial importance than for major 'Volksparteien' such as the COU and the
SPO, since a few thousand votes can be critical in pushing the party
beyond the five per cent hurdle. In this context, the FOP has been the
most active party vis-a-vis its advertising campaigns. During the last
elections the Free Democratic Party was the first German party that ran
three week advertisements in a number of Turkish newspapers - both
liberal and conservative. In addition, before the Bundestagselection they
started a poster campaign in Kreuzberg with FOP slogans in the Turkish
language.
Christlich Demokratische Union (CDl1J22
One assumes that the exclusive politics vis-a-vis citizenship and
integration that are represented by the COU do not make the party the
first choice for many Berliners of Turkish origin. Yet, Ozcen Mutlu who sits
in Kreuzberg's Bezirksverordnetenversammlung for the Green party
admits grudgingly that the COU in Kreuzberg has both more
members/activists and voters who are from an ethnic minority background
than his own party (Oer Tagesspiegel, 11.7.199n23
Berliners of Turkish origin might regard the Christian Democrats as an
agreeable political choice for four main reasons: a) the COU proposes
conservative moral politics (konservative Wertpolitik) with an emphasis on
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traditional family values (comparable with the Conservatives' 'Back to
Basics' agenda) and religion; b) furthermore, its economic policies are
regarded as favourable for small- and medium sized enterprises; c) in its
public statements it endorses restrictive policies that seek to curtail new
immigration and in particular, the arrival of asylum-seekers. Both are
popular proposals in the eyes of many Turkish Berliners who - like their
German counterparts - consider new immigration movements as a threat
to their economic well-being; d) finally, although the CDU has declared
itself against the possibility of Turkey becoming an EU Member State, in
particular, its silence on human rights abuses in Turkey, both against
Kurds, and/or political prisoners, as well as the ban of the PKK in
Germany which was implemented under the Kohl-government, have
gained the party in general, a more 'Turkey friendly' image than that of the
GRUNEN or the SPD.24
Some activists of immigrant organisations are (or have been and I will
explain my choice of the past tense shortly) CDU members. These include
amongst others the former president of the Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin
(Turkish Association of Berlin), Mustafa Cakmakog/u; the TBB committee
representative Emine Demirbiiken and the Milli Gonse activist Erdan
Taskiran. In 1996 Ertugru/ Uzun (CDli) founded the Deutsch Tiirkische
Union (DTU - German Turkish Union). Uzun was previously the first
secretary of the Europaische Vereinigung Tiirkischer Akademiker (EATA -
European Association of Turkish "Academics), an organisation that was
founded in 1992 with financial support from the government in Ankara.
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According to Riza Baran, the EATA seeks to lobby on behalf of Turkey by
offering seminars, organising visits to Turkey and by extending political
contacts between Germany and Turkey (Baran, without year). The DTU is
independent from the Christian Democratic Party, but it exclusively admits
CDU members and attempts to become a formal CDU association (which
would allow them to propose motions at party conferences)
The emergence of the DTU and its aspiration to become formally
acknowledged by the CDU is not undisputed. Some of the old-established
Turkish CDU activists - like 9akmakoglu for example - distance
themselves actively from Uzun by opposing a formal DTU inclusion within
the party framework. They also regard his initiative as a 'one-man-show'
with a single purpose, namely the advancement of his own interests and
career (Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.199n. Without
discussing it at this point, the 'trench warfare' between many political
groups or politically active individuals is often not so much about ideas or
ideologies but rather, or in addition, about competition for status and
influence.
According to Ertugrul Uzun, in 1"997the DTU had approximately 100
members in Berlin, of which 25 were 'ethnic German'. The DTU sees itself
as a 'bridging organisation' or a mediator who both lobbies for the CDU
amongst "Turks" in Berlin and who articulates "Turkish matters" within the
party. In addition, the organisation wishes to be a forum for close contacts
"between Turks and CDU officials." Questioned over what "Turkish
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matters" exactly includes, Uzun refers on the one hand to topics that
concern the situation of ethnic minorities in Germany, e.g. urgent changes
to Germany's ethnically defined citizenship policies, or the improvement of
the situation of young Berliners of Turkish origin in the area of education.
Uzun rejects proposals such as the introduction of quotas, and positive or
affirmative action. From his point of view ''Turks are confidenf' and not in
need of a special approach to advance their equal standing in German
society. He supports the idea of founding a "Berlin Parliament for Turks"
which - in the absence of any really representative umbrella organisation -
would allow "Turks to formulate common policy recommendations that
would be achieved in a democratic process." (Interview with Ertugrul
Uzun, 27.5. 1997)
On the other hand, Uzun highlights the necessity to both improve and
intensify German-Turkish bilateral relations and to further Turkey's
integration into the European Union. In this context the DTU organises
conferences and seminars "to promote a relevant and critical dialogue
and to set up networks that help to achieve this aim". In his opinion "so
called human rights abuses" must not serve as a justification to criticise
Turkey or to exclude the country from political and economic co-operation.
In addition to the few 'old-established' CDU members like Cakmakoglu, or
Uzun's new DTU (also Emine Demlrbuken of the TBB is a member of the
DTU), also members of the Milli Gorus intend to - or have already become
- formally involved with the Christian-Democrats. In the Autumn of 1996
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one case was picked up by the press, that of Erdan Taskiran who was
immediately excluded from the CD!) after his Milli G6riis affiliation became
publicly known. The CDU argued that the Milli G6riis is in principle an
anti-constitutional force and that his exclusion was a means to prevent an
'Islamic infiltration' of the party (see die tageszeitung 10.10.1996,
26. 10.1996)
SUMMARY
Berliners of Turkish origin have thus far been excluded from the German
concept of the people and hence from the macro-level of politics. As a
result, their political engagement in political parties - which they are not
allowed to elect and for whom they cannot run for office - is marginal as is
the parties' interest to become more inclusive regarding both content and
membership. Against the background of an increase in naturalisation
numbers and an assumed fundamental change in Germany's citizenship
legislation, the parties' disposition to fully exclude Berliners of Turkish
origin from their agenda may however change.
A very small number of Berliners ot Turkish origin have started to become
involved in party politics and thereby are seeking to break this cycle. In
many ways they intend to function as 'brokers' between the ethnic minority
population on the one hand and main stream political parties on the other.
For the time being, all politicians of Turkish origin are restrained to one
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particular political topic, namely the politics of immigration and integration,
or - as is the case for the PDS politician Ismail Kosan - international
solidarity. The reasons for being both 'pigeon-holed' in such a way and
their hesitant acceptance of this placement are twofold: within the parties'
structure they are not accepted as 'regular' but as 'exotic' components,
and as a result they are perceived as 'natural' representatives of
'particularistic' interests and assigned for respective tasks and positions.
At the same time the peripheral conceptualisation of questions concerning
ethnic relations and equality for German residents of minority origin has
clearly been an important motive for 'minority politicians' in becoming
party members. From their point of view an engagement in mainstream
parties is the most effective way to call for a more central place for these
topics in the German political system. In all parties their strategy for
achieving this aim has included the establishment of specific
organisations or working groups. It is at this point where we can identify
the first surpassing of traditional conceptualisations of national politics.
A second element of this process can be identified in the following: the
reasons for joining or for supporting a German political party do not stem
entirely from the parties' national agenda, but are at the same time
effected by the parties' attitudes towards politics in Turkel5 Here, I have
sought to illustrate that Berliners of Turkish origin do not shape their
political interests only in negotiation with, or as a result of, policies
concerning their country of settlement, but at the same time in direct
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response to the politics of the country they, or their parents and/or
grandparents have been born.
In this context I would like to summarise two further observations. First, it
is noticeable that all minority members of the Berlin parliament are of
Kurdish origin. Clearly, this is such a small number that any attempt to
generalise its significance would be misplaced. However, at the level of
speculation I would like to bring the subsequent comments up for
discussion: a higher interest by people of Kurdish origin or Alevis in
German mainstream politics might be conceivable for four reasons: a)
members of these groups display in general, a more 'integrationist'
perspective as their freedom in Germany is incomparable with that in
Turkey; b) the (stated) critical stance of some German parties vis-a-vis
Turkey's Human Rights abuses does not constitute a hurdle or an area of
conflict, but is an incentive to join a party like for example the Greens; c)
people of Kurdish origin or Alevis do not have an effective network within
the Turkish political establishment at their disposal which may further their
interests in Germany; d) people of this background have less interest in a
possible political career in Turkey (which some Turkish politicians
envisaqe).
Second, it appears that in particular, members of the second generation
seek to break with the tradition of forming separate migrant organisations.
Their interest in becoming members of German parties - from my point of
view - not only reflects their different perspectives towards Germany (and
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Turkey for that matter) but is at the same time an indicator of the
emergence of a new elite who have less networking capacity in Turkey
and less interest in 'home-oriented' politics.
Having so far discussed the political participation of Berliners of Turkish
origin in German political parties, I would now like to turn to those political
organisations outside the mainstream.
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ENDNOTES CHAPTER 7
Attempts in the 1990s to introduce the 'foreigners' vote' at the local level were
declared invalid by the German constitutional court (31.10.1990), arguing that the
German constitution does not allow an interpretation of the term 'the people' in a way
that includes 'non-Germans'.
2 EU citizens residing in Germany constitute a special case (twenty-five per cent
of Germany's and eleven per cent of Berlin's 'non-German' population are EU nationals),
as they have important direct and indirect ways of participating in the political process. A
central political right that they are denied is to participate in the national elections.
However, against the background of EU politics one might argue that this national vote
becomes increasingly insignificant. There are three reasons that can support such an
argument: First, the emerging EU citizenship guarantees EU citizens almost full citizens'
rights in all EU countries. Second, EU citizens are allowed to participate in the local and
European Parliament elections in Germany and can thus directly participate on specific
levels of the political process. Third, EU' citizens can indirectly influence the politics in
Germany by participating in the national elections of their country of origin: on the one
hand, the elected national government is actively involved in shaping EU politics that are
decisive for all EU-Member States; on the other hand, many political decisions that are
taken in one EU country have ceased to be exclusively relevant within its national
borders, but affect at the same time other EU countries.
3 'Auslander' were allowed in 1967 to become members of political parties. As
Tomas Hammar points out, parties could however reject the admission of 'foreigners' and
this decision was taken by the Bavarian CSU - the Christian Socialist Party (Hammar
1990a, p. 79>.
4 Non-Germans are in general however not allowed to form their own parties and
the activities of their associations are subject to strict controls. In addition, ethnic
minorities can vote and stand for election in universities and in the context of the
Workplace Labour Relations Acts (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) and the Co-determination
Act (MitbestimmungsgesetZ). They are eligible to vote in Sozialwahlen (elections in the
context of self-governmenUautonomy of social security agencies).
5 Clearly, the three reasons that have been mentioned here do not necessarily
exclude each other. As will be shown in the text, in most cases a number of reasons
apply at the same time and form the political interest of individuals and/or groups in party
politics.
6 Furthermore, as expressed by one young interviewee who was quoted in the last
chapter, the motive to join a political party might at the same be based upon the intention
to make a political career - a common and international feature amongst many of today's
politicians.
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7 Riza Baran, a directly elected parliamentarian for the Green party, describes the
common stereotype of a 'typical' Green politician amongst Kreuzbergers of Turkish
origin: "When I am walking around in Kreuzberg many of my compatriots tell me 'oh, you
know, you don't fit the Greens, you are different'. I don't know what their image of a
proper Greeny is, probably long hair and Birkenstock sandals." In addition, he
remembers that after his election victory in 1995 a few Kreuzbergers of Turkish origin
started to come to Green party meetings, but only once or twice as they were to some
extent "scared off by the intellectuals" (Interview, 30.4.1997).
8 The first Green local councillor of Turkish origin was elected in 1989. In 1992,
three Berliners of Turkish origin became Green local councillors.
9 Mutlu describes the discussion with the local administration as such: "We asked
them whether they think that it makes sense to hire all these interpreters and translators.
Isn't it more rational to fully employ people as officials in charge who speak at least two
languages? ... They behaved as if this was a really new idea. I mean, it doesn't take
much thinking to come to this conclusion, does it? Well, we then demanded to fill all
those training places that do not require the trainee to be a German citizen with non-
Germans." (interview with Oczan Mutlu, 4.6.1997) In 1997, 12 young Berliners of minority
origin had become trainees employed by the local administration in Kreuzberg.
10 Kadik6y is a district in Istanbul which was an intermediate stop for many rural
Turkish migrants who came to Germany in the 1960s.
11 This was a project of first-generation Turkish immigrants that disintegrated very
quickly due to insurmountable differences between its members, both regarding their
attitudes towards Turkish politics and individual career ambitions. "Well, it was a total
flop, because it was an ethnically based affair. Just Turks. It was run predominantly by
the first generation and consequently they had their eyes on some sort of a career. They
indulged in trench-war-fare and the whole matter was sentenced to death." (Interview
with Oczan Mutlu, 4.6.1997).
12 "Well, the good thing about Immi-GrOn is that its activists are members of the
second generation. Thus persons who have been born or brought up here and who have
encountered problems that are different from those of the first generation or of that
clique of academics that came at that time." (Interview with Ozcan Mutlu, 4.6.1997)
13 He continued: "Another area where it is possible to change and to achieve
something, is the media. It is pleasing [to see that] recently more and more young people
of the second generation are media people. So far predominantly in the print-media and
radio, but it won't take long and we will see them on TV as well." (Interview with Oczan
Mutlu,4.6.1997)
14 A 'media feast' was for example the intervention of the Turkish consul in Berlin
when conflicts occurred in the Tilrkische Gemeinde Berlin between secular Kemalists
and religious activists (see die tageszeitung and Hurriyet, 21.4.1997)
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15 Wahlkreis 3 is in the former Kreuzberg 36, and stretches from Schlesisches Tor,
G6rlitzer Bahnhof, Skalitzer StraBe to WassertorstraBe.
16 "I said, well we live here, we work here and the centre of our life is here, and for
this reason we need to have a critical look at this society. For our political orientation we
need to know what the political parties actually stand for, who supports us, who is against
us ... And most importantly, we have to be able to change, a change in our outlook.
Those who are unable to undergo this process, are also unable to change a society ...
And they [various Kurdish organisations] called me a betrayer. Well, I still work in
support of the Kurds, but differently. I don't want to be a boat that brings goods from
there to here, I live here and I want to contribute, participate here." (Interview with Riza
Baran, 30.4. 1997)
17 He too, would in principle prefer to work on a wider variety of political issues,
rather than being pigeonholed as the person responsible for 'migrant politics'. However,
he sees the necessity to focus his energies in this area as long as there is no parity as
regards content within the party's agenda.
18 Also in the actual sense of the word, as two thirds of the PDS members are older
than 60 years old (Der Spiegel 4111998, p. 46).
19 "You have to differentiate between [political] motives that are concerned with
migration politics and those that are home-orientated ... home-orientated politicians use
the parties for their Turkish interests, but politicians concerned with migration want to
improve the situation in the country they reside in." (Interview with Giyassetten Sayan,
7.5.1997)
20 In March 1997, the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet for example described the SPD
as 'Social Terrorists' rather than 'Social Democrats' (Hurriyet 4.3.1997). In general the
conservative Turkish press presents the SPD's (as well as the Green party's) 'Turkey-
politics' as evidence for their dislike of Turkey and thus of Turks in Germany.
21 "If I - just as a private individual - write a letter to the leader of the FDP and point
out those issues that need improvement, then that just doesn't have the same effect as if
I write as the leader [of the LTD] and possibly submit the letter to the press." (Interview
with Mehment Daimaguler, 29.5.1997)
22 Although not a formal prerequisite, the CDU in general expects their members to
be German citizens.
23 According to him, the CDU in Kreuzberg has approximately 100 members of
ethnic minority origin. The party has one BVVmember of ethnic origin, a person who was
born in Sri Lanka.
24 In addition to these factors, at the national level younger CDU politicians have
already been campaigning for a relaxation of citizenship laws and improved integration
policies. After the party lost the 1998 elections, a possible 'generational reshuffle' would
allow those younger Christian Democrats to take a more prominent role in shaping future
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CDU politics at the national level - provided that the party does not take the same path
chosen by the British Conservatives who turned even more to the right.
25 However, such an international or transnational interest is by no means a unique
feature for Berliners of Turkish origin but applies - although for a different set of reasons
- for many segments of the German society (take the examples of solidarity campaigns
for Nicaragua; or Middle East politics).
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CHAPTERS
TRANSCENDING NATIONAL POLITICS (II)
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF BERLINERS OF
TURKISH ORIGIN IN IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS
"In a few words, German politics is like an equation.
For now we aren't really part of this equation and
none of the political parties would want to damage the
balance for our sake. But ... we can get involved
anyway, can't we? Then their sums won't work out
any longer, ... and they will have to start calculating
from scratch." (Interview with V., male, 20,6.6.1997)
The right to vote and to stand in elections as well as membership in
political parties are the classical forms of political participation or
involvement. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, both forms are
currently either unavailable or rather restricted for most Berliners of
Turkish origin. Yet, the range of forms of political participation does not
stop at formal elections and party affiliation but includes a number of
further possible choices. The 'repertoire of political participation' has
changed significantly since the second half of the 1970s, in particular if we
look at more unconventional forms (Uehlinger 1988, p. 5). The 'new social
movements' that emerged at the end of the 1960s both supplemented and
challenged classical forms of political participation in two respects: first, as
regards their political focus, new social movements did not emerge against
the background of 'traditional' (Le. industrial) conflicts, but "sparked off due
to new conflicts concerning societal reproduction" (for example 'ecocide'
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and nuclear armament) (Brand 1985,p. 9). Second, they both sought, and
needed to, organise outside the established political system in
autonomous and self-determined small clusters (see Janicke 1979; Offe
1980).
Like the activists of new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s
members of ethnic minorities have created for themselves political
organisations that allow them to articulate political demands thus far
neglected by the existent political system. They are in many respects the
representatives of new emergent societal conflicts that stem from the
progressing transformation of modern societies into ethnically
heterogeneous systems. In the following chapter I will attempt to
demonstrate that, in their endeavour to articulate and to realise their
political demands, Berliners of Turkish origin adapt to, and/or - depending
on the point of view - make use of, already established 'institutional
channels' of political participation (see Ireland 1994)and add at the same
time new foci to Germany's political landscape that transcend national
boundaries. For the purpose of this analysis, I will first provide a brief
overview of central aspects concerning the emergence of organisations of
Berliners of Turkish origin. Second, I will describe the content and form of
the work of selected groups in Berlin, namely the TOrkische Gemeinde zu
Berlin (TGB), the TOrkische Bund Berlin Brandenburg (TBB), and the
TOrkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB).
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THE FORMATION OF ORGANISATIONS OF
BERLINERS OF TURKISH ORIGIN
The academic literature usually relates the process of self-organisation of
Berliners of Turkish origin to the three phases of the immigration process,
namely migration to Germany as contract-workers, family unification and
settlement (see Layton-Henry 1990a, Ozcan 1993). Changes in the
structure and work emphasis of immigrant organisations occurred
correspondingly: they transformed from 'situational' or private networks
and/or home-oriented political organisations into associations that a)
became - albeit not exclusively - concerned with issues related to the
political and socio-economic situation of immigrants in Germany and b)
started to articulate their interests and demands in an increasingly 'public'
manner.
Already during the first phase, in the 1960s until 1973, a number of
organisations can be identified in Berlin, both secular and religious.
Secular organisations consisted on the one hand of those that were
primarily concerned with the general welfare of newly arrived migrant
workers. One of these associations was for example the TOrkischer
Arbeiterverein in Berlin (TurkishWorkers' Association in Berlin), founded in
1964. Its main aim was to assist fellow 'guestworkers' in the process of
adjusting to the new conditions in Germany. It provided help in coping with
bureaucratic procedures or finding rental accommodation and organised
social events and get-togethers. On the other hand, a plethora of political
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groups emerged at that time in Berlin - founded by a small group of
Turkish students and intellectuals, as well as the first flow of political
refugees from Turkey - that were influenced by political and social events
taking place in their country of origin. According to Ozcen, at the beginning
of the 1970s "nearly the whole politlcal spectre of political parties and
orientations that existed in Turkey was represented via the foundation of
like-minded organisations in West-Berlin" (Ozcan 1993, p. 66, author's
translation) .
Looking at the formation of religious groups during this phase of
immigration, Blaschke points out that Islam developed in a rather
unorganised and diverse fashion in Germany. Most Muslims of Turkish
origin tended for example to practice their religion in their private flats or
rooms together with friends, and did not make use of the religious and
cultural activities offered the two existing mosques in Berlin (Blaschke
1984, p. 296). The first public expositions of Islamic life in Berlin only
started to take place at the beginning of the 1970s, when various Islamic
associations organised events at Islamic holidays. Against the background
that active Muslims were not allowed to form associations in Turkey that
openly depicted an Islamic orientation, organisations of Turkish Muslims
formed under "clandestine conditions" in Germany and avoided using the
word 'Islam'. Instead, they employed names such as 'Cultural and
Solidarity Associations' (Blaschke 1984,p. 299).
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Political divisions in Turkey continued to have a consequential impact
upon the organisations of Turkish immigrants in Germany throughout the
1970s. In particular various Islamic groups - with links to the National
Salvation Party (MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan, and the National Movement
(MHP) of Alparslan Tiirkes - collided fiercely and at times violently with
leftwing or liberal secular groups. However, as 'temporary guestworkers'
turned gradually into settled immigrants, in addition to home-orientated
politics the function and activities of Turkish associations became
continuously more related to the settlement process. Take for example the
agenda of the first social-democratic organisation of 'Turkish' immigrants,
the Verein links von der Mitte in der Tiirkei (Association Left of Centre in
Turkey). This association was founded in 1973 and was renamed in 1975
as the Progressive Volkseinheit der Tiirkei in Berlin (HDB - Progressive
Turkish People's Union in Berlin). The HDB officially pursued two aims: on
the one hand it sought to actively support social democratic movements
and parties in Turkey and on the other "it aimed at representing at least a
segment of the Turkish population in Berlin and their demands vis-A-vis
social and political equality in Germany." (Ozcan 1993, p. 68, author's
translation). Clearly, regarding the former point, substantial overlaps
existed between the various organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin.
Yet, the deep clefts stemming from political divisions in Turkey spoiled any
opportunity of co-operation on this issue.
This situation changed to some degree with the beginning of the 1980s.
During this decade three developments are of importance: first, we can
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identify the emergence of both professional organisations (e.g. the
'Society of Turkish Doctors' or the 'Association of Turkish
Businesspersons') and self-help initiatives such as the 'Turkish Parents'
Association' or the 'Association of Turkish Pensioners'. Second, attempts
were made to form a Turkish immigrant umbrella organisation. This step
was seen as a crucial instrument to unite the divided political landscape
under a new political agenda, namely the German politics of immigration.
But yet again, this aim was only partially achieved as differences in
orientations concerning Turkish politics led to the foundation of three
umbrella organisations, the Initiativkreis Gleichberechtigung 'Integration'
(IGI - Initiative Equality 'Integration') in 1980 and three years later, in
1983, the TOrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB - Turkish Community of
Berlin) and the TOrkischer Bund fOr Gleichberechtigung in Berlin (West)
(BIT - Turkish Union for Equality in Berlin (West)). Initially, the TGB
enjoyed the support of a rather broad basis, including conservative-liberal
associations as well as some religious and social democratic groups. This
consensus lasted for about three years and came to an end with the
withdrawal of some key organisations1 Today, as I will describe below, the
TGB represents the conservative end of the political spectrum, both
regarding Turkish and German political parties. The Turkish Union for
Equality in Berlin (West), by comparison, was from its beginnings a social-
democratic organisation. It stopped its work in 1990 and was replaced one
year later by the Bund der Einwanderlnnen aus der TOrkei Berlin-
Brandenburg, later renamed TOrkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg (TBB,
see below).
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A third development that should have an important impact upon the
formation of organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin was - as has
already indicated in chapter 5 - the restructuring of welfare policies in
Berlin during the 1980s. In this context money for self-organised projects
and social work was directly channelled to organisations of Berliners of
Turkish origin. Today, there is a plethora of cultural, political religious and
social organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin. The documentation
material provided by the Berliner Institut fOr Vergleichende
Sozia/forschung lists more than one hundred associations, spanning from
self-help initiatives providing assistance for persons with Aids, to
psychotherapeutic advise centres, women's and girls' groups, youth
initiatives, Kurdish and Alevi cultural and political organisations, sport
clubs, student associations, Turkish theatre groups, professional
associations etc.2 In the following I will outline the work of two
organisations that are central for the Berlin context, the Turkish
Community of Berlin, the Turkish Union of Berlin Brandenburg. In addition,
one further group, linked to the TBB, is included which seeks to meet the
needs and interests of one particular group, namely the Turkish Women's
Association Berlin.3
Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB - Turkish Community of Berlin)
The Turkish Community of Berlin has existed, as pointed out above, since
1983. From having been initially an umbrella organisation for a relatively
wide range of organisations of Berliners of Turkish origin, it represents
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today both secular groups with a predominantly conservative political
orientation, and Islamic organisations that can be associated with the
'religious establishment' in Turkey, Le. officially tolerated and state
controlled Islamic institutions (see Bruinessen 1984).
In summer 1997, the TGB consisted of more then 20 associations,
including amongst others cultural groups and sport associations, Islamic
groups, employers' organisations and social initiatives. It receives financial
support for specific purposes from Barbara John's office, in addition
contributions are made by its member organisations towards running costs
and the management of public campaigns. Nine persons represent its
committee, the organisation's decision-making institution. The committee
is elected by a council of representatives, and each member organisation
- regardless of its seize - is allowed to send two of its members to the
council. In its organisational rules the TGB emphasises four principles to
be adhered to by its members, namely loyalty to the German constitution,
non-violence, political independence,and laicism.
According to Mustafa Cakmakoglu, the TGB's secretary in summer 1997,
the organisation is strictly opposed to the use of the term 'foreigner' when
referring to the 'Turkish' population in Germany. Also terms such as
immigrants or migrants (lmmigranten, Einwanderer, Zuwanderet) are "old-
fashioned" and "unsuitable" as they do not capture the social reality of
'Turks' in Germany. As an alternative, the TGB promotes the application of
the term 'national minority'. This, in Cakmakoglu's opinion, describes
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adequately both the national - as opposed to an ethnic - background of
'Turks' residing in Germany and it establishes the 'Turkish' minority as a
distinct and permanent national minority in Germany. (Interview with
Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.1997) Thus far, only Danes and Sorben hold
the status of constituting national minorities in Germany."
Regarding the formal citizenship legislation, the TGB demands the
introduction of an element of ius soli and the official toleration of dual
citizenship. The latter point however is - according to Cakmakoglu - no
longer of crucial necessity as Turkey guarantees important rights to
naturalised Germans of Turkish origin. Since the beginning of the 1990s,
when new citizenship legislation was introduced in Germany, the TGB
strongly advises Berliners of Turkish origin to apply for naturalisation.
Cakmakoglu estimates that currently 40,000 applications for naturalisation
are being processed by local administrations (the district's registry offices)
and is convinced that ''the slow processing of applications is nothing but a
political manipulation. They want to delay [naturalisation] as long as
possible." (Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.1997).
An amendment of citizenship legislation is not the only interest of the
TOrkische Gemeinde in Berlin regarding the German/Berlin situation. The
organisation also demands the official recognition of Islam as one of the
main religions practised in Germany, and the introduction of Islamic
education in Berlin's schools. In this context, the TGB, in co-operation with
one of its members, 0.1.T.IB. e.V. Berlin5 has articulated its interest in
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becoming the single organisation responsible for providing Islamic school
education (see chapter 5).
The TOrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin has both initiated and supported a
number of important campaigns that focus on the situation of people of
Turkish origin both in Germany, and more specifically in Berlin. In this
context the TGB appealed to its members to support demonstrations
against racist violence and right-wing extremism in the aftermath of arson
attacks in Molin and Solingen in 1992 and 1993. Every year, the Turkish
Community of Berlin awards a prize to politicians who "promote a peaceful
co-existence with foreigners" (Mustafa Cakmakoglu, die tageszeitung,
8. 1.1993)So far Barbara John; Heiner GeiBler (CDU); the Turkish consul
in Bonn, Onur Oymen; the former national Auslanderbeauftragte,
Lieselotte Funcke; and the former Minister for Justice (later for Foreign
affairs), Klaus Kinkel, have received this award. The TGB co-operates with
the police in Berlin on two subjects. First, in its endeavour to tackle
existent racism within the police, the organisation demands the
establishment of the post of a 'commissioner for foreigners' within the
police force. The TGB supports police efforts to teach its staff Turkish, to
establish personal contacts between the police force and Berliners of
Turkish origin and to run seminars on 'multi-cultural affairs' (die
tageszeitung 4.4.1996). Second, the TOrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin co-
organises informative events together with Berlin's pollee for young people
of Turkish origin. With the help of such events the police hopes to increase
the number of young persons of Turkish origin in the police force. In 1994,
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350 of Berlin's police officers (out of a total of 21.000) were of ethnic
minority origin (die tageszeitung, 6. 10.1994)
Activities of the TOrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin are however not exclusively
directed towards, and developed in response to, German politics. They are
at the same time shaped by, and concerned with, political developments in
Turkey. For instance, the TGB emphasises that vigorous action is needed
to tackle "Kurdish terrorism" in Germany. The organisation accused
members of the PKK of having carried out a series of attacks against
Turkish institutions in Berlin in 1993-5 and demanded swift action on the
side of the police and policy makers. It called for both the banning of the
PKK and the extradition of known "PKK terrorists" to Turkey (die
tageszeitung, 26.6.1993, 6.11.1993, 31.3.1995). Furthermore, the TGB
perceives itself as a mediator, or in Cakmakoglu's words, as a "bridge"
between Germany and Turkey, both in terms of international relations and
regarding the 'transstate' interests of Berliners of Turkish origin. In co-
operation with the Turkish consulate in Berlin, the TGB offers seminars
and other informative events on Turkish politics. In addition, in summer
1997 the TGB founded the Forderkreis der tilrkischen Gemeinde
(Association for the support of the Turkish Community) with approximately
1,700 individual members. This support association intends to offer certain
services, for example cheap flights to Turkey or legal advice on matters
arising in Turkey to the 'Turkish' population in Berlin. All members shall be
issued with a membership card. This card - so Cakmakoglu - will "help to
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create a sense of belonging for our members, who live in two worlds."
(Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu, 24.4.1997).
In Germany, the TGB has established political links with the Christian
Democratic Party - Mustafa Cakmakoglu is a long-standing CDU member
(see also Blaschke 1984) - and seeks to convince Berliners of Turkish
origin to become active in German mainstream parties. "We have to
become organised in parties, too. Otherwise we will end up in a political
cul-de-sac." (Interview with Mustafa Cakmakoglu 24.4.1997)
Links do also exist with Turkey's military and/or political establishment and
became particularly apparent in 1997. At the time when I carried out the
main part of my field research in Germany, the TOrkische Gemeinde zu
Berlin was caught up in a major power struggle that potentially threatened
the future of the organisation. The crisis was (officially) triggered by the
question whether the TGB should be open towards the possibility of a
renewed membership of the Milli GorOs. Cakmakoglu and his supporters
vehemently rejected this idea, whereas an outspoken critic of
Cakmakoglu, Sabri Abrak, and members of 0.1.T.I.B. argued that, in order
to control the ''fundamentalist radicalism" of the Milli Gorus it would seem
necessary to incorporate this organisation. The question of whether this
conflict was really brought about by opposed views concerning questions
principle, or was simply (as some observers have argued) concerned with
internal power struggles, shall not be discussed at this point. Of more
interest is the intervention of both the Turkish consulate in Berlin, as well
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as members of the Turkish 'National Security Council" in Ankara. In
Spring 1997, the National Security Council sent two officials to Berlin in
order to appease the two conflicting parties. Observers argue that the
military establishment undertook this step, because it wanted to
strengthen the laicistically-orientated TGB at a time when Turkey's former
Prime Minister Erbakan had planned to establish the Milli GorDs as the
main Turkish-Islamic organisation abroad (see die tageszeitung
24.2.1997,21.4.1997).
Tiirkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg (TBB - Turkish Union in Berlin-
Brandenburg)
The Turkish Union in Berlin Brandenburg is an umbrella organisation for a
wide variety of associations of Berliners of Turkish origin, ranging from a
trade co-operative, an Alevi cultural centre, to a football club. In total, 22
associations were members of the TBB in 1997.7 The TDrkische Bund
Berlin Brandenburg was founded in December 19918 its beginnings
however go back to the 1980s.At that time, a group of approximately thirty
individuals, consisting of 'Turkish' trade unionists and social democrats,
came together in order to edit a booklet summarising their point of view
vis-a-vis the integration of former Turkish guestworkers and their offspring
in Germany. The motivation for this was on the one hand the belief that a
community of immigrants should focus in their political activities and
demands primarily on the country of settlement and not on the political
situation of the country of origin. "Now, we live in Germany and we don't
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go back. Hence, we have to deal with the situation in Germany." (Interview
with Kenan Kolat, secretary of the TBB, 25.4.1997). On the other hand, it
was an appeal to building an alliance of various Turkish organisations that
were divided along political conflicts and party hostilities in Turkey.
Against the background of political experiences gained in the 1980s, the
'golden rule' of the TBB is that no public statements are made on matters
regarding Turkish politics. The TBB's committee consists of nine members
who are elected by an assembly to which each organisation elects four of
their own members as representatives. In addition, for every eight
representatives of the member organisations, another two trade unionists
and one individual member of the TBB join the assembly. In 1997, the
assembly consisted of approximately 120 delegates. The TBB appeals to
its member organisation to be represented by equal numbers of men and
women, currently 30 per cent of the delegates are female.
Regarding its finances, the Tiirkische Gemeinde Berlin Brandenburg
receives 100,000 DM annually from Barbara John's office. This money is
used for financing the post of the secretary (Kenan Kolat), a part-time post
for support staff as well as overheads. The TBB has received another
60,000 DM from the European Union for the setting up of an 'anti-
discrimination office'. As all members of ethnic minorities who experience
discrimination shall be supported by this office, and not only Berliners of
Turkish origin, the TBB co-operates on this project closely with other
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immigrant organisations, such as the Association of Iranian Refugees and
the Polish Social Council (TBB Annual Report 1996).
On a daily basis, the TOrkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg offers advice
and mediation in family conflicts, or conflicts that occur at the work place
and in schools, and arranges for further counselling. Furthermore, it
undertakes public relations work reporting incidents of discrimination and
racist violence and offers educative seminars on the situation of ethnic
minorities in Germany. In 1996, the TBB published a bilingual guidebook
containing organisations that offer advice in areas such as health,
education, legal issues etc.
The main political demand articulated by the TBB is concerned with a
change of citizenship legislation in Germany. "Political and legal equality is
the prerequisite for a peaceful living together in Germany." (Interview with
Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997). In this context, the TBB demands are in principle
congruent with the latest proposals as formulated by the new German
government (see chapter one). Against the background of changes in
Turkish law, the question of dual citizenship is no longer seen as crucially
important. However, as a matter of principle an official toleration of dual
citizenship is regarded as a positive step, as it would signify a recognition
of existent multiple loyalties and interest of Berlin's 'Turkish' population
(Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997). The TBB published an advice
leaflet that advertises the benefits of formal German citizenship in 1996
(see die tageszeitung, 10.12.1996).
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Discussions that are articulated in the British or the US American context,
and that highlight the disadvantaged position of ethnic minority members
regardless of their formal citizenship are, according to Kolat not yet
relevant for Germany.
First of all we have to get to the same starting point. When
the legal conditions have changed and when we live in a new
political context, then can we see what further steps have to
be undertaken. (Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997).
In addition to demands that are concerned with a change of German
citizenship legislation, the TBB calls for equal treatment for Islam in
Germany. However, Kolat points out that religious education should be
offered on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, it should not only represent the
Sunni version of Islam but should also incorporate religious beliefs of
Shiites and Alevis. The TBB (standing in a social democratic, Kemalist
tradition) regards religious education as the responsibility of the state, and
rejects its teaching under the control of Islamic organisations (or churches
for that matter).
The recognition of diversity in a situation of legal and political equality is a
central theme for all member organisations of the Turkish Union of Berlin-
Brandenburg. "Integration", means according to Kolat ''to accept people on
their own terms". However, the recognition of diversity should not end with
the tolerance of cultural or religious practices. Recognition means, above
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all, that any disadvantage experienced by minority members is seen as a
disadvantage for the whole of society.
Only when the German political establishment realises, that
an educational problem of young 'Turks' is not a problem of
the Turkish community but one of German society as a
whole, then we have tolerance and recognition. A
categorisation of such problemsas 'problems of foreigners' is
opposed to the principle of integration. It makes the
disadvantage the problem of one group. (Interview with
Kenan Kolat, 25.4. 1997)
The TBB rejects the idea of groups rights. Although this is currently not -
as has been pointed out before - an important issue, Kolat stresses the
point that the organisation is concerned about the rights of the individual.
At this point, he emphasises that the TBB does not claim to be the
representative of the 'Turkish community' in Berlin. "We can only speak for
individuals, and we solely demand the improvement of the situation of
individuals." (Interview with Kenan Kolat, 25.4.1997).
Activities that are supported and/or organised by the TOrkischer Bund
Berlin-Brandenburg are numerous. It seeks for example to advance a
dialogue between Turkish and German. intellectuals, the Forum fOr
Verstandigung (Forum for Mutual Understanding). The motive that let to
the organisation of a series of seminars is twofold. On the one hand it is -
as Kolat points out - transparent that German intelligentsia is only
marginally interested in issues that are of concern for members of ethnic
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minorities. On the other, intellectuals can be important mediators between
ethnic minorities and the political establishment. In the past, the TBB has
supported Kreuzberg's mayor Strieder in his letter campaign to promote
naturalisation (see chapter 5). The organisation has - like the TGB _
supported demonstrations against racist violence in 1992-1994. However,
the TBB went one step further and organised, in co-operation with one of
its members - the TOrkischer Hotel- und Gaststiittenverband, a one-hour
strike, or rather closing, of Turkish businesses at the 11.6.1993 (see die
tageszeitung 9.6.1993; 11.6.1993).
Having close social-democratic leanings itself, the TOrkischer Bund Berlin-
Brandenburg promotes strongly that Berliners of Turkish origin join political
parties. One of the organisation's committee members, Emine
DemirbOrken, is a member of the CDU and Uzun's DVU (see chapter 7).
The political exclusion of 'Turkish' residents in Germany has, in Kolat's
view, contributed to the fact that religious fundamentalist, Turkish
nationalist and Kurdish groups enjoy significant support.
If people don't have the right to vote, or if they are not
allowed to participate effectively and actively in the political
decision-making process, then, it should not come as a
surprise that in some cases political interests are still
orientated towards Turkey (Interview with Kenan Kolat ,
25.4.1997)
In addition to the organisation's German political networks, the TBB is a
member of EU Migrants' Forum. Furthermore, it collaborates with the
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Turkish consulate in Berlin in organising events such as seminars and
panel discussions on matters regarding immigration and ethnic relations.
Tiirkischer Frauenverein in Berlin (BTKB - Turkish Women's
Association Berlin)
The BTKB was the first autonomous association of 'Turkish' women in
Berlin. It was founded at the 8th of March 1975. Its founding members - a
group of about 55 women - had already been active in the socialist
Progressive Women's Movement in Turkey, with which they maintained
strong links. The motive for setting up this women's organisation was
twofold: it was seen as a means to raise support and to collect money
amongst fellow immigrants for supporting campaigns on women and family
issues in Turkey (e.g. campaign for the introduction of child allowance,
TDrkischer Frauenverein Berlin e.V. 1991). Furthermore, the BTKB's
mostly middle class founding members declared as their immediate aim
the fight against illiteracy amongst 'Turkish' women in Berlin.
According to Aysin Inan from the BTKB, the organisation started to
undergo major changes with the beginning of the 1980s: "The women felt
more settled here and became more confident. And, of course, in addition
there was the money from the Senate." (Interview with Aysin Inan,
12.5.1997). In a short time, the Turkish Women's Association was in a
position to offer a wider programme, including German classes,
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typewriting, mother and child group, girls' group, sewing classes and
needlework, assistance with school homework.
At the beginning, the organisation offered what I would call
'consumer orientated social-work'. That was basically what
all other social initiatives did at that time. They took the
women by the hand and showed them what to do '" In the
course of the 1980s this has changed. Again, it was not only
us, but the whole approach to social work has changed. Our
idea then was to offer help for promoting self-help. Important
social knowledge, knowledge you need on an every-day
level. (Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997)
Furthermore, the STKS's organisational and personal links with women's
groups in Turkey became weaker during this period. Inan notes three
explanations for this development:
As I said, with regard to politics many things have changed,
and currently we actually focus only on the German aspects.
That started definitely by the end of the 1980s. More and
more of us, the second generation, became [BTKB]
committee members. ... We were simply a little more
confident and at ease with the situation here and it was clear
to us, that we will remain living here. So we wanted to work
on issues that concern us here .... After the military coup [in
1981] the active women of the first generation became
furthermore increasingly afraid to work on Turkish issues ...
And then there was the pressure from the Senat. 'You only
get money for social work'. Well, we did that anyway, but the
Senat started to control it much more strictly (Interview with
Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997).
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Today, the BTKB consists of approximately thirty women activists, most of
whom have been born in Berlin, and are in their early thirties. In total, the
organisation has about 150 members, some of whom have returned to
Turkey, others no longer live in Berlin but in different cities in Germany or
elsewhere. Men in general are not allowed to become members of the
BTKB. This however does not deter men from accompanying their wives,
female relatives, or friends to the premises of the Turkish Women's
Association. In addition, the group does -on rare occasions - offer
informative, or social events for members of both sexes.
The focus of BTKB's work lies in providing social and educational services
but "sometimes we do classical political work" (Interview with Aysin Inan,
12.5.1997) - such as participating in 8th of March demonstrations,
supporting signature collections for dual citizenship, or joining public
protests against the introduction of residence permits for 'Turkish' children
(see chapter 5). In summer 1997, however, almost all political energies
were taken up by the fight to secure future funding from the Berlin Senet"
Confronted with the sword of Damocles of closing down all activities (the
. rent for premises, the payment for teachers, and some minor overhead
costs had been covered by the Berlin Sena~, not only the group's activists
but also its clients initiated a letter campaign and organised press
conferences for the survival of BTKB's work.
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According to Inan the group's conception as to what constitutes political
work has not only shifted as regards to its links with Turkey, but on a more
general level:
What does political work mean? For me, the fact that our
women have started to fight for our survival, that they
developed ideas for this, that is our real political work. They
know what they want and they are able to actively fight for it.
... But, we were never able to make this clear to the older
women, the activists of that time [1975]. They want us to give
lectures on the 8th of March on Clara Zetkin, but we do know
about the history of the International Women's Day. We
might as well just celebrate it. ... Their activities when they
started this group were all important and right. But, to cope
with the situation here [in Berlin], and to fight our corner, that
is the political work of today. (Interview with Aysin Inan,
12.5.1997)
The women who attend classes and events organised by the BTKB are
from a diverse ethnic or religious background and include Kurds, Alevis,
Sunnis, and Turks. And at times conflicts have arisen amongst the
women. Inan tried to illustrate this point at two concrete examples: First,
during Erbakan's premiership some women hung up the picture of Kemal
AtatOrk in the office of the BTKB. "Not only our founding members had
tears in their eyes, thinking of their old Luxemburg portraits. There were
also Kurdish women who felt terribly offended. The second generation was
somewhat split. We quickly got rid of it." (Interview with Aysin Inan,
12.5.1997) A further incident occurred during the sewing classes.
According to Inan, 'non-political' sewing classes become quite regularly
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battle fields for secular versus religious arguments. Should women be
allowed to sew headscarves? Should it be tolerated that they show Islamic
attire during the annual fashion show? The BTKB does not exclude veiled
Islamic women as a matter of principle but "we do point out to them that
we emphasise different aspects in the life of Turkish women" (Interview
with Aysin 'nan, 12.5.1997). Regardless of any 'official' line however, other
participants have succeeded in the past ''to freeze out" on one occasion a
woman who started to distribute Milli Gorils material, and articulate their
criticism against any manifestation of sunnite Islam in an open and ardent
way. "Especially the Alevi women, they sometimes have an incredibly
sharp tongue." (Interview with Aysin 'nan, 12.5.1997).
The Tilrkischer Frauenverein in Berlin is the TBB's only women's
organisation. 'nan states that the umbrella organisation provides useful
and crucial backing that assists the survival of the BTKB. According to her,
in particular the rather well-established links between the TBB and the
SPD have been important in securing the organisations' funding provided
by the Berlin Senate. "I really don't know whether our letter writing would
have been enough." (Interview with Aysin Inan, 12.5.1997). Further links -
on a personal level - exist with on German party, namely the PDS as 'nan
is a party member.
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SUMMARY
Political interests or affinities regarding Turkish politics, the exclusion of
Berliners of Turkish origin from classical forms of political participation, and
the ignorance of mainstream political parties vis-a-vis ethnic minority
interests has resulted into the establishment of a plethora of immigrant
organisations in Berlin. As settlement took place, initial concerns with
Turkish politics were widened and the situation of Berliners of Turkish
origin in their country of residence gradually became the main focus. In the
course of this transformation process, the organisations of Berliners of
Turkish employed existing, unconventional, forms of political participation,
such as a) the founding of umbrella organisations that aim at establishing
alliances of groups with diverse political orientations under a unifying
agenda, in order to influence the political decision-making process more
effectively; b) the establishment of professional association, or c) self-help
initiatives. Their work was further influenced by the restructuring of welfare
policies in Berlin during the 1980s, that resulted into the financing of social
initiatives.
Today, immigrant organisations such as the TGB and the TBB seek to
influence political debates increasingly not in isolation, but rather in
engaging with state institutions and political parties. Many of their activists
are party members themselves, and they promote this form of involvement
amongst their supporters. The establishment of networks with the political
mainstream is regarded as a prerequisite for protecting and advancing the
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interests of Berliners of Turkish origin. The main focus of their work lies in
their demand for legal and political equality, for the recognition of diversity,
as well as in providing services that are of immediate help for their
clientele and that have been neglected by German institutions.
In addition to their work vis-a-vis Germany it has been argued, using the
example of the TOrkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, that activities remained
partly shaped by, and concerned with, political developments in Turkey
and/or German-Turkish relations. Furthermore, links exist between the
Turkish political establishment and immigrant organisations in Berlin.
Potentially, such links could be employed to articulate the interests of
Berliners of Turkish origin on an inter-governmental level. However both
the interest in Turkish affairs as well as links with Turkish institutions
appear to be of less concern to members of the second generation.
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ENDNOTES CHAPTER 8
These were the Moscheenvereine (mosque associations) of the Milli G6riis, the
'Association of Turkish Businesspersons'; and the 'Turkish Association for Science ,
Culture and Social work' (Ozcan 1993, p. 71).
2 Due to problems related to a continuous update of information and the gathering
of information in the first place, this documentation does not list all existent organisations
of Berliners of Turkish origin. For example the numerous small mosque associations are
not included in the BIVS documentation.
3 I had intended to include sub-groups of all three umbrella organisations. This was
however not possible, as at the time when I carried out interviews in Germany, the
members of the TGB were involved in a power struggle that upset both the structure and
orientation of the Turkish Community of Berlin fundamentally. As pointed out in endnote
1, access to organisations of the IGMG proved to be difficult for a different set of reasons.
4 Approximately 50,000 Sorben, who speak a distinct language, live in a particular
area of the former GDR close to Berlin (Spreewald, here especially the cities Bautzen
and Cottbus). Both the former GDR and the Federal Republic recognise(d) the Sorben as
a minority with specific language and cultural rights (Art. 40 of the former GDR's
constitution). The same status is granted to the Danish minority residing in Schleswig-
Holstein (Kieler Erklarung 26.9.1949; Bonner Grundsatzerklarungen, 29.3.1955).
5 0.1.T.I.B. e.V. Berlin was founded in 1982. It is an umbrella organisation for those
Islamic groups that represent an officially promoted and controlled Islamic orientation in
Turkey (for an excellent discussion on the relation between state and Islam in Turkey,
see Bruinessen 1984).
6 The 'National Security Council' is a constitutionally established institution with the
purpose of securing the influence of Turkey's military establishment in the political affairs
of the country.
7 These organisations were: 1. Akarsu (Gesundheit, Bewegung und
Berufsvorbereitung fOr lmrnlqrierte Frauen e.V.); 2. AI-Birlik; 3. Bahadin-Der; 4. Bund der
Psychosozialen Fachkrafte; 5. Hilfs- und Solidaritatsverein fur Rentner, Behinderte und
Senioren; 6. Halkevi Kultur e.V.; 7. Kulturzentrum Anatolischer Alewiten; 8. KSF
Umutspor; 9. SC Umutspor; 10. SG Anadoluspor MG; 11. Agrisport; 12. TOrkenzentrum;
13. TOrkische und Deutsche Kaufleute; 14. TOrkischer Frauenverein in Berlin; 15.
TOrkischer Hotel- und Gaststattenverband; 16. TOrkischer Verein fur Wissenschaft, Kultur
und Sozialarbeit; 17. TOrkisches Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum Berlin; 18.
Interkulturelles Zentrum; 19. Verein der turkischen Reiseagenturen Berlin; 20.
Kulturverein Schwarzmeer; 21. Turkisches Folklorezentrum; 22. F.C. G6ztepe.
B From 1991 until 1994 the organisation was named Bund der Berliner
Einwanderlnnen aus der Turkel Berlin-Brandenburg (BETB - Union of Berlin Immigrants
from Turkey Berlin-Brandenburg).
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9 The TOrkischer Frauenverein in Berlin does not receive its funding from the Berlin
Aus/anderbeauftragte but from the Department for Women's Affairs, which, like Barbara
John's office has been object to significant financial cuts in recent years ..
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
The claim for "citizenship for everyone, and everyone the same qua
citizenship" (Young 1989)within a national territory, stands at the heart of
the liberal ideal of universal citizenship and represents a main principle
upon which modern democracies are based. Until recently, the politics of
citizenship in Germany was an example of an outright violation of this
principle. Yet, despite, or in my view because of, being an extreme case,
the German politics of citizenship illustrates forcefully the deficiencies of a
nationally bound concept of citizenship.
The German case study shows that countries of immigration cannot take
the claim that citizenship is for everyone for granted. The population of
contemporary Germany does not consist exclusively of formal citizens, but
also of 'resident aliens'. For them the concept of citizenship does not
present itself as a means to achieve equality, but very often as an
obstacle on their way to achieve full inclusion. On the one hand their
access to rights, most importantly to cruclal political rights, is restricted, or
altogether absent. On the other, the lack of formal citizen status for 'non-
German' immigrants and their offspring reinforces ideas of 'otherness' in
contrast to 'belonging'. It thus perpetuates an ethnically exclusive
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definition of 'who constitutes the people' and adds to the repression of an
ethnically heterogeneous reality.
The German citizenship legislation was crucially amended between 1990
and 1993, when the former conservative government introduced, for the
first time, the right to naturalisation for two groups of 'foreigners'. However,
a cynic may want to question the former conservative government's
rational that led to this 'change of heart'. Despite governmental claims to
the contrary, it was not based upon a genuine desire to bring about legal
and political equality, nor was it intended as a first step to officially accept
that Germany had become a country of immigration. Rather it was part of
a well-known horse trade between the conservative-liberal government
coalition and the Social Democratic Party in the context of discussions to
curtail the right of political asylum inscribed in the German constitution (the
Bonner AsylkompromiB of December 1992). In order to change Art. 16(2)
of the constitution the government needed a two-third majority in the
Bundestag and thus the votes of the opposition. The SPD agreed, but
demanded in return that citizenship legislation should be amended in a
more inclusive way. In my view, the government did not expect that a
significant number of members of ethnic minorities, in particular those of
Turkish origin, would actually make use of their new rights as it required
the applicant to give up her or his previous citizenship.
Initially, this 'plan' - that was more likely a result of political 'adhocracy'
rather than a well thought-out strategy - seemed to work out. The
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response from persons of minority origin was at first indifferent and
interest in German citizenship remained low. Furthermore, the demand for
dual citizenship continued to be at the top of the agenda of many
immigrant organisations. This however has gradually changed and dual
citizenship appears to be no longer of crucial importance. Just in Berlin -
a city that has always been characterised by a more inclusive approach to
granting citizenship - approximately 45,000 applications for naturalisation
were waiting to be processed by the responsible authorities in 1995 (die
tageszeitung, 2.2.1996). I have argued that this change of attitude
amongst Berliners of Turkish origin was brought about by a number of
factors. First, the Turkish government introduced important legislation that
guarantees naturalised Germans of Turkish origin the possibility to retain
crucial rights in Turkey, and opting for German citizenship no longer goes
hand in hand with a legally disadvantaged situation in Turkey. Second,
most Berliners of Turkish origin hold dual citizenship either officially, or
unofficially due to legal loopholes. Third, as a result of their exclusion from
German society, it was considered an act of betrayal to seek to acquire
German citizenship. In this context, for some young Berliners of Turkish
origin, the giving up of the Turkish passport was regarded as an act of
subordination. The 'symbolic distance' - Le. the undesirability of German
citizenship - could only be overcome in the moment when the acquisition
of citizenship became redefined as a strategy for improving individual life
chances. Fourth, the long established 'legal normality' that citizenship was
practically unavailable had to be eroded over time. This process was
supported by various campaigns initiated by Barbara John's office. Yet, for
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German citizenship to become a common everyday accoutrement for
Berliners of Turkish origin, a 'critical mass' of applicants is needed, who as
neighbours, friends, relatives or colleagues demonstrate and
communicate the availability and the benefits of formal citizenship and
who thus initiate a breakthrough and start a process by which it is normal
for German citizenship to be acquired.
However, the restrictive nature of German citizenship legislation is not the
only manifestation of the exclusion experienced by Berliners of Turkish
origin. The principle of the primacy of the nation, as sustained by the
German political establishment, affects also other dimensions of
citizenship and has resulted in the disregard of people of Turkish origin in
the design of social, economic and cultural policies. In this context, the
urban situation of Berlin and especially one of its districts Kreuzberg, plays
an important role. We have seen that Kreuzberg, with a minority
population of over thirty per cent, of whom more than half are Berliners of
Turkish origin, is caught in a vicious circle consisting of high long term
unemployment, the erosion of the local tax base, cuts in financing social
facilities (such as youth centres, kindergartens etc.), decline in school
standards, loss of the middle class population and an influx of
disadvantaged, low skilled new immigrants. The district is in urgent need
of substantial financial support to improve the educational and
employment opportunities of its population as well as to provide targeted
social services. Yet, despite the aggravation of Kreuzberg's overall socio-
economic situation, even the already small budget for financing various
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self-help organisations (of which a high proportion are run by ethnic
minority members) that have thus far provided important services, has
been cut substantially over the past few years. But without the opportunity
of one third of Kreuzberg's population to express their dissatisfaction at
the ballot box, so far such negligent treatment is not likely to have adverse
consequences for policy makers.
Furthermore, an analysis of the educational abyss as experienced by
young Berliners of Turkish origin, makes transparent their disadvantaged
access to one of the main areas determining the level of social equality
and access to substantial citizenship in modern, knowledge based
societies. The main reason for their educational underperformance can be
identified in the monocultural orientation of German and Berliner
education policies. This manifests itself in a) school curricula that consider
proposals for 'inter'- or 'multi-cultural' education merely as additional or
specific tools, but that are - if put to use at all -not seen as approaches
that should be applied as a matter of course; b) the disregard of potential
bi- or multi-lingual abilities of ethnic minority pupils as valuable assets; c) a
lack of additional support for young Berliners of Turkish origin that are in
many cases not fully literate in either German or the language of their
parents; d) in staff that consists predominantly of ethnic German teachers.
Policies regarding education fall under the sovereignty of the
Bundes/iinder, in this case Berlin. Therefore, the Berlin government could
theoretically introduce comprehensive regulations and policies that more
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adequately meet the needs of young Berliners of Turkish origin. However,
both their gross underperformance and a look at the few measures
introduced by the Berlin government - e.g. three primary school models
that make children of Turkish origin literate in both German and Turkish,
and the German-Turkish Europaschule - have demonstrated that the
Berlin government, like its national counterpart, in general adheres to the
dictum of repressing the fact of immigration and of ignoring important
policies that address the disadvantagedstanding of ethnic minorities.
However there are exceptions of this generalisation. In the case of Berlin
there are also existing manifestations of approved multi-culturalism which
are both numerous and publicly extremely visible. This makes the term
'exception' rather imperfect. Good examples of such institutions are the
Berlin Carnival, the Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Radio Multikuln and many
more. On the official level, the best known institution that seeks to
represent and to promote multi-culturalism in Berlin, is the office of the
city's Auslanderbeauftragte, Barbara John. Her main role is that of
mediator between the government on the one hand and ethnic minority
groups on the other. She has a small budget through which the office
supports self-help initiatives, and finances the development of measures
against racism and its rather well known public-relations work. Steve
Vertovec called the latter poignantly "space-changingmulti-culturalism that
has sought to change the space between peoples' ears - their
fundamental thoughts about social categories and processes affecting
their city" (Vertovec 1996, p. 391).
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The committed and effective work of the Berliner Aus/anderbeauftragte
regarding integration, is powerfully undermined and contradicted by
Berlin's current government. Apart from hostile public statements made by
the Berlin Minister for the Interior, the official general approach adopted by
the Berlin government becomes apparent when we look at some 'hard'
governmental choices, i.e. the provision of financial means and resources
for the implementation of Barbara John's working agenda, or, at the
conflict of teaching Islamic education in Berlin's schools. When confronted
with a conflict that challenges established national tenets, the lack of a
commitment to multi-culturalism becomes indisputable. The governmental
position of repressing the city's diversity is particularly damaging as the
German capital Berlin has perhaps a greater symbolic presence in the
'nation's' self-image than that of other cities. This thought is certainly
shared by J6rg Sch6nbohm (Berlin's Minister for the Interior) who wants
Berlin "to reassure a nation that is in search of itself".
I have argued that the legal status of a citizen has to be accompanied by
measures that both respond to disadvantage, and that seek to
accommodate diversity. The repression of both realities inevitably results
in an outcome that is characteristic for the situation in Great Britain and in
the USA - namely that not everyone will be the same qua citizenship but
some will remain "more equal than others".
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The tensions that arise in ethnically heterogeneous countries between
citizenship's link to membership in a national community and its claim that
equality of status is a guarantor of equality of opportunity leads us to the
question of agency. Or more precisely to the inquiry as to how Berliners of
Turkish origin contribute to the transformation of citizenship in their pursuit
of seeking to establish themselves as equal members of society. In this
context, it is important to discuss the shortcomings of modern citizenship
not only with regard to their exclusionary outcome, but to identify them as
motor for possible changes in the concept of citizenship.
The interviews with young Berliners of Turkish origin have illustrated that
these young people think of citizenship primarily in an instrumental way.
They regard the acquisition of formal citizenship as particularly beneficial
in areas of employment, freedom of movement in the EU, and as a
welcome respite from bureaucratic procedures that only apply to so called
foreigners. Furthermore, many are also keen to finally obtain the right to
participate in political decisions in their home-country - Germany. On the
basis of these illustrative and insightful interviews I argue, that in their
individual strategies, these young people carry out and induce a
transformation of citizenship, that has become - on an abstract level - a
major objective of academic debates around citizenship, namely the
disengagement or disentanglement of citizenship and national identity. On
the one hand young Berliners of Turkish origin regard citizenship as a
means to gain access to rights and to improve their life chances in
Berlin/Germany or even Europe. By doing so they construct citizenship in
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a way that corresponds with the concept's basic meaning, i.e. as an
emancipatory tool. Expressions of identity are not blended with formal
citizenship. For them the colour of their passport is not and cannot be an
expression of their identity. Their multiple links, needs and identifications
cross national boundaries and can by definition not be encapsulated by a
printed document that establishes a formal link between an individual and
one state.
Beyond the level of individual strategies, Berliners of Turkish origin also
contribute to the transformation of citizenship through their participation in
main stream political parties and immigrant organisations, and through the
incorporation of minority interests into the parties' agenda. With the
increase of applications for naturalisation in Berlin, political parties across
the political divide have begun to turn their attention to this group of
potentially new voters. The parties' tentative attempts to 'court' minorities
have not remained unrequited and an increasing - albeit still small _
number of people of Turkish origin have joined and have become elected
to political offices. Thus far three members of the Berlin
Abgeordnetenhaus are naturalised Kurdish Berliners. The reasons for
Berliners of Turkish origin to become members of political parties include:
a) most importantly, the membership and active involvement in a political
party is regarded as an effective way to demand changes for, and to
improve the situation of, ethnic minorities in Germany; b) some regard
party involvement as a way to advocate in favour for, or in opposition of,
political affairs and conflicts in Turkey; c) finally, in particular for members
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of the second generation, the interpretation of their party membership
within a mono-political framework that comprehends political activities of
Berliners of Turkish origin exclusively on the basis of ethnic or national
affiliation is inadequate. Like for any member of the majority population,
party politics are at the same time an expression of a broader and more
general political agenda and preferences.
Yet, for the time being, party members of Turkish origin - regardless of
the fact to which party they belong - are 'pigeon-holed' as being
responsible for 'matters conceming ethnic minorities'. This reflects the
marginal role that both the topic and its assigned 'representatives' occupy
in German politics in general. In their endeavour to push the interests and
needs of ethnic minorities onto the parties' agenda, specific organisations
or immigrant working group were established in all parties. Main areas of
their concern include first and foremost the demand for changes in
German citizenship law; the introduction of Islamic education at Berlin's
schools; in the case of the SPD, changes in the selection process of
candidates that currently disadvantages 'non-German' comrades; and
provision of adequate services on the local level.
However, the political activity of Berliners of Turkish origin in political
parties is not exclusively influenced by 'German affairs'. Riza Baran for
example, a former Kurdish activist, encountered serious problems
concerning his candidacy in the run up to the elections to the
Abgeordnetenhaus in 1997. He was the only candidate of Turkish origin
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banned from appearing on the Turkish satellite channel TDt, and was
after the election depicted as "Turkey's enemy" in the Berlin parliament. In
addition, in particular the desire to function "as a bridge between Germany
and Turkey", or the protest against human rights abuses in Turkey and the
Kurdish question, have illustrated that Berliners of Turkish origin who are
members of political parties, do not shape their political interests only in
negotiation with, or as a result of, policies concerning their country of
settlement. They also respond to the politics of the country they, or their
parents have been born. In this context however, the second generation
seem to be strong advocates for leaving behind Turkish political ties.
The analysis of political participation of Berliners in immigrant
organisations, at the example of the Tiirkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, the
Tiirkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg and the Tiirkischer Frauenverein zu
Berlin has shown similar findings. Political interests or affinities regarding
Turkish politics, the exclusion of Berliners of Turkish origin from classical
forms of political participation, and the ignorance of mainstream political
parties vis-a-vis ethnic minority interests, has resulted in the establishment
of a plethora of immigrant organisations in Berlin. Currently these are in
total 800-1000 of which at least 150 are those of Berliners of Turkish
origin. Analogous to the settlement process they became increasingly -
albeit not exclusively - concerned with the situation in Berlin/Germany.
Today, key members of many immigrant organisations are at the same
time members of political parties and promote a party affiliation amongst
their supporters. I have argued that immigrant organisations are part of
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the new social movements that emerged as alternative and
unconventional forms of political participation at the end of the 1960s.
They are representatives of new emergent societal conflicts that stem
from the progressing transformation of modern societies into ethnically
heterogeneous systems. According to the way citizens' participation is
traditionally defined - Le. as an activity that transcends particularity and is
directed at the common good of society - their interests and activities, like
those of their party-counterparts, are not regarded as 'citizens'
participation'. Most politically involved Berliners of Turkish origin have
become naturalised to maximise their political opportunities. However,
their 'particularistic politics' which reflects their position in society, is used
to define their activities as those of incompetent 'citizens'. This
perpetuates the exclusion of minorities, because it defines their claims as
irrelevant for the wider community.
Clearly, it is insufficient to interpret the emergence of immigrant
organisations, or the interest and activities of Berliners of Turkish origin
merely as symptoms of a crisis or of contemporary conflicts. Rather, they
have to be analysed at the same time in their role of bringing about
change and inducing societal transformation processes. It is in this context
that I argue that in their political activities, for example by bringing in new
foci and networks that transcend the concern and the geographical
boundaries of national politics, Berliners of Turkish origin induce a
transformation of citizenship.
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At the end, I would like to return to Ruth Lister's question that was posed
at the beginning of this thesis: "how useful is a concept associated with
the nation-state at a time when the nation-state is becoming less pivotal
economically and politically and when migration and asylum-seeking are
on the increase?" This thesis has been concerned with the latter part of
her question and has sought to show, that by bringing together three main
dimensions of citizenship - status, rights and participation - the concepts
retains both its political and analytical value. The modern concept of
citizenship was formulated for a society far less complex and more 'self-
contained' than those of today. This means that the promises of
citizenship cannot be kept, as it no longer corresponds to its national
enclosure. However, citizenship is not a static concept. Just as citizenship
in the past could be modified to incorporate diverse segments of society
especially as it transcended city boundaries some five hundred years ago,
it can now be modified yet again to respond to the struggles for equality
that will arise in the future on multiple levels of politics that are emerging.
In this context, a conception of citizenship that stresses the 'engagement'
of citizens rather than their 'belonging' becomes a prerequisite. Citizenship
is 'par excellence' a contested concept and because of this it has the
flexibility, to adapt to the dramatic changes taking place in the global
village that world is becoming.
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ANNEX I
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
1. Interviewswith young Berlinersof Turkish origin
(26 Interviews in total, 14 with young men, 12 with young women)
Meeting with teachers and the headmaster of a Berlin Gesamtschule
Interview with F., male, (nearly) 18 years old
Meeting with both girls and social-workers of a Madchenladen in Berlin-
Kreuzberg
Interview with Z. male, 20 years old
Interview with S., female, 24 years old
Interview with A., female, 15 years old
Interview with N., female, 15 years old
Interview with M., female 16 years old
Interview with Y., female, 16 years old
28.5.1997 Meeting with teachers and the headmaster of a Berlin Realschule
29.5.1997 Interview with 0., female, 16 years old
23.4.1997
9.5.1997
14.5.1997
23.5.1997
26.5.1997
27.5.1997
2.6.
3.6.1997
4.6.1997
6.6.1997
Interview with M., female 16 years old
Interview with B., female, 16 years old
Interview with U., male, 16 years old
Interview with T., male, 16 years old
Meeting with teachers and the headmaster of a Berlin Hauptschule
Interview with F., female, 17 years old
Interview with M., female, 16 years old
Interview with J., female, 17·years old
Interview with S., male, 17 years old
Interview with D., male, 26 years old
Interview with E., female 15 years old
Interview with D., male, 17 years old
Interview with E., male, 15 years old
Interview with D., male, 16 years old
Interview with B., male, 22 years old
Interview with S., male, 18 years old
Interview with M., male, 18 years old
Interview with U., male, 20 years old
Interview with M., male, 19 years old
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2. Interviews with Berliners of Turkish origin who are active
members of German political parties and trade unions
28.4.1997
29.4.1997
30.4.1997
7.5.1997
12.5.1997
27.5.1997
29.5.1997
4.6.1997
Interview with Ismail Kosan (DIE GRONEN)
Interview with Safter Cinar (peutseher Gewerksehaftsbund - DGB)
Interview with Riza Baran (DIE GRONEN)
Interview with Giyasetten Sayan (PDS)
Interview with Fanem Kieft (GEW)
Interview with Ertugrul Uzun (CDU)
Interview with Mehmet DaimagOler (FOP)
Interview with ozcan Mutlu (DIE GRONEN)
3. Interviews with Berliners of Turkish origin who are active in
'Immigrant Organisations'
25.4.1997 Interview with Kenan Kolat (TBB)
Interview with Mustafa Cakmokoglu (TOrkisehe Gemeinde zu Berlin)
29.4.1997 Interview with Nurudun KOtOk(BTBTM)
12.5.1997 Interview with Aysin Inan (TOrkiseher Frauenverein in Berlin)
22.5.1997 Interview with Mr Hassan (KOMKAR)
2.6.1997 Interview with Mr Turhan ((Kulturzentrum Anatoliseher Alewiten)
8.6.1997 Meeting with Mr OztOrk (Verein Vergessene Jugend e.V.)
15.5.1998 Interview with Mr Kizilkaya (Milli GorOs)
8.6.1998 Interview with Mr OztOrk (Verein Vergessene Jugend e.V.)
4. Interviews with members/employees of social initiatives
28.4.1997 Hinbun
6.5.1997 TIO (Hatiee)
Interview with Helga Seyb (Antirassistisehe Initiative Berlin)
26.5.1997 Interview with Niruman Kurt (Familiengarten)
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s. Interviews with Employees/Officials of the offices of the
Aus/anderbeauftragten on the national, regional and local level
29.4.1997 Meeting with Robin Schneider (BOro der Auslanderbeauftragten Berlin)
Meeting with Gerhard Simoneit (BOro der Auslanderbeauftragten Berlin
13.5.1997 Interview with GOlestan GOrbay (BOro der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung
fOr Austandertraqen) (a further meeting took place at the 6.6.1997)
Interview with Ms Josten (Auslanderbeauttraqte Kreuzberg)
6. Miscellaneous
Meeting with Jochen Blaschke (BIVS) (further meetings took place at the
22.4.128.5,/4.6.1997)
Meeting with Ahmed Esoz (BIVS)
Interview with Eckhardt Bartel (SPD)
Interview with G., female, of Turkish origin.
Interview with Eberhard Seidel-Pielen (author and journalist)
26.5.1997 Interview with M., female, of Turkish origin.
28.5.1997 Interview with Ceyhon Kara Oournalist)
16.4.1997
23.4.1997
30.4.1997
21.5.1997
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